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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This study was undertaken to establish whether the legal phenomenon 
known as a contract exist in indigenous legal systems and in particular, 
among the Swazi. As the underlying aims and consequences of indigenous 
contracts differ not only between indigenous peoples but is also affected by 
the degree of westernisation that has taken place, a micro study has been 
done in semi-rural areas in the Kingdom of Swaziland to establish if the 
existing value systems are altered or replaced when western legal institutions 
are introduced. 
 
Data was obtained by way of interviewing a panel of experts and compared 
with available literature. Through the process of gathering information, the 
legal principles were described and the functioning of social processes 
noted.   
 
Different indigenous contracts and general principles were identified. It 
must, however, be noted that a contract is more than a device for 
establishing the economic and legal implications of a transaction. Most 
contractual disputes are resolved outside the courts through negotiated 
settlements to restore harmony in the community. Although the Swazi law of 
contract is showing clear signs of adapting to new developments, there is 
proof that established legal principles and Swazi values are being retained.  
 
This study will not only be useful as a source of information for both Swazi 
courts and administration, but could also serve as a basis for codification 
 v
intended by the Swazi Government.  For that purpose, a memorandum has 
been compiled for consideration by the Swazi authorities. 
 
The compatibility of Swazi law and custom with a Bill of Rights was also 
evaluated and suggestions were made for possible law reform in the 
Kingdom of Swaziland. 
 
 
 
Key terms: 
 
Bill of Rights; dispute settlements; holistic approach; harmonization, 
unification and integration; indigenous contract; indigenous 
marriage; legal reform; legal values; living law; recording and 
codification; Swazi law and custom. 
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Chapter 1 
 
ORIENTATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This research was a direct result of a number of Swazi Government 
initiatives which had as their main objective, striving for good governance 
and achieving sustainable development in the Kingdom of Swaziland. 
 
A recommendation articulated as a priority objective by the Political Review 
Commission established in 1992, was to investigate and consider ways in 
which customary institutions and processes could, or should, be 
accommodated in the political system of Swaziland in view of their 
important constitutional and social role in terms of Swazi law and custom. 
 
One of the central concerns raised by the people of Swaziland relates to the 
constraints impacting on the interface between the traditional and modern 
systems of governance.  In this regard, the recording of Swazi law and 
custom and its integration into modern law became one of the major 
initiatives necessary to realise the transformation needed for the achievement 
of good governance. 
 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Although Swazi law and custom has been recorded (cf Whelpton 2005), 
only certain aspects of the Swazi law of contract have been attended to. The 
12 
 
Government of Swaziland now intends to codify Swazi law and custom and 
harmonise it with the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland.  This study was therefore undertaken in order to give a proper 
exposition of the Swazi law of contract and to make suggestions for the legal 
reform envisaged in the Kingdom of Swaziland. 
 
If law is an indispensable ingredient of organised society, it should be 
obvious that Swazi law and custom, too, stands to contribute to the future 
development of the Kingdom of Swaziland.  The future of Swazi law and 
custom is important in the sense that a substantial part of it is still living law.  
The continued application thereof is also expressly guaranteed in the new 
Constitution (Sec. 252(2)). 
 
It is therefore important that the living law and judicial values of the Swazi 
people should be taken into account in the legal development of Swaziland. 
Many legal values and principles are reflected in the Swazi law of contract 
among the Swazi, as this is more than an instrument for participating in the 
economic and legal life of the community. The researcher conducted a micro 
study in semi-rural areas in the Kingdom of Swaziland (see map) to establish 
what these legal values and principles are and whether they are being 
retained in the changing economic and social environment of Swaziland. 
 
A large portion of African customary law has been recorded or codified.  
These recordings and codifications have been criticised in that they have 
intended to restate or codify traditional law rather than the living law of the 
people, and have created the impression that African customary law consists 
of immutable rules.  Critics have, however, overlooked the fact that 
13 
 
customary law also consists of processes, and is quite capable of adapting to 
changing socio-economic circumstances (Dlamini 1990:84).  Furthermore, a 
written exposition of those indigenous legal systems which are in accord 
with jurisprudence increase the status of indigenous law and promote 
certainty and consistency in its application and enforcement. 
 
While the continued application of Swazi law and custom has been 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Swaziland, it will, as has been the case in 
the past, continue to undergo constant change.  There is sufficient evidence 
that Swazi law and custom has the capacity to adapt to economic, social and 
environmental changes.  Yet this adaptation should be in harmony with its 
underlying postulates and should not be initiated by a Bill of Rights (cf 
Whelpton 1997:145-151). 
 
The legal reform envisaged in the Kingdom of Swaziland may include 
unification, integration and modernisation as experienced by other African 
countries.  This should be done, however, with due regard to the values, 
norms, ideals and realities of the Swazi people which this study intends to 
emphasise (cf Spalding 1970:117). 
 
Finally, this research of the Swazi law of contract, containing trusted and 
cherished Swazi values, envisages not only enhancing the standing of Swazi 
law and custom, but also promoting certainty and consistency in upholding 
the laws of the Swazi nation. 
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1.3 LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND 
 
Legal pluralism is generally found in countries of the Third World and also 
in quite a number of developed countries elsewhere on the globe (cf Prinsloo 
1990:325).  It often stems from the heterogeneous composition of the 
population of countries.  Legal pluralism is also found in the Kingdom of 
Swaziland where both Roman Dutch Law, as the adopted colonial common 
law, and Swazi law and custom are officially recognised.  Swazi law and 
custom apply predominantly to Swazi people and common law to Swazi 
citizens, including people of non-Swazi origin. The system of legal 
segregation furthermore resulted in a dual court system – Swazi law and 
custom may be applied only in Swazi courts and common law in 
magistrates’ courts and the High Court. Since both these legal systems 
consist of rules that regulate relations between public authorities and Swazi 
subjects on the one hand, and the mutual relations between these subjects on 
the other, there is an urgent need for harmonisation, reconciliation and 
ultimately even unification of these two legal systems (cf Bennett 2004:74). 
 
Unification of the different legal systems of a country is usually a gradual 
process to ensure legal certainty regarding the application of relevant legal 
values and rules, and is usually characterised by three phases, namely 
harmonisation, integration and unification (cf Prinsloo 1990:427).  The 
unification of Swazi common law and Swazi law and custom by replacing 
them with a uniform legal system is currently not envisaged by the law-
makers.  It should be kept in mind that greater legal certainty by means of 
unification in a country cannot be achieved without the assent and co-
operation of the communities involved.  Moreover, the connection between a 
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legal system, the economy and other aspects of culture of a society should 
always be taken into account in the process of legal reform.  A legal system 
that is too advanced and does not bear reference to the economic and social 
order and other spheres of life of a society is as ineffective as one that has 
become obsolete (cf Prinsloo 1990:329).  A new reformed legal system 
containing values and rules that are foreign to the existing and living law 
will lead to legal uncertainty and will not be observed.  The following 
examples can be mentioned in this regard: 
 
• long after the acceptance of the Ethiopian Civil Code, the indigenous 
communities still adopt children in terms of the repealed indigenous law; 
• in the cities of Nigeria the indigenous population give precedence to the 
unofficial tribunals for the speedy, simple and effective solution of their 
problems; and 
• in certain indigenous communities of Ghana the administration of justice 
is still managed by traditional institutions, despite having been abolished 
by the central authority of the country (cf Prinsloo 1990:330). 
 
In terms of the new Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland, the common 
law and Swazi law and custom are recognised and the aim is to integrate 
indigenous Swazi law and custom into a modern legal framework.  This will, 
inter alia, entail the reconciliation of indigenous Swazi values and rules with 
human rights values such as equality, human dignity, non-sexism and non-
racialism contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Swaziland. 
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Such harmonisation involves the elimination of conflict and reconciliation of 
conflicting elements between the rules and their effect on the different legal 
systems while each is still in force as a separate legal system (cf Prinsloo 
1990:325).  An example of harmonisation and reconciliation is to regard 
both the indigenous marriage and the common law marriage as valid 
institutions in the Kingdom of Swaziland with due recognition of, and 
protection for, women and children.  Law reform in the Kingdom of 
Swaziland should therefore take proper account not only of the provisions 
contained in the Bill of Rights but also of indigenous Swazi values, customs 
and legal rules.   
 
1.4 PREMISES, PRINCIPLES AND PARAMETERS OF THE 
RESEARCH 
 
Following the abovementioned rationale and theoretical orientation, the 
premises below are identified and listed and were taken into account as 
points of departure in the research of the Swazi law of contract, and 
secondly, to provide guidelines for the development and transformation of 
Swazi law and custom and which should facilitate its possible integration, 
harmonisation and reconciliation with the universal principles of the 
Constitution. 
 
1.4.1 The universal principles of the Swaziland Constitution are non-
negotiable  
 
In terms of section 14(2) of the Constitution, fundamental rights are 
applicable to all legislation in force – thus also to Swazi law and custom – 
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and no fundamental right will be infringed by an obligation in common law 
or Swazi law and custom.  Swazi law and custom is therefore now subject 
specifically to the provisions of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution.  This 
implies that the principles and conditions of Swazi law and custom may be 
challenged by the guarantees of human rights such as equality and non-
discrimination (Whelpton, n.d.; Grant 2006:23).  In fact, in terms of section 
268(1) of the Constitution, the existing law, after the promulgation of the 
Constitution, “shall as far as possible be construed with such modifications, 
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it 
into conformity with this Constitution.” 
 
1.4.2 Swazi law and custom is protected in the Constitution   
 
Most of the Swazi traditional institutions which were entrenched in the then 
existing Constitution when Swaziland became independent in 1968, have 
also been guaranteed and protected by the new Constitution (see section 
227(1) of the Constitution) e.g. The king (ngwenyama); the queen mother 
(ndlovukazi); the princes of the realm (lingunga); the advisory council 
(liqoqo); the Swazi national council (sibaya); chiefs (tikhulu); senior prince 
(umntfwanenkhosi lomkhula); royal governors (tinduna) (Whelpton, n.d). 
 
In terms of section 115(6) of the Constitution, the matters listed below 
furthermore continue to be regulated by Swazi law and custom. 
 
These are: the status, powers or privileges, designation or recognition of the 
Ngwenyama, Ndlovukazi and Umntfwanenkhozi Lomkhulu; the 
designation, recognition, removal and powers of a chief or any other 
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traditional authority; the organisation, powers or administration of Swazi 
(customary) courts or chiefs’ courts; Swazi law and custom, or the 
escertainment or recording of Swazi law and custom; Swazi nation land; and 
the First Fruits Ceremony (incwala), Reed Dance (umhlanga), Regimental 
System (libutfo) or any similar cultural activity or organisation (Whelpton, 
n.d.). 
 
1.4.3 The legal system of Swaziland is characterised by pluralism 
 
The Constitution confirms the application of the principles and rules of the 
Roman-Dutch Common Law as applicable to Swaziland since 22 February 
1907, as the common law of Swaziland, except where, and to the extent that, 
those principles or rules are inconsistent with the Constitution or a Statute of 
Swaziland (Section 252(1)).  Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, 
the principles of Swazi law and custom are also recognised and adopted to 
be applied and enforced as part of the law of Swaziland (Section 252(2)). 
 
As indicated in item 1.2 above, it can thus be said that Swaziland is 
practising a system of legal and judicial segregation.  This implies that 
Swazi law and custom applies only to people of Swazi origin and the 
received common law applies to all Swazi citizens.  This includes people of 
non-Swazi origin.  As already mentioned (see Chapter 1.3), this system of 
legal separation has resulted in a dual court system i.e. Swazi law and 
custom may be applied only in Swazi courts, and common law in 
magistrates courts as well as the High Court.  Where these different systems 
of personal law, namely Swazi law and custom, as well as common law 
continue to be in operation, it is a question of whether the adjudication of 
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Swazi law and custom should be confined to lower courts. This question 
becomes more pertinent now that the Constitution of Swaziland, which 
includes the protection of basic human rights, has been adopted. 
 
1.4.4 Swazi law and custom is the living law of thousands of Swazi 
people 
 
The contemporary reality is that the lives of vast numbers of Swazi people 
are still controlled and directed by Swazi law and custom on a daily basis.  
This fact has to be acknowledged and provision has to be made for its 
accommodation in the development of the Swazi legal system. 
 
1.4.5 The development and modernisation of Swazi law and custom 
must be addressed   
 
The Constitution has had the effect of placing Swazi law and custom 
squarely in the domain of public law.  The Constitution guarantees every 
person’s fundamental rights and freedoms, subject to respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and for the public interest.  This clearly poses a 
challenge for Swazi law and custom and suggests that the latter should be 
put under scrutiny.  Adaptation or transformation of Swazi law and custom 
may thus be necessary.  Rules which might be regarded as antiquated could 
require harmonisation or modernisation, e.g. some of those relating to 
contract, marriage, succession and land, in order to be consonant with 
contemporary and changing socio-economic conditions.  This implies what 
is referred to elsewhere in Africa as the liberalisation of customary law (cf 
Prinsloo 1990:325).  The process would be directed more specifically at the 
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removal of certain inequalities which people may experience as a result of 
gender and other related factors. 
 
1.4.6 Certain inequalities as experienced by people in view of the 
Constitution  
 
Potential areas of conflict between the two systems of law in the Kingdom of 
Swaziland should be thoroughly investigated and mitigated.  This should be 
done through the development of procedures and guidelines that would 
facilitate appropriate and equitable solutions with due consideration for 
individualism characterised by Roman Dutch Common Law and 
communalism based on patrilineal principles that characterise Swazi 
indigenous law. 
 
By recognising Swazi law and custom and at the same time prohibiting 
discrimination, the Constitution, among other things, creates a direct 
confrontation between the two conflicting principles, namely an individual’s 
right to equal treatment and a group’s right to observe the culture of its 
choice (cf Whelpton 1997:150). 
 
The Bill of Rights, as contained in the Constitution, places strong emphasis 
on the rights of the individual, thus creating a possible conflict with Swazi 
law and customary values.  This fact, in general terms, implies the 
following: with human rights the emphasis is on the individual, whereas 
with Swazi law and custom the emphasis is on the group or community, or 
the individual in group context; with human rights the emphasis is on rights, 
whereas Swazi law and custom maintains the principle of patriarchy, which 
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means that freedom of thought, speech, movement or association is qualified 
by the respect due to senior persons (cf Whelpton 1997:150). 
 
The question is, therefore, how these divergent approaches can be reconciled 
and who will set the norm: the Bill of Rights or the community (Vorster 
1993:552). 
 
The Constitution does not contain any specific indications as to how to 
address this problem.  The solution to conflicts between Swazi law and 
custom and fundamental rights must therefore be sought outside the 
parameters of the Constitution, and in this process factors such as the social 
implications of instituting fundamental rights should be explored (cf 
Whelpton 1997:594-601).  Additional information gathered by thorough 
research is therefore required to address this issue. 
 
1.4.7 Swazi law and custom is not necessarily incompatible with 
fundamental rights   
 
Rights in Swaziland are mainly held by family groups, with each member 
sharing those rights, according to his or her rank within the family group 
concerned.  In this context, no members, and this includes women, are 
without rights.  All members are full, and equal, participants in these group 
rights (cf Dlamini 1990:84). 
 
The family group specifically, and the community at large, therefore, 
constitute the framework within which individuals exercise their political, 
economic and social rights and freedoms.  It may be argued that customary 
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law is essentially a right of groups that limits individual rights (Eze 
1984:15).  It would, however, be more correct to say that the rights of 
individuals are often limited by the rights of family groups and the 
community at large, since the individual forms part of a number of 
constituent bodies in Swazi society.  Although individual rights are not 
ignored, the emphasis is not on the individual as such, since communal 
ethics is the first priority, and rights are understood within the context of the 
family group which functions as a corporate legal entity and which also 
underlies the group-orientatedness of Swazi life (cf Whelpton 1997:149). 
 
A Bill of Rights is not unlimited in nature.  It was originally devised to 
protect citizens in their relations with the state, that is, rights were applied 
vertically.  Recently these rights were extended to the relationships between 
individuals, i.e. horizontal application, a development which presented the 
courts with the problem of having to determine when Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution, on fundamental rights, may be applied horizontally. 
 
The equality principle per se does not always provide the courts with 
sufficient grounds to create rights that do not already exist, or give them a 
mandate to amend certain indigenous rules. Circumspection is the key and 
even the legislator will have to approach such matters with care as many 
practices, though changing, are embedded in Swazi culture.  This implies 
that the different customs and institutions are integrated and an intervention 
affecting one will have repercussions for others. These matters require 
thorough investigation and choice of law and reform of the courts are but 
two of the possible considerations. 
 
23 
 
1.4.8 Swazi law and custom does not comprise immutable rules  
 
Swazi law and custom is dynamic and consists of processes with the 
capacity to adapt constantly to changing socio-cultural, socio-political and 
socio-economic contexts.  Swazi law and custom still comprises the very 
fabric of Swazi society.  It is essentially still living law and stands to 
contribute significantly to the future development of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland.  As is the case with customary law elsewhere in Africa, Swazi 
law and custom consist of processes and have the capacity of adapting to 
changing socio-economic and socio-political circumstances and will 
constantly undergo change.  This change and adaptation should, however, 
not be initiated by a Bill of Rights in the sense of being an instrument to 
entrench western values.  Law and custom should be adjusted in accord with 
their own inherent postulates and principles.  It is possible to do this in 
conformity with the Bill of Rights by interpreting, where appropriate, the 
Bill of Rights in the cultural context of the Swazi people (cf Whelpton 
1997:150). The harmonisation, integration, reconciliation and modernisation 
of the Swazi legal system can thus only be meaningfully accomplished with 
due regard to the values, norms, ideals and realities of the Swazi people 
themselves (cf Spalding 1970:117). 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY AND STRATEGY 
 
The research strategy was comprehensive and multi-sited. This entailed 
adopting the ethnographic method for this research.  
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The emphasis was thus not the elicited social-survey type of data gathering, 
and hence not exclusively on the legal rules, but also on the processes as 
currently being enacted in the living law. To this end extensive use was 
made of: 
 
• a study of the recorded Swazi Law and Custom document (Whelpton 
2005) and the Constitution (2005) of the Kingdom of Swaziland, 
including the Bill of Rights; and 
 
• discussions with various stakeholders such as the Project Coordinator for 
the recording and codification of Swazi law and custom, the Attorney 
General and his personnel, the Law Commission, Woman for Law and 
members of the Swazi national council; 
 
• the gathering of information by means of ethnographic interviewing; 
 
This entailed observing, participating in and listening to obtain firsthand 
information to record as much as possible of the legal values of the Swazi 
people.  The emphasis was on unstructured in-depth interviewing.  Such 
interviewing entailed observational interrogation.  
 
Various respondents were identified and selected by the local chiefs 
(tikhulu) for interviews.  These included key and casual respondents.  The 
researcher relied on “large numbers of casual informants, but focused on a 
relatively small number of key informants upon whom they may become 
very dependant” (Ellen 1984:224). 
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The comprehensiveness of the research required panel discussions regarding 
the aspects to be covered in the research.  Such panels of respondents were 
representative of the profile of the Swazi community with regards to 
variables such as seniority, age, gender, educational qualifications and 
occupational specialisation to mention the most important of these.  If 
different views about an aspect of a specific manifestation of Swazi law of 
contract were held by members of the panel, they conferred to clarify the 
matter.  Experience has shown that it is sometimes desirable for panel 
members to consult others in the community before feedback is given on an 
issue.  In this way the Swazi community at large became indirectly involved 
in the research. 
 
The tried and trusted genealogical method is an indispensable instrument in 
the recording and restatement of law where exactness is required.  It is, for 
instance, an effective instrument for the reconstruction of history, to gain an 
understanding of social, legal and other relationships, the composition of 
family gatherings and agnatic reconciliatory bodies that play such an 
important role in resolving disputes in private law to restore harmony in 
society. The family ties obtained through the use of the genealogical method 
gave statistical verification of the oral information on the prevalence of 
exogamy, and the rules of preferential marriages as well as the dissolution of 
marriages.  The employment of this method became the single most 
important verification of the oral information on the Swazi marriage law. 
The value of the genealogical method is perhaps best summarised in a 
publication of the Royal Anthropological Institute, “Notes and Queries on 
Anthropology” (1951).  It states: 
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“The genealogical method has proved of such value in 
Anthropological research that it is now considered an essential 
technique in sociological investigations ….  In collecting genealogies 
the investigator will find corroboration, or new information which he 
may not have expected, with regard to the remarriage of widows, 
special marriage customs among [chiefly] families, etc., etc.  Thus 
both from the point of view of gaining exact information and as an 
actual introduction to the group with whom work is to be done, the 
collection of genealogical data affords a sound basis ….” 
 
1.5.1 Control techniques 
 
To ensure valid and reliable information about the legal rules and values of 
the Swazi people, various techniques and instruments were used to verify the 
recorded data.  In the recording and restatement of law, as well as the 
reconciliation of legal rules and values deriving from different legal systems, 
the research methodology and techniques employed ensured valid and 
reliable information.  These methods and techniques were employed in this 
regard are described below. 
 
1.5.1.1 The cross-checking of information gathered from various legal 
officials, experts and panels of key respondents  
 
After interrogating of key respondents regarding particular issues, the 
information gathered was cross-checked with other groups of knowledgeable 
respondents, as well as with the information that is already available in 
published and unpublished sources.  In this way information acquired was 
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consistently checked and subjected to verification.  Where differences and 
variations and seemingly irreconcilable values were identified, these issues 
were also workshopped in panel discussions (cf Prinsloo 1991:28).  
 
1.5.1.2 The application of the emic and etic orientated approaches 
 
In anthropological research it is important to see the people being studied as 
actors in their own cultural context, and to be aware of how they perceive 
and categorise the world, and what is humane and meaningful to them in the 
context within which they are living.  This is known as the emic approach 
which is used to avoid the pitfalls of ethnocentricity i.e. that of judging 
others according to the researcher’s own value system.  The emic approach 
is the converse of the etic or researcher-orientated approach in which the 
focus shifts from native views, categorisation, explanations and 
interpretations to the perspective and analysis of the anthropologist as 
researcher.  Anthropologists combine the etic and emic approaches in their 
fieldwork strategies because the interaction between these approaches 
usually presents the most objective view of the issue being investigated. 
 
1.5.1.3 The attendance at court cases/hearings 
 
These are regarded by anthropologists and jurists in particular as the most 
reliable mechanisms for the checking and verification of information (see 
Coertze 1987:92-236; De Clercq 1975:9; Prinsloo 1989:420-428).  In the 
present study a significant number of court hearings, particularly in the 
courts of chiefs (tikhulu) were attended. It is contended that this method 
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provides reliable data because it eliminates prejudice with regard to ideal or 
real law (Hoebel 1954:42). 
 
1.5.1.4 Legal maxims and proverbs 
 
Studies by Schapera (1970), Campbell (1970:121-224,325-347) and De Beer 
(1984:4-9) among the Tswana and Northern Ndebele respectively have 
shown that proverbs and legal maxims play an indispensable role in the 
elucidation of prevailing legal rules and the confirmation of legal values.  
According to Campbell (1970:121): 
 
“Proverbs are an integral part of the tradition and culture of the 
Batswana. Though not used much in straight conversation, they are 
used extensively both in explanations and in putting forward a point 
of view….  Most of them express right behavior, that is the behavior 
expected of a normal person under any given set of circumstances.” 
 
The literal and metaphorical meaning of maxims can be illustrated from the 
research of De Beer (1984:9) among the Northern Ndebele, particularly in 
regard to the law of contract.  The maxim: ‘O ka se sekise mapele a letlabo’ 
– literally, you cannot try the testicles or genitals of a rhebuck in court 
(mapele) is the euphemism for ‘merete’.  This maxim indicates that you 
cannot conclude a contract with a minor, since he/she, according to Northern 
Ndebele respondents, knows as much of contracts as the genitals of a 
rhebuck – nothing. The Swazi say: ‘akunasivumelwani nemtwana’, meaning 
“you cannot conclude a contract with a minor”. 
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Maxims reflect the manner in which people perceive their culture in general, 
and their relations with kin and other people, and particularly the guidelines 
for acceptable and positive behaviour that are fundamental to an orderly and 
law-abiding society. 
 
It is, therefore, evident that the information contained in the idiomatic 
expressions and maxims, which underlie indigenous Swazi legal values, was 
indispensable in the present study.  Due to the fact that there is no well 
recognised dictionary available of siSwati words and terminology, the 
researcher compiled a glossary of Swazi terms, proverbs and legal maxims 
gathered during the interviews. Although some may not be relevant to the 
law of contract, the recording thereof remains valuable for future reference 
and research.  
 
1.5.1.5 Falsification as a test instrument 
 
Truly reliable and credible data are only finally gathered when the researcher 
places such data in jeopardy by setting up conditions or makes allegations 
whereby the data are exposed to falsification (see Pelto & Pelto 1978:35).  
This means that the researcher interviews the same respondents again and 
contradicts information that has already been gathered from respondents 
during the first round of interviews to try to prove them wrong.  If their 
indignation is aroused and they immediately refute the statements and 
allegations of the researcher and confirm the accuracy and reliability of the 
information originally given, the credibility of such information is assured 
(cf Prinsloo 1991:29).  Pelto and Pelto (1978:35-36) reckon that research 
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results are only completed after being tested and scrutinised by falsification 
as a test instrument. 
 
These methodological techniques have proved to be valuable and 
indispensable mechanisms to distil legal rules from customs, explain legal 
values, rules and processes and also to ensure that criteria such as accuracy 
and reliability of information are constantly met during the research process. 
 
Panel discussions have thus been conducted for the gathering of data during 
the research process, supplemented by attendance at informal dispute 
resolution discussions and or court cases, to ensure first-hand experience of 
Swazi Law in process. 
 
1.5.1.6 Memoranda 
 
Memoranda or guidelines for interviews on all the various topics were 
compiled beforehand.  The purpose of the memoranda was to cover the 
research topics fully, to deal with various themes systematically without 
preventing the respondents from giving information voluntarily and to have 
sufficient examples available during the interviews (cf Prinsloo 1991:23).  
The memoranda merely provided an outline or checklist of topics and items 
to be covered, but no specific sequence of items or questions was prescribed.  
The objective was to prompt and encourage the respondents to furnish 
information on what they considered important. It also facilitated unification 
of existing information against information obtained during the interviews 
(cf Prinsloo 1991:51, 59). 
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1.5.1.7 Local experts 
 
Local experts, who served as respondents, were selected in consultation with 
the chiefs, who are familiar with their people.  Chiefs from the various 
chieftaincies were asked to nominate members from whom some were 
selected, after they had been interviewed.  At each locality the respondents 
were interviewed in a panel on the basis of a memorandum prepared 
beforehand. In this way, the collective knowledge of the panel was obtained, 
after the members had corroborated and supplemented one another’s 
knowledge.  Questions were compiled to include easily appreciated facts and 
due allowance was made for variations in different regions of the country.  
The information given by the respondents was verified by cross-questions, 
information given by respondents from the other panels, examples of cases 
(hypothetical and real) and legal maxims and proverbs. 
 
The panel consisted of twenty people (ten men and ten ladies) and facilitated 
the formation of a working group. All field data obtained through interviews 
were evaluated critically.  The data were tested against the requirements of 
logic, the norms of justice, science in general and the norms of Swazi law 
and custom (cf Prinsloo 1991:6). 
 
1.6 THE FIELD RESEARCH 
 
The researcher was equipped with knowledge of the field research methods, 
the culture of the Swazi people and in particular the law of contract.  It saved 
time and prevented difficulties in the field and gave a better insight into the 
research problem (cf Prinsloo 1991:13).  
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A memorandum for interviews in the field was compiled.  It covered the 
research topic fully, and was amended in accordance with insight gained in 
the field.  Information was recorded promptly during the interviews (cf 
Prinsloo 1991:14).  
 
The researcher made use of a local interpreter who also acted as a research 
assistant.  He assisted with the local arrangements and expedited the course 
of the interviews (cf Prinsloo 1991:21).  
 
1.7 THE STUDIED PEOPLE: THE SWAZI IN THE KINGDOM OF 
SWAZILAND 
 
Since a micro study was done on the Swazi of the Kingdom of Swaziland, a 
brief overview is necessary of the country itself, the Swazi people, some 
characteristics of Swazi law and custom, and its relevance for, and impact 
on, society, governance and the dual system of government in which the 
traditional and modern systems co-exist side by side. 
 
1.7.1 The Kingdom of Swaziland 
 
The Swazi nation was shaped by the early leaders and it is said that the 
leading Nkhosi – Dlamini family, who established the Swazi nation – either 
by peaceful incorporation or forcible absorption – entered the present-day 
Swaziland approximately 250 years ago (Whelpton 2005 Governance:4). 
Comprising 17,363sq kilometres, Swaziland is a landlocked country situated 
between Mozambique and the South African provinces of KwaZulu Natal 
and Mpumalanga, between the 20th and 27th latitudes south and the 31st and 
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32nd meridian east. In 1880 the boundaries were formally defined by the 
British, the Portuguese and the Transvaal Afrikaners, who decided that the 
Pongola Valley would form part of South Africa, even though it was an area 
historically occupied by Swazi people (Whelpton 2005 Governance: 16-17). 
 
The Kingdom of Swaziland is the smallest country in the southern 
hemisphere. It consists of four topographical and climatic areas, which vary 
from 400 to 800 metres above sea level, each of which has its own climate 
and characteristics (Anspach 2004:42) (See the enclosed map of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland). 
 
In 1903, Swaziland became a protectorate under British colonial rule and 
retained this status until it became a self-governing state in 1967, when 
Sobhuza II received international recognition as king and the country 
acquired its own flag. The country celebrated independence in 1968 and the 
monarchy has retained its position of strength since then (Anspach 2004:43). 
 
1.7.2 The Swazi people 
 
The current total population of Swaziland is estimated at approximately 1,2 
million people. There are three main language groups absorbed in the 
Kingdom, namely, Nguni, Sotho and Tsonga. The clans representative of 
these language groups are 70% Nguni, 25% Sotho and 5% Tsonga. The 
integration of these three main groups brought with it a distinct legal 
perspective from each of the respective groupings, elements of which would 
have been incorporated into Swazi law and custom, making the Swazi an 
ideal focus for a holistic study of the topic. 
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From the Nkosi-Dlamini clan, the kingship is hereditary and all other clans 
rank in decreasing order thereafter. Every Swazi person acquires his/her 
father’s name by birth. Although women retain their paternal clan name on 
marrying, they may never transmit it to their children. Clanship is of primary 
importance in regulating marriage and succession, in particular. With the 
exception of the king, marriage with a person of one’s own clan is prohibited 
(Anspach 2004:43). 
 
The Swazi people are a proud and peaceful nation. Approximately 77% live 
in rural areas and the remaining 23% within towns and cities. The average 
population density is only 5.2 people per square kilometre. Traditionally, the 
Swazi are a polygamous society, although today monogamous marriages are 
becoming more common due to western influence (Anspach 2004:44). The 
cultural heritage is deeply rooted and traditions are carefully protected and 
maintained. 
 
The Swazi kinship (bukhosi) consists of the king (ngwenyama), currently 
Mswati III, the queen mother (ndlovukazi), the members of the royal house, 
chiefs (tikhulu) and headmen (tindvuna).  The king stands at the apex of both 
the traditional and the modern systems of governance (Anspach 2004:45-
46). The king has played a major role by initiating the legal and 
constitutional reform processes in the Kingdom of Swaziland.  He also 
initiated the recording of Swazi law and custom. 
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1.7.3 What is Swazi law and custom? 
 
Swazi law and custom is the product of age-old traditions and customs that 
in the course of time came to be classified as “law”.  According to Marwick 
(1966:280), “……the repository of these traditions is chiefly the old men, 
particularly those associated with the king’s village (umuti weBukhosi) 
where they are continually in attendance listening to and taking part in cases 
and making use of the code which is to them a living body of precepts.”  
Differences in human qualities are universally recognised and, in 
hierarchically ordered societies like that of the Swazi, the senior echelons 
will be assumed to be more, rather than less, generously endowed with 
wisdom, understanding and insight than other people. 
 
When the Swazi speak of “our way of life” (indlela yekuphila kwethu) and 
of “our traditions” (emihambo yetfu), they are referring to the social 
relationships and social actions which have as their point of departure age-
old customs validated by the ideology of traditionalism and legitimised by 
the king (Vilakazi 1977:227-228).  The king, the royal family, chiefs and 
elders are the main custodians of Swazi law and custom.  Announcements by 
the king become Swazi law when they are made known to the nation, 
usually at the cattle byre ‘esibayeni’ where all national meetings are held 
(WLSA 1994:24).  The king is referred to as ‘umlomo longacali manga’, 
meaning “the mouth that never lies” essentially because he pronounces as 
“law” what the Swazi believe or accept as binding.   
 
Swazi law and custom therefore emerge from what the Swazi people do, or – 
more accurately – from what they believe they ought to do (lebakholelwa 
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kutsi bangakwana), rather than from what a class of legal specialists 
considers they should do or believe.  It is pre-eminently embodied in a set of 
concrete principles, the detailed application of which to particular cases is 
flexible and subject to change. The principle is unchanging, no doubt, but it 
is not always easy from a western perspective to establish when any given 
norm or rule is an authentic principle, or is nothing more than the practical 
application of a general norm to a particular case. 
 
1.7.3.1 Custom and law 
 
Although the Swazi vary in the details of their conduct, certain standardised 
patterns of behaviour are incumbent upon them, depending on their age 
(umnyaka), (budzala), gender (bulili) and rank (lizinga).  All these patterns 
of behavior, or rules of conduct, collectively constitute what we 
conventionally term the “laws and customs” (umtsetfo emasiko nemihambo 
yesiSwati) of the Swazi. 
 
The question is whether any distinction can or should be made between 
“custom” and “law”.  The problem is complicated by the fact that the Swazi 
have no written codes setting aside legal rules apart from all other types of 
rules.  A few rules are epitomised in proverbs (sisho) and kindred sayings, 
which can be quoted when the occasion arises.  The vast majority, however, 
are inherent in the Swazi social system.  They occur simply as established 
usages and observances which have developed over the course of time and 
become accepted by the people at large as binding and obligatory, as norms 
or correct standards of behaviour. 
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The Swazi themselves employ a variety of terms to denote all or certain of 
their rules of conduct.  They speak, for example of ‘umhambo’ (manners, 
etiquette, polite usages), ‘lisiko lokuhlonishwako’ (traditional usage, custom) 
(taboo), and ‘imisebenti’ (duties).  Most frequently, however, they speak of 
them collectively as ‘emasiko nemihambo esiSwati’. 
 
‘Umtsetfo’ may refer to a single “law of ordinance”, to “the law” as a whole 
or, more rarely, to “an order or demand of a ruler”.  ‘Umhambo’ in general 
applies to what we would term: manner, way, fashion, habit, usage, and 
‘lisiko’ to custom, traditional usage; and (always in the plural from) to: 
manners, customs, polite usages.  The terms are not really precisely 
distinguished from each other in ordinary Swazi usage.  The same rule of 
conduct for example be spoken of on one occasion as ‘umtsetfo’ and at 
another occasion as ‘umhambo’ or ‘lisiko’. 
 
This particular distinction, although not consistently maintained by the 
people, suggests a possible line of approach to the problem of what should 
be regarded as Swazi law and what should not.  ‘Lisiko’ is stronger than 
‘umhambo’, as the latter generally means a usage.  The Swazi employ 
various mechanisms to ensure that all members conform to the recognised 
norms of conduct.  Children are carefully taught by their parents the 
difference between right and wrong conduct.  At the formation of age-
regiments (emabutfo), more formal instruction of the same nature is given, 
certain definite rules of behaviour being firmly impressed upon the minds of 
the young people concerned.  Later, as an adult, everyone participates fully 
in Swazi society and learns by actual experience what may or should 
lawfully be done and what is forbidden or resentful. 
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The distinction drawn between law and custom may be illustrated by the 
following example: If a man cohabits with an unmarried woman and 
impregnates her, her parents are entitled to claim damages from him.  Five 
beasts are paid by the boy’s parents to the girl’s parents.  One of the beasts 
(a cow) known as ‘umdzalaso’ is slaughtered just outside the homestead 
before the girl delivers the baby (kuchitsa umhlolo).  This is done as a ritual 
to dispel the bad omen which might cause the girls of the homestead to fall 
pregnant before marriage.  Damages are paid because less ‘emalobolo’ will 
be received for such a girl (usule sibaya sendvoldza). 
 
If a man cohabits with a woman married to someone else, her husband is 
entitled to damages, while if he violates a woman forcibly, he will be 
punished for rape (kugagadlela). His behaviour in all these instances is 
controlled by the law.  On the other hand, there is nothing in law to prevent 
him from sleeping with a menstruating woman, particularly if she is his own 
wife.  The action in itself will not bring him within the jurisdiction of the 
courts.  Nevertheless, very few Swazi men will ever dare to sleep with such 
a woman as it is firmly believed that they will then become afflicted with a 
virulent form of sickness.  In this particular instance the man’s behaviour is 
controlled by custom, which in its own sphere may thus be no less effective 
than law. 
 
1.7.3.2 Enforcement of custom (lisiko) 
 
It is significant that the vast majority of the Swazi people generally observe 
most rules of living, including legal rules, faithfully on a daily basis, without 
any thought of being “forced” to comply.  Such voluntary observance of a 
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rule often indicates that it is a rule of law, even though its nature has never 
been determined by a court (Vorster & Whelpton 1996:14). 
 
According to Marwick (1966:283), public opinion is the primary means of 
enforcing customs.  Breach of customary norms may result in deliberate 
ostracism and derisive songs being sung about the offender.  Marwick also 
mentions what he calls a “moulding” force, which is spiritual and ritual in 
nature, as opposed to a sanction which demands or prohibits.  A Swazi 
person needs the assistance of his or her family to ensure that good rains 
come, that crops are produced, that illnesses are properly treated and that his 
or her spirit rests in peace after death.  These beliefs ensure that family 
members are reluctant to oppose the extended family clan in their actions 
(LWSA 1994:27). 
 
Actual sanctions also play a role.  There is, for example, a taboo against 
going to the king’s burial place.  It is believed that anyone who does so will 
suffer immediate and permanent blindness (Marwick 1966:284). 
 
Throughout life, therefore, one’s behaviour is either deliberately or 
unconsciously moulded into conformity with the social norms that create 
law and order.  At every stage, moreover, pressure is brought to bear in the 
form of sanctions, which are forms of social control restraining one from 
violating established rules of conduct.  Diligent adherence to community 
usage earns the approval and respect of one’s fellows.  Failure to comply 
with community norms on the other hand, is penalised in various ways, 
according to the nature of the offence.   
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One may suffer loss of social esteem, or be treated with contempt, as when a 
girl is notoriously promiscuous, or a man recklessly squanders his wealth.  
Or if one breaks any of the numerous taboos (kwephula loko 
lokuhlonishwako) pervading Swazi life, one will, it is maintained, be 
afflicted with sickness or some misfortune by the offended ancestor spirits or 
some other supernatural agency.  This is the supernatural sanction.  There is 
also a penal sanction, in that the offender if discovered will be tried and 
punished by the chief, normally by a fine of one beast. In this case, the taboo 
is recognised as sufficiently important to be reinforced, not merely by the 
supernatural sanction, but also by the court. 
 
1.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF SWAZI LAW AND CUSTOM 
 
The indigenous legal systems of Southern Africa are related to the 
indigenous legal systems of the rest of Africa, especially those countries 
south of the Sahara. According to Allott (1965:165), the indigenous legal 
systems of Africa do not constitute a single system, but rather a “family of 
systems which share no traceable common parent”. Nevertheless, more 
fundamentally, indigenous African laws reveal sufficient similarity of 
procedure, principles, institutions and techniques for a common account to 
be given of them.  Elements reflecting the characteristics of Swazi law and 
custom are discussed below. 
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1.8.1 The unwritten nature of Swazi law and custom 
 
Like most indigenous legal systems in Africa, Swazi law and custom were 
never recorded in written legal sources such as statutes, law reports or 
textbooks. Court procedures were conducted orally, and the law was 
transmitted orally from one generation to the next. The process of legal 
transmission was furthered by the public participation of adult men, in 
particular, in the administration of law. The result, therefore, is that the 
community at large has a broad knowledge of the law (Marwick 1996:280). 
 
The recording of Swazi law and custom (Whelpton 2005) therefore, 
recognised the status of Swazi law and custom as the people’s living law, 
resulting in certainty and consistency in the application of law. 
 
1.8.2 The customary nature of Swazi law and custom 
 
Swazi law and custom have been distilled from those age old traditions and 
customs that in the course of time became compelling obligations (legal 
rules). According  to Marwick (1996:280) the “repository of these traditions 
is mainly the old men in Swazi society, particularly those associated with the 
king’s village where they are continually in attendance listening to and 
taking part in the hearing of and adjudication of cases and thus applying the 
legal heritage which is to them a living body of precepts”. The king and the 
royal family are the main custodians of Swazi law and custom. 
Pronouncements by the king in council become Swazi law when they are 
made known to the nation, usually at the cattle kraal where all national 
meetings are held (cf Whelpton 1997:147). 
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1.8.3 Swazi law and custom as an expression of community values 
 
Public participation in the process of adjudication results in Swazi law and 
custom which give expression to the prevalent values or the general moral 
behavioural code of the community. As values change over time, so does the 
law. Conflict between legal and moral values is therefore eliminated. This 
endorses the dynamic nature of Swazi law and custom. 
 
In a dispute between parties, usually representing two different family 
groups, the emphasis is not only on the resolution of a dispute between 
individuals but also on its implications for the wider community, so that any 
decision regarding the dispute has to take into consideration future relations 
between whole family groups in the community. These relationships are 
extremely important for harmony within the wider community. Thus, the 
administration of justice does not primarily concern simple legal justice as 
such, but rather reconciliation between groups of people. Moreover, in 
Swazi law and custom there are many informal institutions of dispute 
resolution before it is taken to the courts. Therefore, formal court decisions 
are too restricted a source to determine the law of the community (Whelpton 
1997:20). 
 
1.8.4 The influence of magico-religious conceptions and practices in 
Swazi law and custom 
 
According to Vilakazi (1977:227-8) the Swazi social order derives from the 
sacredness of tradition, the validity of which is reinforced socially and 
psychologically by fears that, if tradition is transgressed, the anger of the 
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ancestral spirits will result in magical evils. It is believed that rules for social 
conduct, and thus also Swazi law and custom, have been received from the 
ancestors and are protected by the ancestral spirits. Even today, misfortunes 
such as illness, drought, hail, floods and heat waves, are often experienced 
and interpreted as forms of supernatural punishment. The cause of such 
misfortune can therefore be correctly determined only through supernatural 
practices. Kasenene (1993:28) states that the most popular form of magical 
practice in the Kingdom of Swaziland is divination: The Swazi believe that 
some people, especially witchdoctors (tinyanga) are able to unveil the 
mysteries of nature and reveal the knowledge that is hidden from the 
ordinary people. They are consulted when people want to know, for 
example, the cause of sickness when someone is sick; who the thief is when 
something is stolen; or to find out why something has gone wrong. 
 
1.9 THE TRADITIONAL SWAZI SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Swaziland has a centralised system of government characterised by 
centralised institutions of authority, administrative systems and judicial 
institutions. As previously mentioned in this chapter, the Swazi kingship 
(bukhosi) consists of the king (ngwenyama), the queen mother (ndlovukazi), 
the members of the royal house, the chiefs (tikhulu) and headmen (tindvuna). 
The system of local government, in other words, the system of local chiefs 
and the inner councils (bandlancane), normally follows the pattern of the 
central authority of the country. Each chief (sikhulu) has his inner council as 
well as his headman (indvuna). Each has his own ‘umphakatsi’.  
‘Umphakatsi’ therefore symbolises the spiritual unity of the nation. All these 
bodies are pillars of kinship (bukhosi).  They share responsibilities with the 
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king, who rules through them. A Swazi can thus say: “A king is a king by 
his people”, or “a king rules through his people”, (inkhosi ibusa ngebantfu). 
The king is regarded as the mouthpiece of his people and is described as 
‘umlomo longacali manga’, meaning “the mouth that tells no lies” (Anspach 
2004:45). 
 
Certain modern administrative structures of government have been 
integrated into the traditional Swazi system of governance. The structure 
incorporates the system known as ‘tinkhundla’ and provides for the people 
to elect parliamentary representatives for specific constituencies. The king is 
at the apex of both the traditional and the modern systems. The cabinet and 
the Swazi national council, which represents the full spectrum of the Swazi 
nation, including the country’s traditional leaders, advise the king (Anspach 
2004:46). 
 
1.10 THE SWAZI SOCIAL ORDER  
 
The Swazi political structure which is typical of most countries in Africa 
before colonisation, allows no particular person or group absolute power.  
They are still dependent for their cohesion on bonds of kinship, without the 
organising potential of a centralised authority.  Accordingly, at the heart of 
their socio-political order lay the family, a unit that was extended both 
vertically and horizontically to encompass a wide range of people who could 
be called ‘kin’. 
 
In the Swazi society, the group provides for all.  This includes the 
individual’s material, social and emotional needs.  Loyalty to it is a cardinal 
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value.  Individual interests are inevitably submerged in the community, and 
the normative system tends to stress an individual’s duties instead of his or 
her rights.  This can be ascribed to the fact that the family is the focus of 
social concern.  To emphasise rights would be anti-social, rather, one is 
expected to compromise one’s interests for the good of all.  The legal 
relationships are, therefore, mostly those that arise out of a family’s dealings 
with other families and not those flowing from one person’s relations with 
another. 
 
Among the Swazi, the lack of emphasis on rights is clearly evident in the 
situation of women and children.  Swazi law and custom has no specific 
rules and procedures to secure a child’s upbringing.  The main social issue is 
the family’s right to claim the child as a member.  Women are in a similar 
position.  Swazi law and custom have always coexisted alongside a family’s 
rights to that of a woman’s capacity for work and child-bearing rather than 
her rights to demand respect and support from her husband and her natal 
family.  The powerful ethic of generosity within extended families towards 
all kinfolk, assures them of nurture and protection.  It therefore does not 
follow from an absence of rights that women and children are abused, 
neglected or treated like objects. 
 
The Swazi social order, like any other, is dynamic.  In domestic 
relationships, change, rapid and disruptive, is clearly evident.  Christianity, 
capitalism, individualisation and urbanisation have all had corrosive effects 
on the ties of kinship.  Illegitimate births have proliferated; women have 
been forced to undertake the rearing of children alone, and many modern 
households lack the stabilisation influence of a patriarchal head. 
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1.11 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the study, states the problem and aim of the study, and 
describes the people studied, the research methodology and fieldwork 
techniques. 
 
Chapter 2 considers the recording and codification of indigenous legal 
systems. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the indigenous contract as a legal phenomenon. 
 
Chapter 4 evaluates the requirements for establishing a contract in terms of 
Swazi law and custom. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses breach of contract in indigenous law. 
 
Chapter 6 considers the termination of indigenous contracts. 
 
Chapter 7 deals with specific indigenous contracts with regard to the 
permanent exchange of goods. 
 
Chapter 8 reviews specific indigenous contracts with reference to non 
permanent exchange of goods, including bailment and mandate. 
 
Chapter 9 discusses contracts that influence status.  
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Chapter 10 concludes and summarises the study and makes 
recommendations with regard to legal reform and codification.  
 
1.12 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter the purpose and aim of the study and, the methodology, as 
well as the premises, principles and parameters of the research were 
discussed. The Kingdom of Swaziland, and the traditional system of 
governance and its people were described.  An explanation was also given of 
Swazi law and custom and the characteristics thereof. 
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Chapter 2 
 
RECORDING AND CODIFICATION OF INDIGENOUS LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Recording of indigenous legal systems involves a systematic and 
comprehensive exposition of the law in order to ensure an authoritative 
source of information (cf Allott, Epstein & Gluckman 1969b:13).  It is 
mainly concerned with a written exposition of the unwritten law, but in some 
cases the collected material also includes legal rules from different written 
sources.  The result is not a code, because the purpose of recording is not to 
change the content or nature of the law.  The product of recording is rather a 
handbook or other document to be used by people involved in training, 
interpreting and applying the law; in other words, courts, executive officers, 
legal practitioners and law reformers (cf Prinsloo 1989:420).  The basic 
objective is a precise exposition of the law as provided by local experts.  The 
product of recording must be useful to the indigenous communities and 
should serve as a source of information for both the Swazi courts and 
administration (cf Prinsloo 1989:420). The written record would thus serve 
as a source in which the law of the people could easily be found. 
 
2.2 THE NEED FOR RECORDING 
 
Prinsloo (1989:421) states that there seems to be a general need for 
recording.  There was already a general call for recording in 1959 at a 
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conference on the future of customary law in Africa.  Since then several 
people have supported this call and customary law is strictly adhered to in 
many African countries.  Negative criticism of, or contempt or even 
disregard for, customary law does not change this fact.  Predictions that 
sooner or later western law will replace customary law have already been 
proven wrong.  Even in countries where specific indigenous legal rules have 
been abolished or replaced with foreign ones against the will of the people, 
the indigenous rules are still adhered to (cf Prinsloo 1989:421).  This can be 
explained by the fact that the law is part of people’s culture and is 
continually adapted in accordance with changed circumstances (cf Whelpton 
1991:59). 
 
There is a tendency to regard customary law as lower than, or inferior to, 
western law.  According to Prinsloo (1989:423), this tendency is not only 
due to the ethnocentricity of some western jurists, but can also be ascribed to 
the unwritten nature of customary law and ignorance thereof.  This tendency 
is also to be found among some African jurists, officials and politicians.  
Consequently a written exposition of indigenous legal systems in accordance 
with jurisprudence and taking culture into account will increase the status of 
indigenous law and promote certainty and consistency in its application and 
implementation or enforcement (cf Whelpton 1991:62). 
 
Moreover, recording can also be of great use to those governments 
considering the unification or integration of indigenous law and common 
law, since legal rules cannot be changed if the legal advisers, lawmakers and 
legislature are not familiar with the rules.  Legal (juridical) reform must be 
done from a position of knowledge.  The principle that new law cannot be 
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created without knowledge of the existing law applies to all legal systems.  
For this reason, then, it is important that a written source of information 
should be available before legislation on the specific indigenous legal rules 
(norms) is considered (cf Prinsloo 1989:422). 
 
Even though in most cases the criticisms are not valid, the recording of 
indigenous legal systems is nevertheless not always above criticism.  Since 
recording does not involve legislation, it is incorrect to refer to recording as 
if it changes the contents of the rules or deprives the peoples concerned of 
the power to amend or revise the rules.  For the same reason, the argument 
that recording indigenous law would petrify it so that it became rigid without 
any possibility of development or adaptation to outdated circumstances does 
not hold.  Recording is merely a written exposition of indigenous law that 
can still be amended by the people after the recording. The criticism is 
justified, however, if law enforcers do not take possible changes since 
recording into consideration (cf Whelpton 1991:61 & Prinsloo 1989:420). 
 
Some anthropologists maintain that the people whose law has been recorded 
do not understand the written version of their law themselves because it is 
couched in western legal terminology (Verhelst 1968:21).  However, 
although the report is written as an authoritative source for higher courts, it 
should also be practical for traditional courts.  To achieve this objective, it is 
emphasised that the rules (customs) must be described simply and clearly 
and the western legal terms should also be explained with reference to the 
indigenous terms.  Another reason for the incomprehensibility is that the 
laws are provided without an explanation of the cultural context.  For a 
proper understanding, an indigenous regulation ought to be explained with 
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reference to the cultural practice (cf Whelpton 1991:61 & Prinsloo 
1990:329). 
 
2.3 CODIFICATION OF INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
Codification involves producing a statute book to serve as a comprehensive 
and exhaustive definition of the applicable law with regard to a given topic 
or area (cf Prinsloo 1990:426).  While non-codified customary law has the 
authority of law because it is created by the people themselves, codified 
customary law derives the latter’s authority from parliament or the latter’s 
delegate, irrespective of what the subjects think of the law.  Furthermore, 
non-codified customary law can be changed by the people concerned by 
custom, but a code can only be amended by the authority who created it (cf 
Whelpton 1991:61). 
 
Although a code provides greater certainty about the content of the law and 
contributes to customary law being easier to determine, little success has 
been achieved with codes in African countries to date.  According to 
Twining (1964:23) codification rather increases the resistance of customary 
law to culturally foreign influences.  It is also argued that an indigenous 
norm is raised to a higher status by means of codification or other form of 
legislation.  The same can basically be achieved, however, by recording (cf 
Prinsloo 1989:425). 
 
Allott, Epstein and Gluckman (1969b:33) write that codification can be 
regarded as a useful and powerful instrument in the hands of governments 
to direct the course of political, economic and social development and even 
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to change society completely.  It can be used as a method of unification or 
at least integration of different legal systems.   
 
Whelpton (1991:62) states that although a code can be of use for the 
unification of legal systems and other purposes, it runs the danger of being 
rejected by the community or society.  A prerequisite for effective law is 
that the law should be known and generally be acceptable.  A code runs the 
risk of not fulfilling either of the two requirements.  Legislation that 
purports to solve problems, but is not observed and enforced is a common 
phenomenon in Africa.  The Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960 is a good 
example of this.  In a discussion of the Penal Code of Papua New Guinea, 
Weisbrot (1982:95) it was stated that one of the reasons for the faction 
fighting was the inability or failure of the official court system to do justice 
in the community’s view and the consequent resistance to using the official 
courts to solve disputes(cf Prinsloo 1989:426). 
 
A further consequence of unacceptable codes is, according to Hooker 
(1975:401), the increase or promotion of legal pluralism.  This leads to a 
new uncertainty on the basis of the presence of regulations from officials 
and unofficial legal orders instead of the greater unification and certainty 
that was the initial aim.  The envisioned unification of the different legal 
rules regarding land ownership in Kenya, Botswana and Nigeria and 
succession in Ghana has not been fully achieved by means of legislation.  
Customary law is still partly observed and enforced, with the consequent 
continuing complication and uncertainty that unification had hoped to 
eliminate (cf Prinsloo 1990:425). 
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Although the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland was advised not to 
codify Swazi law and custom, they opted to codify it.  The researcher 
therefore prepared memoranda for the codification of the Swazi law of 
contract and the law of marriage and intends submitting same to the 
Swaziland Government. 
 
The disadvantage of codification is that it petrifies the law and makes it 
rigid.  Codification would deprive Swazi law and custom which is mainly 
customary law, of its natural development.  The local community will no 
longer play a role in the adaptation of the law to continually changed 
circumstances.  Amendment of Swazi law and custom would rest with a 
political authority.  It is mainly for these reasons that the Natal Code of 
Zulu Law is considered a failure.  A code leaves little room for the 
development of the law by judicature because the court is bound by the 
stipulations of a code irrespective of whether it is just or in accordance with 
prevailing circumstances (cf Prinsloo 1990: 426-427). 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter the advantages and disadvantages of recording and 
codification of customary law have been discussed.  It would appear that 
there is a need for the recording of customary law, as such recording will 
increase the status of indigenous law and promote certainty and consistency 
in its application and implementation. The result of codification is a statute 
book which serves to assist jurists, politicians, legislature and parliament for 
economic development and could even also bring about change to the 
society in its entirety.  Codification does, however, have its disadvantage in 
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that it may bring about stagnation and that it will result in the law becoming 
rigid.  One must, however, bear in mind that, unlike common law, 
indigenous law is mostly unwritten and that it is a system of law that has 
been known to communities, practised and passed on from generation to 
generation. Furthermore, indigenous law has its own values and norms.  
Throughout the history of indigenous law it has evolved and developed to 
meet the changing needs of communities, and that it would continue to 
develop within the context of its values and norms consistent with a 
constitution. 
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Chapter 3 
 
CONTRACTS IN INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS: A 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The underlying aims and consequences of indigenous contracts differ from 
those in western legal systems.  Writers such as Olivier (1989:544-549) even 
raise the question of whether indigenous contracts as a legal phenomenon, 
exist in indigenous law. 
 
The word “contract” has a specific meaning in law. Collins English 
Dictionary (1991:347) defines a contract as “to enter into an agreement with 
(a person, company, etc.) to deliver (goods or services) or to do (something) 
on mutually agreed and binding terms, often in writing; a formal agreement 
between two or more parties; a document that states the terms of such an 
agreement; the branch of law treating of contracts”.  
 
In its specialised meaning, a contract is thus an appointment or an agreement 
between people which results in an obligation, subject to certain 
requirements being met. Such an agreement has underlying aims and 
consequences, namely to demand performance against the obligation to 
deliver. Due to this meaningful content of an agreement, the application 
thereof is questioned in an unspecialised legal system. The underlying aims 
and consequences of a contract in terms of western law, differ from those of 
an indigenous contract, Mahoney (1977:58), points out that “perhaps the 
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argument which has been put with most force is that contracts are unusual 
and inappropriate where people’s relationships with each other are multi-
stranded and intense, where most transfers of property and services are made 
on the basis of people’s social positions, and where obligations and 
generosity are held to be more important than a right”. 
 
A further definition of a contract in its less specialised meaning is provided 
by Maine (1917:99) as “the free agreements of individuals” in which the 
parties secure their respective rights and obligations. According to Maine 
(1917:179), people’s social position within an unspecialised legal system is 
determined by birth and this leaves little possibility of entering into 
agreements. Pospisil (1978:150) maintains that, theoretically and de iure, 
various types of contracts are available by way of which rights and 
obligations may be acquired and through which service and matters can be 
exchanged. 
 
According to Gluckman’s (1967:29) reflections on the law of the Bemba of 
Zambia, strict contractual relations are irreconcilable with multi-stranded 
relationships due to the fact that most relationships “reside in relationships 
established by birth or marriage, or by political position”.  The nature of 
such obligations is therefore defined by the status of the parties involved.  
Furthermore, Gluckman points out that “all these relationships are marked, 
in the widest sense, by a stress on generous helpfulness and love and mutual 
give-and-take. No multiplex relationships can survive if the parties insist on 
their rights only and try to live by the letter of the law of contract.”  This 
view has also been expressed by researchers working elsewhere. 
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Mahoney (1977:58-62) working among the Birwa of Botswana, emphasises 
that entering into a contract results in acquiring rights and obligations. 
However, the social relationship between the parties determines their extent 
and content. Close relations even conclude contracts for the purpose of 
insulating that aspect of their relationship characterised by voluntary 
assistance without counting the cost from transactions that are potentially 
disruptive and a regular cause of complaint and dispute. 
 
3.2 CONTRACTS IN TERMS OF INDIGENOUS LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 
 
Allot, Epstein and Gluckman (1969a:77) are of the opinion that it is only 
within western legal systems that mere promises are enforceable. Indigenous 
legal systems in general only give effect to real contracts, that is, contracts 
where one of the parties has performed or partially performed. According to 
Mahoney (1977:58-59), it is only in western legal systems where damages 
can be claimed when defaulting or where a mere promise is broken.  
Schapera (1965:142) on the other hand, maintains that a mere promise is 
enforceable in indigenous law and that damages can be claimed when a 
promise is broken.  Schapera refers to case law Goitumelang v Lekwee, 
Ngwaketse 74/1913, where a husband was ordered to honour his promise to 
his wife that he would not practise polygamy. 
 
According to Moore (1969:376) the enforceability of a contract by a court of 
law is of secondary importance because the most important place where 
legal rules and ideas operate is outside the courts. Enforceability should not 
only be sought by courts as it is apparent that most members of any 
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community or society usually abide by most legal rules and other rules 
without regarding these as being forced upon them. The voluntary following 
of the law often points to whether a specific rule is also a legal rule, even 
though the nature thereof has never been determined by a court. 
 
Although Whelpton’s work among the Bakwena ba Mogopa of Hebron, now 
known as the Bakwena of South Africa found that institutions such as courts 
enforce legal rules and promote compliance, the following factors are of 
greater importance in indigenous legal systems: the religious or magical 
element of the law; public opinion; the fact that, should someone’s rights be 
threatened, they would take the necessary steps to protect or reinstate such 
rights; and the influence of leaders who ensure compliance with the law, 
even before legal findings can be made. In addition, traditional leaders are 
consulted before any important action is taken. This method ensures that 
others’ interests and/or rights cannot be infringed in an unfair or unlawful 
manner. Furthermore, should a legal dispute arise at a later stage due to such 
conduct, the court would already have been informed and, in its capacity as 
mediator, would exercise its powers to protect established rights and prevent 
their violation or alternatively to ensure legal redress (Whelpton 1991:30). 
 
It is clear that the consensus of recent research in the Southern African 
context agree that the obligation arising from agreements cannot always be 
interpreted as being part of a general and formal law of contract in 
indigenous societies.  The way in which resulting disputes are interpreted 
and resolved requires a wider view than strict enforcement through formal 
legal procedures. 
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According to Myburgh (1981:233-234), only real contracts are known in 
indigenous law. Exchange, loan and usage of moveable and of immoveable 
property are known.  Livestock is given as security for performance by way 
of delivery or notation of goods with the understanding that it will be 
returned afterwards. In the case of non-performance, the livestock is 
forfeited and creditors are liable for loss, alienation or damage to the goods.  
 
Strydom (1985:429) states that the South Sotho of Qwaqwa is familiar with 
a variety of contracts, starting with collective contracts (ditumellano).  Some 
contracts such as a sale, exchange/barter and loan agreements, as well as 
employment contracts, are more general. Other contracts are more specific, 
such as farming out (mafisa) contracts. Strydom also refers to quasi 
contracts, such as an agreement that a competent family member or friend 
may raise someone else’s child, or the contribution of an uncle (malome) 
towards the maintenance and bridal gift of his sister’s child and his resultant 
entitlement of a portion of her marriage goods (bohadi) received for her.  
According to Strydom (1985:252), contracts, their underlying principles and 
their requirements all form an integral part of the total culture. 
 
Pauw (1985:118-135) differentiates between various contracts of the 
Imidushane and Amabhele of the Eastern Cape. According to him no 
contract comes into being without performance. All contracts are conditional 
and a party is only liable if the other party has performed. According to 
Pauw (1985:112) “contractual liability rests therein that when a party to such 
contract does not perform, he has to return that which he has already 
delivered (performed). If he has not performed, partial performance by one 
party does not make the other party liable to perform”. 
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Giving a general view of the situation in Southern Africa, Bekker 
(1989:332) states that indigenous contracts are real contracts, and he 
maintains that there are no fundamental differences between indigenous and 
western contracts of purchasing, exchange or loan agreements. Olivier et al 
(1989:544-549) refer specifically to certain contracts such as an employment 
contract, but consider it more appropriate to use a wider term instead of 
contract or agreement “omdat die tradisionele gewoontereg verskeie gevalle 
onderskei waar die verpligting om ‘n skuld te delg of ‘n (teen) prestasie te 
lewer, nie voortvloei uit ‘n konsensuele kontrak nie, maar uit die toepassing 
of werking van bepaalde regsbeginsels” (because traditional customary  law 
distinguishes several instances where the obligation to discharge a debt or 
deliver a (counter) performance does not stem from a consensual contract 
but from the application or effect of particular legal principles). It is  not 
clear however,  why the term “skuldreg” would be appropriate, especially 
where the law of delict is not a sub-section of “skuldreg”, as a debt does not 
only result from an obligation in terms of a contract. A contract is not the 
sole source of an obligation. An obligation can also result from an unlawful 
action. Olivier et al (1989:546) agree that there are various established forms 
of contracts in indigenous law that can be used on a daily basis, such as 
sales, purchase, exchange, lease, mandate and bailment.  
 
The researcher is therefore in agreement with Whelpton (1991:34) that it can 
be accepted that the phenomenon of a contract is generally known in 
indigenous law and that it is not incorrect to refer to it as indigenous law of 
contract. The particular characteristics of each contract should nevertheless 
be kept in mind as each has its own specific requirements, which affect the 
rights and obligations of each party to such a contract.  This was confirmed 
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in this study among the Swazi in the Kingdom of Swaziland. They refer to a 
contract as ‘sivumelawano’, being a voluntary agreement between two 
parties, imposing obligations upon one or both and reciprocally conferring 
rights upon the other or both. According to the Swazi panel of experts, a 
Swazi contract primarily emphasises the relations between people rather 
than the object of performances (cf Whelpton 1991:66). 
  
3.3 THE NATURE OF AN INDIGENOUS CONTRACT 
 
It is generally accepted that an underlying aim of the law is to ensure 
people’s happiness, which is attainable by giving effect to people’s wishes at 
the highest executable level (Corbin 1963:1). In order to do so, the law 
protects social order and furthers justice, even if these are not irreconcilable. 
Indigenous law also gives effect to community values and, if the general 
moral code of the community changes, the law inevitably changes. However, 
in indigenous law, when a dispute arises between the parties about who is 
right or wrong, the dispute usually also involves the wider community. 
Consequently the outcome of the dispute must take into account the effect 
on the future relationship between the relevant parties. These relationships 
are important in order to maintain harmony within the wider community. 
The focus in indigenous law is in the first instance not on justice, but rather 
on reconciliation (Myburgh 1985:2-9). 
 
According to Corbin (1963:2), the law of contract aims to realise a 
reasonable expectation that is created by making promises. This is not the 
only reason for the creation of the law of contract, but is generally 
considered the main underlying aim. It is accepted then, that this underlying 
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goal should be a prerequisite for understanding the legal rules or norms. 
Nevertheless, the law does not anticipate the realisation of each expectation 
created by a promise. The expectation must be one that most people would 
have and honour. This invariably leads to a complexity in law, which 
determines under what circumstances a promise will be honoured and 
become enforceable (Whelpton 1991:67). 
 
Regarding the term ‘reasonable’, it cannot be assumed that contractual 
disputes can be resolved by the dictum that expectations must be 
‘reasonable’ (Corbin 1963:2). Reasonableness is no longer absolute. Like 
morality and justice, reasonableness is an expression of people’s values and 
practices, which are inconsistent in time and place.  
 
The indigenous law of contract in general also gives expression to 
reasonable expectations, but the underlying aims and consequences are not 
the same as those in the western legal systems. Moreover, no legal 
consequences result from a mere promise or agreement (Whelpton 1991:71). 
In terms of the indigenous law of contract, the terms ‘reasonable 
expectation’ has no value other than that parties can expect to be rewarded 
for what they have performed. According to Walker (1969:66-67) “the 
mutual agreement, when it is used as a basis for economic exchange in the 
tribal setting, fulfils a different function than under western law. It does not, 
upon formation, offer a guarantee to each party that, provided he complies or 
stands ready to comply with its terms, he will receive the full measure of his 
bargain. What it does make certain is that any performance actually rendered 
will be justly compensated”. The idea is to place the parties in the same 
position they would have been in before the contract was made, and not to 
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place them in the position they would have been in had the contract been 
performed. 
 
In terms of indigenous law, a party can under no circumstances, whatsoever 
rely on expectations based on a promise. According to the Swazi, the reason 
for this is that a promise only becomes juridicial once performance has taken 
place, as it is then accepted that there can no longer be a change of mind. 
This confirms the specific nature of the indigenous contract in that a mere 
promise or agreement as such, is not sufficient to establish contractual 
liability. Performance or partial performance must take place before it is 
seen to be a contract (cf Whelpton 1991:100). 
 
Whelpton (1991:68) states that in order to understand the term ‘promise’ 
more fully, it must be noted that there are various motives which underpin 
the making of a promise, such as to commence negotiations or to make 
somebody happy. Furthermore, promises are not only made to establish 
contractual relationships, but also to strengthen family ties and relationships 
and to fulfil religious obligations. This was confirmed by the Swazi 
respondents. 
 
To illustrate that the underlying aims and consequences differ from those of 
western legal systems, Walker (1969:66-67) states that a mutual agreement, 
when used as a basis for economic exchange in the tribal setting, does not 
guarantee the full measure of the bargain upon compliance with its terms. 
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3.4 THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS 
 
Given that the validity of a contract no longer depends on its classification, 
and that it is generally accepted that the different contracts are not numerus 
clauses, the question is why one should still have to deal with different types 
of contracts.  According to Joubert (1991:251-252), the classification of a 
contract is an expression of the important contractual aims of a specific point 
in time.  The classification of contracts also mirrors the most preventive and 
important contractual content existing in a society.  Acknowledging different 
types of contracts thus expresses the need in the law of contract to 
distinguish between the different forms (Joubert 1991:254). 
 
Joubert (1991:254-255) points out that the mere classification of a contract 
does not always depict the appropriate norm applicable to a concrete 
contract. Should a contract not fall into one of the acknowledged types of 
contracts, none of the known norms would be applicable to it.  In such an 
instance, legal norms would have to be developed for the new type of 
contract. 
 
This study has shown that various kinds of contracts are known in Swazi law 
and custom (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9).  Agreements to exchange goods and 
services are widely used, including barter, sales, loans and employment 
agreements.  The reasons for entering into agreements, however, vary from 
community to community.  Often an agreement is negotiated as a result of 
economic hardship.  A man, who finds himself with a shortage of grain for 
his family or no cattle to plough his fields, may seek to improve his lot by 
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exchanging certain of his excess goods or by borrowing from a neighbour, 
which results in a contract (cf Whelpton 1991:181). 
 
3.5 THE ROLE OF INDIGENOUS CONTRACTS  
 
In indigenous law, and in particular, Swazi law and custom, a contract is 
more than a mere instrument for participating in the economic and legal life 
of the community. Indigenous contracts essentially emphasise relations 
between people rather than objects of performances. One of the primary 
functions of the indigenous law of contract is to maintain harmonious 
relations between members of the community through speedy resolution of 
disputes (Anspach 2004:8). Any dispute is seen as potentially damaging to 
the fabric of the community, and accordingly, resolutions – effected either 
through negotiation and mediation or through the courts – give expression to 
community values and moral code (Whelpton 2005:292). 
 
Indigenous contracts are generally made between kinsfolk and in-laws (viz. 
persons already related by status). Social processes and the maintenance of 
good social relations are important underlying fundamentals, functioning 
outside the strict parameters of the law, which direct the application of the 
indigenous law of contract and reflect the values and aspirations of the 
community. The indigenous law of contract has a broad-based orientation to 
ensure that disputes do not damage the fragile fabric of society and provoke 
potentially dangerous disharmony. In order to appreciate fully the nature and 
function of indigenous contracts, a holistic view of the topic has therefore 
been taken, which involved a multi-disciplinary approach, with particular 
emphasis on the disciplines of anthropology and sociology. 
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In remedying a breach of contract, the restoration of harmonious relations 
between not only the contracting parties but also the community at large, is 
of the utmost importance (Whelpton 1991:140). Whilst promises remain 
unperformed, no remedy is available on repudiation by one of the parties to 
the agreement. Accordingly, the concept of fair justice in the unspecialised 
legal systems, differs markedly from that in specialised western systems. It 
does not require that the parties receive the full measure of their bargain, but 
only that any performance rendered is justly compensated for (Whelpton 
n.d.). 
 
3.6 THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF INDIGENOUS CONTRACTS 
 
According to Anspach (2004:10) indigenous contracts have to be examined 
in the context of the fabric of their indigenous social life: contractual 
liability has to be viewed against a backdrop of established community 
values and the perpetuation of harmony within the community. The 
indigenous community appreciates and understands that a contract fulfils an 
important role in the social environment. The parties to a contract are aware 
of, and have regard to, this wider dimension and to the possible social 
ramifications of their contractual relationships. 
 
As in other indigenous legal systems, law amongst the Swazi is a cultural 
universal. The role of contracts of the Swazi must therefore be viewed in the 
context of the culture and way of life of the Swazi people. Swazi law and 
custom is an essential component of the community’s social life and culture. 
Accordingly, Swazi law and custom and social change must be examined 
together to be incorporated into a living law in the indigenous Swazi 
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communities.  Due to its flexible nature, the Swazi indigenous contract is 
liable to develop or adapt to reflect the changing lifestyle of their 
community. It is imbued with a distinctive character embracing both a 
complex combination of social processes and the realities of social life on 
the one hand, and incorporating cultural change and development on the 
other. 
 
The indigenous Swazi contract functions within the community environment 
and takes account of community relations. Hence, whilst reasonable 
expectations are fulfilled, contractual justice lies mainly in the sphere of 
reciprocity or a quid pro quo basis. Contractual terms and conditions can be 
legally adapted to the “living” rules and values of the community, with all 
aspects of the contract conforming to, and taking account of, such 
community values (cf Whelpton 1991:42).  
 
Swazi courts are cognisant of the important social dimension in the 
settlement of contractual disputes among the Swazi. They do not hesitate to 
apply considerations of a morally and ethically persuasive nature to adapt or 
modify strict legal principles in order to achieve “social justice”. Thus, for 
example, the realisation of profits is generally not considered a laudable 
objective at the expense of the economy. In reaching their decision, Swazi 
courts relate their society’s norms to the realities of social life by the 
application of “living” law through a flexible judicial process. 
 
Since contracts among the Swazi are more than a device for establishing the 
economic and legal implications of a transaction, but also for social purposes 
and to control community relations, the real nature of the indigenous Swazi 
 68
contract become evident in that it is what people in the community do (and 
not what they meant) that is important. The manifestation of intention is thus 
the crucial factor and not merely the intent per se: contractual obligations 
result only from actions and dealings in the form of performance or part-
performance. Since a mere promise or a mere agreement does not lead to 
contractual liability, such promises and agreements are considered and dealt 
with only in the realm of the social and moral environment and not the legal. 
 
To establish contractual liability, indigenous contracts seek positive 
performance that is both evident and readily understood by members of the 
community. Hence, only performance or part-performance by one of the 
parties to an agreement meets such a requirement. Given the primary 
function of indigenous law to ensure the perpetuation of harmony in the 
community, performance as the practical rationale for the basis of 
contractual liability is both self-evident and readily appreciated. 
 
3.7 DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS 
 
Most contractual disputes in non-specialised legal systems are settled outside 
of a legal forum by negotiation, mediation and reconciliation, with recourse 
to the courts only if the parties have been unable to resolve the dispute 
among themselves (cf Whelpton 1991:72). In this way, the likelihood of 
disruption of communal harmony is also diminished as the dispute does not 
have to be aired publicly in court. Moreover, the social elements of such 
disputes are often better understood and more readily appreciated outside of 
court proceedings, and accordingly negotiated settlements and mediations 
are often utilised to resolve contractual disputes. In so doing, contractual 
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justice incorporates a measure of social justice by taking account of 
community expectations. 
 
With indigenous courts, settling underlying social problems in the 
community, the courts endeavour to reconcile disputing parties within the 
community’s social harmony. Individuals are persuaded to accept the 
community’s boni mores - the standards of social behaviour and conformity 
(with the emphasis on extra-legal diverse traits such as friendliness and 
generosity). Contractual disputes, in addition to the legal issues, have further 
cultural, social and, to a lesser extent, psychological dimensions. Social 
tensions are relieved or diffused and the prevailing community moral code is 
applied and upheld. 
 
In seeking out the broader issues underlying contractual disputes, the Swazi 
courts also act as custodians of the community’s fundamental values – with 
value judgements being applied in an endeavour to maintain social harmony. 
Any prospective “deviant” behaviour on the part of one of the contracting 
parties is censured and the individuals are thereby helped to conform to 
accepted social norms for the good of the community in general. The aim of 
the indigenous Swazi law of contract is therefore to reconcile people – not 
only with each other but also with the community at large. 
 
Solutions to contractual disputes can thus form a buttress of a traditional 
society’s moral code – an instrument of moral reinforcement maintaining 
social stability at the expense of the individual’s self-centred rights or 
demands. Holistic and acceptable solutions are sought to relieve social 
tension by removing potentially disruptive dispute problems. Universally 
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accepted principles of morality and humanity are invoked as part of the legal 
solution to a contractual dispute. 
 
Moreover, the wealthy elements in the Swazi community cannot use the 
medium of contracts to further their own selfish interests and thereby 
increase their wealth. If hardship was engendered for the other contracting 
party in such a situation, or if any potential social harmony was envisaged, 
the indigenous Swazi courts would not hesitate to emasculate the wealthy 
contracting party’s claim and apply human/community justice. Profit is not a 
worthy motive and no elitist protection exists – the greater good of the 
community will generally prevail in the indigenous Swazi legal system. 
Cultural perceptions of group (as against individual) importance are 
reinforced, with contracts being viewed in a family or community and 
cultural setting. 
 
3.8 THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF INDIGENOUS CONTRACTS 
 
Like in most non-specialised legal systems, legal representation is not 
known in Swazi law and custom. No representation is deemed necessary, as 
members of the community are able to argue the merits of the case in simple, 
unequivocal and readily understood terms before the court. Every adult male 
has the capacity to appear in court, irrespective of whether he is well versed 
in the law of his community. 
 
In deciding contract cases, indigenous Swazi courts are cognisant of the 
value of eliciting everyone’s arguments because the general opinion of all 
those present is important. Moreover, these courts appreciate the persuasive 
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force of the moral value of the community and will strive to take account of 
such principles in reaching a decision. A “just” decision in the context of the 
indigenous Swazi contract thus involves a highly skilled selection and 
application of both legal and moral principles, which will be socially 
acceptable in terms of community conscience and group cohesion. To 
western jurists, trained in accordance with strict legal parameters, this may 
seem an anomaly. However, in the context of an indigenous contract 
context, such seemingly extraneous factors are overlooked at the expense of 
the maintenance of communal harmony. Contracts thus have to be viewed in 
terms of the broader perspective of their effect upon the social life of the 
community – with the legal decisions related to them ensuring that the 
persuasive force of communal mores is upheld. It is crucial to keep in mind 
that indigenous Swazi contracts essentially emphasise relations between 
people rather than objects of contractual performance. This was also found 
by Whelpton (1991:68) in his study of the law of contract of the Bakwena of 
South Africa. 
 
When contractual disputes do reach the Swazi courts it would not simply 
enforce contracts. They would rather settle disputes arising out of contracts. 
More often than not, the courts will settle a dispute by cancelling the 
contract and will try to reinstate the parties in their original position where 
this is possible. 
 
As was found by Walker (1969:71) among the Malete, the primary function 
of indigenous contracts “is to ensure the perpetuation of harmony through 
the speedy resolution of disputes. There is concern for justice to the 
individual, but it must often yield to the greater interest of the community as 
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a whole in preserving harmonious relations between its members. This 
interest is not born solely of altruism, but reflects recognition that in a 
marginal economy, survival may depend upon sharing between friends and 
neighbours and upon the customary links between members which call for 
economic exchange. Any dispute, therefore, is thought to be of potential 
damage to the fabric of the community as a whole”. This corresponds with 
the position among the Swazi. 
 
This study has shown that the indigenous Swazi law of contract is not as 
well developed as the other divisions of the law, e.g. the law of marriage. 
Most transactions involving the production and the exchange of goods and 
services take place between kinsfolk and in-laws (viz. parties already related 
by status). Thus transactions involving strangers (outside status 
relationships) are both unusual and on the periphery of legal relationships. In 
such status-bound transactions, one can readily appreciate the appeal that the 
real and concrete nature of indigenous Swazi contracts has for the two 
parties involved. No obligation can be created through a third party.  This 
position was confirmed by the panel of experts, who also stated that 
representation and stipulation are unknown among the Swazi. Of particular 
appeal would be the simplicity engendered by contractual liability being 
established by visible performance or part-performance of one of the parties 
to the agreement. This in turn, would enable contractual disputes to be 
settled speedily to restore communal harmony (cf Anspach 2004:80). 
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3.9 THE EFFECT OF CHANGE ON THE INDIGENOUS LAW OF 
CONTRACT 
 
With regard to the effect of change in the sphere of the indigenous law of 
contract in general, Whelpton (1991:iv) states that, although indigenous law 
shows clear signs of adapting to new developments, there is also proof that 
established legal principles and human values are being retained. However, 
these changes are unique and are neither typically traditional nor western. 
 
When the culture of a community changes, so must the law, which must be 
adapted to the new circumstances to reflect the new rules and values of the 
community. However, it should be borne in mind that the deep-rooted 
principles of the indigenous law of contract are so entwined with the 
emotions of the people, that people will be more resistant to change. It 
should nevertheless be noted that Swazi law and custom will be in a state of 
change to make it compatible with the new Constitution. This is especially 
true with regard to the rights of individuals, as opposed to group rights. 
 
Swazi law of contract should thus not be regarded as stagnant, but should be 
viewed as a dynamic process of both adaptation and change. Moreover, legal 
rules only function effectively if they can be synchronised with the dynamic 
social and psycho-cultural environment in which they operate. Adaptations 
to the indigenous contract law will include those brought about by legal 
acculturation. 
 
Given the above, any change affecting the basis of contractual liability is 
unlikely to be accepted into the Swazi indigenous law of contract, since that 
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would involve a fundamental departure from its very real and concrete 
nature (requiring performance or part-performance). It is therefore doubtful 
whether executory agreements or promises will be integrated into Swazi law 
and custom, since the principles upon which executory liability of the law of 
contract are based are completely foreign to, and at variance, with the basic 
tenets and concepts of the indigenous Swazi law of contract. 
 
3.10 A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON CULTURAL ASPECTS 
 
Enculturation imbues people with a certain world-view (derived from their 
own culture). Such a world-view clearly impacts on the perceptions and 
application of legal systems, both specialised and non-specialised. As a 
result of the increasing influence of westernisation, indigenous Swazi values 
are generally in a process of change and partial disintegration, with 
established social patterns slowly dissolving. The unspecialised law that 
operates in this changing indigenous environment thus has to be both 
flexible and adaptable in order to remain “living” law for the peoples 
concerned. 
 
In contrasting western and indigenous cultures, the juxtaposition of 
individual rights and communal-based duties will always lead to difficulties 
in comparative analysis. It is important to bear in mind their main objective 
of maintaining communal harmony as this leads to a better understanding of 
the flexible nuances utilised by Swazi indigenous courts in achieving 
solutions to contractual disputes. 
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While the social environment is changing, (due to the modernising 
influences of western values), the deep-rooted elements of culture, which 
enforces Swazi indigenous values, remain strong and largely unchanged. 
Although the Swazi indigenous law of contract is showing signs of adapting 
to new developments and influences, such adaptations are to be regarded as 
relatively superficial in nature. The changes that do occur are unique, and are 
neither typically traditional nor western. Established legal principles and 
human values are being retained. The cultural values underpinning the 
indigenous world-view and way of life are sufficiently strong to remain 
resilient in the face of the partial disintegration of the social fabric, brought 
about by western influences. While some Swazi customs may have been 
partially modified by these influences, core fundamental cultural values are 
reflected largely unchanged in the application of the indigenous Swazi law 
of contract. 
 
3.11 CONCLUSION 
  
In this chapter it is shown that in accepting the existence of a law of contract 
as part of indigenous legal systems allowance must be made in respect of its 
different nature compared to western legal systems.  A mere promise to 
which has been agreed is not enough. Performance or partial performance of 
one of the parties, is essential. 
 
Contractual agreement is not, as in western systems of law, the main 
instrument through which individuals participate in the legal and economic 
of the community.  The obligation arising from general social and especially 
family relations is more important. 
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The social dimension of indigenous contracts are as important as the legal 
obligations arising from contractual agreements.  Indigenous courts are very 
much aware of this fact.  Dispute settlement therefore very often involves 
the role of extra-judicial procedures in which the greater interest of the 
community at large and the status of the disputants become important. 
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Chapter 4 
 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING A CONTRACT IN TERMS 
OF SWAZI LAW AND CUSTOM 
 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Swazi define a contract as a voluntary agreement between two parties, 
imposing obligations upon one or both, and reciprocally conferring rights 
upon the other or both. A contract is established once the contracting parties 
have reached an agreement known as ‘sivumelawano’ and one of the parties 
has performed in terms of the agreement. Compare Whelpton (1991:81) for 
the position among the Bakwena of South Africa, and Prinsloo and Vorster 
(1990:6) for the position among the Batswana of the former 
Bophuthatswana, now known as the Batswana of the North West Province. 
 
4.2 CONSENSUS 
 
Although a mere agreement is not enforceable, consensus is a prerequisite 
for the conclusion of a contract among the Swazi. According to the panel of 
experts, the parties must expressly declare or make known their intent or 
will. A tacit announcement, such as nodding the head only, is not sufficient 
to express any desire or will (cf Whelpton 1991:81). 
 
Consensus is reached in an informal manner in the course of a conversation 
through a process described as “to suggest or propose”. The Swazi speak of 
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‘kucela’ which literally means “to ask”. There is no specific word in siSwati 
for “offer” or “acceptance”.  No particular legal rules exist as a basis for 
reaching consensus. Usually, long discussions take place between the 
parties, questions are asked and suggestions are made until consensus is 
reached. A party is not held liable to a suggestion until one or other form of 
performance in terms thereof has taken place. Until then, any of the parties 
can change their mind. The Swazi say: ‘umuntfu ulala agucuka’, meaning “a 
person changes his/her mind” or ‘litsemba alibulali umanga kudliwa bafati’ 
meaning “hope does not kill”. 
       
Once the parties have reached consensus, there is still time to reconsider the 
decision. The parties are first given an opportunity to reconsider the 
agreement and discuss it with their family members, and can at any time 
change their view or decision. However, should any of the parties already 
have performed, the other party is then also bound to perform in terms of his 
obligations. This was also found by Whelpton (1991:82) amongst the 
Bakwena of South Africa. 
 
A mere agreement has no juridical meaning and is not meant to remain 
pending for an indefinite period. The proposer or undertaker obtains no 
personal rights in terms thereof and can therefore, until such time as 
performance or part performance has taken place, enter into the same 
agreement with anyone else (cf Whelpton 1991:82).  
 
Whelpton (1991:82) found among the Bakwena of South Africa, that 
consensus can only be reached in the presence of the contracting parties. 
Consensus cannot be reached by mail or over the telephone. Due to the 
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concrete nature of the establishment of a contract, a contract comes into 
existence at the place where performance takes place, and not where 
consensus has been reached. This is also the position among the Swazi. 
 
When an agreement between parties is transformed into a contract through 
performance, a relationship of debt is created between the contracting 
parties. A debt must be paid on demand, or at the time agreed upon, and 
always remains payable, no matter how long ago it was incurred. 
Prescription is therefore unknown in Swazi law and custom. The Swazi 
maxim in this regard is ‘licala aliboli’, meaning “a debt does not decay”. 
 
With regard to the Tswana in the former Bophuthatswana, now known as 
North West Province, Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:6) write that an 
agreement “comes about through an offer by one party and acceptance of the 
offer by another”. According to the Swazi panel of experts, such an 
agreement will only be executed once one of the parties has performed in 
terms of the agreement. The panel reiterated that there are no general terms 
for “offer” and “acceptance” in siSwati.  
 
Liability arises from real (executed) contracts; that is, contracts in which one 
party has partially or totally fulfilled his obligations (cf  Prinsloo and Vorster 
(1990:10). 
 
From this it is clear that in Swazi law and custom the emphasis is on the 
concrete. An agreement must be followed by actual and concrete 
performance in order to establish contractual liability. 
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4.2.1 Consensus reached in an improper manner  
 
According to the Swazi panel of experts, an agreement only acquires 
juridical content once performance has taken place in terms thereof. Parties 
should be cautious during the negotiation phases not to express wishes with 
which they cannot comply. Should it appear after performance that their 
expressed wishes exceeded the limits of decency, the prejudiced party could 
have recourse to the law, which could have prejudicial consequences for the 
proposer (cf Whelpton 1991:84). 
 
The literature on indigenous legal systems does not always differentiate 
clearly between conduct that causes the contract to become void or voidable. 
At the same time, different meanings are given to the content and 
consequences of notions such as fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation and 
improper influence. Coetzee et al (1985:142) state that factors such as fraud, 
intimidation and improper influencing cause a contract to be null and void. 
According to them, the Tswana distinguish clearly between intent (ka 
bomo/ka maikalelo) and negligence (botlhaswa). When negligence cannot be 
proven, no claim exists against a party. A contract can, however, be attacked 
on the basis of misrepresentation. Among the Southern Sotho of Qwaqwa, 
Strydom (1985:434) found that misrepresentation, force, intimidation and 
improper influencing have a negative impact on the validity of a purchase 
agreement. The prejudiced party will not be held liable in terms thereof and 
can repudiate the agreement. According to Pauw (1985:109), intentional 
misrepresentation does not influence the validity of a contract among the 
Imidushane and Amabhele. 
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Also, Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:6) do not distinguish between 
misrepresentation that excludes consensus, and misrepresentation that causes 
a contract to become null and void. According to Prinsloo and Vorster 
(1990a:6), “if consensus is obtained by improper means, that is where a party 
has been misled through misrepresentation or coerced by threat (duress) to 
enter into a contract, the contract is voidable at the option of the prejudiced 
or threatened party”. The Swazi distinguishes between misrepresentation 
(kuyenga), force (kusabisa) and improper influencing as ways of obtaining 
consensus in an improper manner. 
 
4.2.1.1 Misrepresentation (Kugenga)  
 
According to Whelpton (1991:85), misrepresentation is known as ‘reelelo’ 
amongst the Bakwena of South Africa.  The Swazi refers to it as ‘kuyenga’.  
Whelpton (1991:86) writes that the Bakwena of South Africa clearly 
distinguish between intentional misrepresentation and unintentional 
misrepresentation. Intentional misrepresentation is fraudulent. Among the 
Swazi, fraudulent misrepresentation is dealt with as a criminal matter and 
they refer to it as ‘licebo lekuyenga’. 
 
Negligent misrepresentation (budlapha kukhuluma lokubudlapha) occurs 
when the misleading party was not aware of his misrepresentation or that it 
would have a negative impact on the party who was misled. Whelpton 
(1991:86) gives the following example: Should A sell grain pots to B, 
together with a beer pot, which happened to be in between the grain pots, B 
would be in a position to cancel the agreement on the basis that A was 
negligent. The responsibility rests with A to ensure that he sells the correct 
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goods. Misrepresentation is usually seen as unawareness of the inaccuracy of 
a proposal. According to the Bakwena of South Africa, it is possible for a 
contract to become null and void (Whelpton 1991:87). This means that no 
party to the contract is liable in terms of the contract. With both intentional 
and unintentional misrepresentation, the parties are obliged to return 
whatever they received in terms of the contract. The same example was put 
to the Swazi panel of experts and they agreed with the viewpoint of the 
Bakwena of South Africa. They refer to negligent misrepresentation as 
‘budlapha kukhuluma lokubudlapha’. 
 
Among the Tswana, if it is impossible for the prejudiced party to return the 
objects with which he had been misled, he cannot demand that the contract 
be set aside. The misled party cannot retain the object and claim damages. A 
party can only claim damages in cases of intentional and negligent 
misrepresentation. The claim for damages can also only be in respect of 
actual damages suffered. A party cannot demand to be placed in a position 
he would have been if the misrepresentation had not occurred. The damages 
claimed demand a comparison between the current patrimonial position of 
the misled and the patrimonial position he would have been in had the 
misrepresentation not taken place. Furthermore, besides the damages that the 
guilty party has to pay, a court can also order the payment of a fine 
(mangangatlhaa). It is understood that the fine payable is levied, because the 
Court’s time has been wasted and does not relate to the misrepresentation 
(Van Blerk 1990a:72). 
 
Among the Swazi, the party who has been misled may withdraw from the 
transaction. The Swazi say: ‘kuphuma’ or ‘kuyekela’.  Both parties must then 
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restore what they have received under the contract.  Alternatively, the 
prejudiced party may adhere to the transaction but limit its performance to 
the value of the object agreed upon, or insist that the object agreed upon be 
delivered instead of the misrepresented article. It is rare in Swazi law and 
custom to take something without verifying its true value and nature:  The 
Swazi say: ‘emaswati akamtsatsi kati asesakeni’, meaning “a Swazi does not 
buy a cat in a bag for himself”. 
 
4.2.1.2 Force and intimidation 
 
According to Whelpton (1991:88), force or coercion (tshosetso) is known to 
the Bakwena of South Africa. They distinguish between two forms of force, 
namely mere physical overpowering, for example, where A grabs B, holds 
him and forces him to sign a document, and a threat where A points a 
firearm at B and orders him to sign a document. Force by physical 
overpowering does not result in a contract.  In the case of a threat, a contract 
does exist, but is voidable on the basis that consensus was obtained in an 
improper manner. According to the Swazi force and intimidation used to 
conclude a contract, deserve to be punished.  
  
4.2.1.3 Improper influencing 
 
For the Batswana of the North West Province, improper influencing 
(tlhotlheletso) is not a ground for setting aside a contract (Prinsloo & Vorster 
1990a:7). They give the example of a medicine-man who “persuades a 
family to accept his offer of medicines they do not want in exchange for an 
ox. If the medicines are accepted by the family they cannot refuse to render 
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counter-performance on the ground of undue influence.” Whelpton 
(1991:89) questions whether any inference can be drawn from this example, 
as several factors could influence any or every situation. Whelpton also asks 
whether the concept of misrepresentation is not broad enough to include 
improper influencing.  
 
The Swazi, however, agreed with the above mentioned finding of Prinsloo 
and Vorster. According to the Swazi, improper influencing seldom occurs 
because entering into a contract was formerly a matter between two families 
and it was not easy to influence the wishes of a family.   
 
4.3 PERFORMANCE MUST BE POSSIBLE 
 
Whelpton (1991:90) writes that performance must be possible at the time a 
contract is concluded, otherwise there is no contract. If performance was 
possible at the time of the conclusion of the contract, but becomes 
impossible at a later stage due to unforeseen circumstances or due to 
circumstances beyond the debtor’s control, the debtor will be released from 
the obligation to perform. No damages can however be claimed. The 
Bakwena of South Africa explained this with the maxim ‘o se ke wa sugela 
ngwana thari mpeng’, meaning “don’t knit a shawl for a baby before it’s 
born”, in other words, “don’t count your chickens before they hatch”.  The 
Swazi agree with this point of view.  They have a saying ‘ungayibambi 
inhlwa ngenhloko isaphuma’ which means “do not catch an ant before it 
comes out of its hole by himself”. 
 
 85
According to the Swazi, performance must be possible when the agreement 
is concluded. If one of the reciprocal performances is impossible at the time 
the contract is entered into, the contract is void and no performance under 
the contract is due. Therefore, in the case of exchange, for example, if five 
sheep are delivered for a specific ox, which was dead when the agreement 
was entered into, then they must be returned. The position is the same as 
where the parties make the existence of the contract dependent on the 
assumption that the ox does exist. 
 
Among the Swazi, no damages, referred to as ‘umonakalo’, are claimable 
when the contract is void on the grounds of impossibility of performance, 
known as ‘kungeke kwendeke’. If the creditor has incurred expenses in 
building a kraal for the ox, he cannot sue for reimbursement in addition to 
the return of the five sheep, when the debtor had no means of knowing that 
the ox was dead. A party is not expected to incur such expenses before he is 
in possession of the object concerned. Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:8) 
concur, but state that, if the wrongdoer is responsible for the fact that 
performance was impossible, he should pay all costs incurred. However, 
only expenses directly related to the fulfilment of the contract are allowed.  
 
 
4.4 PERFORMANCE MUST BE DETERMINABLE 
 
Most of the available literature on indigenous legal systems does not give 
much detail on this aspect of performance. Among the Southern Sotho of 
Qwaqwa, Strydom (1985:517-518) states that “Informante het beweer dat 
kontrakte ondersteun word deur algemene regsbeginsels en dat dit nie nodig 
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is om die beginsel by die aangaan van ‘n kontrak uitdruklik tot die 
voorwaardes van die kontrak by te voeg nie. Vaagheid in formulering of 
onduidelikheid oor verpligtinge kan in die verband nie as verweer aangevoer 
word vir die nie-lewering van kontraktuele prestasie nie” (informants 
asserted that contracts are supported by general legal principles and that it is 
not necessary to add these principles explicitly to the conditions of the 
contract when entering into it. Vagueness in formulation or obscurity in 
regard to obligations cannot be put forward in this regard for the non-
delivery of contractual performance – [own translation]). The Swazi 
concurred with this viewpoint. 
 
According to Whelpton (1991:91), this allegation would have been 
applicable in original indigenous law when exchange was the rule and goods 
of a similar quality were returned. The parties did not have to negotiate 
counter performance as this was determined by law (ex lege). An equally 
valuable counter performance was a naturalia of a contract. Uncertainty was 
also mostly excluded, as contracts were concluded between family groups.  
 
4.5 THE TRANSACTION, PERFORMANCE AND PURPOSE 
MUST BE LAWFUL 
 
It is clear from the available literature that this aspect of the indigenous law 
of contract has thus far not been fully investigated. Olivier et al (1989:631) 
simply state that courts sometimes used the maxim contra bonos mores as an 
equivalent of the maxim that an act should not be “strydig met 
staatsgedragslyn en natuurlike geregtigheid”.  Bekker (1989:57) alleges that 
the trade in human beings (slaves) was in contravention of public interest 
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and that a daughter could not be offered in payment of a debt as this would 
boil down to human trafficking. The Bakwena of South Africa agreed with 
this statement (Whelpton 1991:93). According to them, a contract would be 
unlawful or contra bonos mores if it was prohibited by law, or if it was 
contrary to public interest or the morals of the community.  
 
According to the Swazi, an unlawful transaction, referred to as ‘lokungekho 
emtsetfweni’, is not recognised and no action is allowed. Moreover, where 
the transaction is unlawful, the parties may be punished for committing a 
public offence. For example, if a plaintiff delivered a bull in exchange for 
killing his enemy and the defendant later refused to adhere to his 
commitment and to return the bull, the plaintiff would have no action against 
the defendant. The Swazi have different categories of legal wrongs 
(offences) which could be regarded as being either against the person or 
family, their property, the authorities or other “unnatural offences”. Since 
this section is only concerned with the unlawfulness of performance in terms 
of a contract, focusing on the offences individually is beyond its scope. 
 
Among the Bakwena of South Africa, various contracts are forbidden ex lege 
(Whelpton 1991:94).  The most important are contracts concluded on a 
Sunday, bribery, and contracts to commit a crime against the community’s 
mores; in other words, contracts that are contra bonos mores.  Among the 
Swazi, a contract may be concluded on a Sunday.  It would, however, be an 
offence to buy off a crime. The siSwati term for bribery is ‘kutsenga 
umuntfu’. 
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No reference was found to wager agreements in the available literature. 
Whelpton (1991:96) attributes this to the fact that no study has been 
undertaken on the law of contract in urban areas. The Swazi people are 
familiar with the concept, but in the form of a game, and do not associate it 
with the law of contract. According to the Bakwena of South Africa, cattle 
herders often took a bet in the ‘veld’ to determine who was the strongest or 
could throw a ‘kierie’ (staff) the furthest. If a person lost the bet and refused 
to pay what he had bet, the other herder would ignore him to force him to do 
so (Whelpton 1991:96).  
 
Nowadays, due to the influence of urbanisation, bets have taken on a 
juridical stature and relate to the law of contract. However, no differentiation 
is made between wager agreements and gambling. These concepts are linked 
to, or associated with, some sort of games contained in a contract and 
whereby parties could win or lose (Whelpton 1991:97). According to the 
Bakwena of South Africa, both betting and gambling are seen as unlawful 
forms of contracts, due to their negative social consequences. They 
distinguish between two forms of wager agreements, known as ‘peelano’. 
The first is a general wager agreement by which each party could win and 
gain something at the cost of the other. The other form does not reflect any 
reference to indecency (thona) and is not seen as unlawful. According to 
Whelpton (1991:97), this form of wager agreements shows a strong 
resemblance to the wager agreements, super re honesta found earlier in 
Roman law. The parties to these bets or agreements had a fair interest in the 
conclusion.  
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Wager agreements and gambling are generally seen as unlawful and 
unenforceable among the Swazi. According to the Swazi, wager agreements 
are not voidable but merely unenforceable. One can therefore not institute 
any legal action to recover a debt incurred by a wager agreement. 
 
4.6 PERFORMANCE OF PARTIAL PERFORMANCE MUST BE 
DELIVERED 
 
As already stated, a mere promise or agreement is not sufficient in Swazi 
law and custom for the conclusion of a contract. In other words, a contract 
does not come into being because of a mere promise. Performance or partial 
performance is required. Similarly to western legal systems, performance 
can be to do, to give, or not to do (dare, facere, non facere).  Nevertheless, a 
promise remains a prerequisite for the conclusion of a valid agreement. 
Whelpton (1991:100) compares this position to a great extent to that of the 
earlier Roman period, when the question was always asked what legal 
consequences resulted from a promise. The reason for the validity of an 
agreement was referred to by the Romans as causa obligationis.  Roman law 
was formalistic and the parties to a promise had to perform some pre-
determined formality, such as uttering formal words or delivering an object, 
for the enforceability of the contract. A promise without a causa obligationis 
resulted in a nudum pactum and ex nudo pacto non oritur actio; that is to 
say, a mere promise or agreement does not give rise to any legal rights, 
obligations or consequences.  
 
In terms of English law, a ‘simple contract’ requires a ‘valuable 
consideration’ before such contract comes into existence. According to 
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Whelpton (1991:100), the ‘consideration’ concept in terms of English law 
requires some quid pro quo between the parties, namely by the person who 
promised something to the person to whom it was promised. For example, 
before A could enforce a promise on B, A first had to deliver proof that he 
had given B something in exchange for what B delivered or had to deliver. 
Performance or partial performance is an indication of a serious intent by the 
parties to bind themselves legally. Such an intent cannot be established by 
any other means than performance or partial performance.  
 
Whelpton (1991:101) investigated whether a promise of a donation has any 
legal meaning among the Bakwena of South Africa.  According to them, no 
debt is incurred upon making a promise to donate something. Such a 
promise is merely a prerequisite for the establishment of a valid contract of 
donation. If the promise to donate something is honoured, then the 
beneficiary thereof can receive it without any obligation to exchange 
something in payment for this. A promise to donate something, therefore, 
does not create any debt. Yet Vorster and Prinsloo (1989:34) state that a 
mere promise does create a debt, but it does not result in any obligations as 
illustrated by the contract of donation.  A contract of donation in terms of 
western legal systems, is unknown to the Swazi. 
 
4.7 THE PARTIES MUST HAVE CAPACITY  
 
A further requisite for the establishment of a valid contract in terms of 
indigenous law of contract, is that the parties to the contract should have the 
capacity to enter into an legal obligation. Regarding African law and the 
capacity of an individual, M’Baye (1975:143-144) states that it “would be an 
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exaggeration to believe that African law never considers the individual. 
Allot has shown that, while only the group counts as against third parties, the 
individual is far from being entirely deprived of rights within the group. 
However, even within the group, the role of the individual as such is 
relatively minor in Negro-African legal relations. Even those who hold that 
in the African system the group does not wholly absorb the individual, admit 
that this is true. The legal status of each individual, taken by himself, 
depends on his ‘position’ within the social group. Such positions can be 
schematically reduced to those of the ‘personage’, the woman, the stranger, 
the child, the sick man, and the slave.”  With regard to the Batswana of 
Botswana, Schapera (1965:146) states that women and unmarried children, 
in principle, cannot conclude or enter into contracts without the assistance of 
their guardians, although such persons could enter into contracts enforced by 
a court of law. 
 
From the available literature, with the exception of a few variations, the 
position appears to be similar among most indigenous people regarding 
capacity in terms of indigenous law (cf Walker 1969:69; Pauw 1985:107 & 
Strydom 1985:511). According to Whelpton (1991:105), even though 
modern indigenous law strongly influences the status of the African person, 
by which means he or she obtains legal capacity, the role of the family group 
cannot be disregarded, especially in terms of contracts relating to 
engagement and marriage. 
 
In Swazi law and custom, the head of the family (inhloko yemuti), in 
consultation with the members of his family, concludes a contract on behalf 
of, and in the interests of the family. He is liable for the fulfilment of the 
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obligations under contracts entered into by him or by a member of his 
family, with his consent. Although individuals are allowed to initiate 
agreements, they must consult certain categories of relatives like the 
grandmother (bogogo), paternal aunts and the head of the household or 
homestead. Swazi law and custom does not recognise absolute majority. For 
as long as there is an older male person in a homestead, all others are subject 
to his authority. The family head, therefore, possesses the greatest authority 
within the family. However, since consultation, referred to by the Swazi as 
‘kubukisana’ plays a major role in the Swazi way of life, the family head 
may not act arbitrarily and not disregard advice arising out of consultations. 
The extent of involvement and consultation with other family members 
depends on the nature of the contract, termed by the Swazi as ‘luhlobo 
lwisivumelwapo’. For instance, contracts involving the exchange of small 
stock and grain may not necessitate the same level of consultation as 
contracts involving the exchange of cattle.  
 
According to Whelpton (1991:105), the Bakwena of South Africa 
acknowledge that an individual traditionally also shares his or her subjective 
rights with other members of the agnatic group. A member of the agnatic 
group shares that in relation to his or her status within the group. Such status 
is influenced by factors such as position within the family and household, 
age, gender and marital status. Due to such shared rights, majority is of no 
importance. The idea of a specific age at which a person becomes 
emancipated was formerly unknown to indigenous cultures. Individuals’ 
capacities increased as and when their status changed, but they could never 
reach a position where, as individuals, they could act independently from the 
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agnatic group. Myburgh’s findings confirm this point of view (1985:77-83, 
110-111).  
 
Whelpton (1991:106) writes that among the Bakwena of South Africa 
various persons have legal capacity, such as married men within the agnatic 
group and unmarried major persons within the agnatic group. Both are 
subordinate to the head of the agnatic group, when decisions impact on the 
family and the agnatic group itself. Furthermore, a widow within the agnatic 
group has full legal capacity, as a woman’s marriage does not dissolve when 
her husband dies. The household continues and, as a member of her 
household, she shares in all the rights, obligations and capacities of the 
agnatic group. She has full capacity with regard to her personal property and 
retains her original capacity as a married woman in the household.  
 
Among the Bakwena of South Africa, certain persons have no capacity to act 
or enter into any contract (Whelpton (1991:106-108).  These people are 
listed below. 
 
• A married woman within the agnatic group. She is subject to her 
husband’s guardianship. 
• Insane persons have no capacity even in circumstances where they only 
obtain rights, and no obligations. Therefore, an insane person cannot even 
accept a donation or gift. Such a person is permanently under the 
authority of the agnatic group. 
• Drunkards - A drunk person who is unaware of the consequences of his 
or her acts, has no legal capacity. 
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• Minors - Traditionally, majority was not known to indigenous peoples.  
Age was, however, not without legal meaning, as a person under the age 
of puberty could not marry. 
 
Myburgh (1985:77-83) confirms that age, as such, has no specific legal 
meaning and greater meaning was given “to puberty and the specific 
ceremonies generally know as initiation ceremonies”. 
 
According to Whelpton (1991:109), because minors participate in certain 
economic activities outside the rural areas, they are allowed to obtain 
property, although their guardians are entitled to a reasonable share of their 
income. Should any dispute arise involving minors, whether within or 
outside the rural area, they continue to be assisted by their guardians.  
 
Rights and duties are controlled and determined by the family according to 
the individual’s evolving status and capacity. Traditionally, the head of the 
agnatic group, in collaboration with the members of the family, concluded 
contracts on behalf of the group and he would then be liable to meet all 
obligations in terms of such a contract. Individuals could not enter into or 
conclude any contracts as individuals. However, there is general consensus 
that nowadays adults can enter into contracts. 
 
The concept of absolute majority is not recognised in Swazi law and custom. 
Consequently an individual is perpetually subordinate to the family. 
According to Swazi law and custom, even a married man (indvodza letsetse) 
is subordinate to his family. He has the responsibility and a degree of 
authority over his wife, children and household property. He does not act 
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independently and has to consult his wife in dealing with household 
property. Decisions on major issues are taken in consultation with the family 
head or successor (inkhosana) in his absence. Furthermore, unmarried adults 
(labangakendzi/labangakatsatsi) are subject to the family head (inhloko 
yemuti) in family affairs. Although they have legal and contractual capacity, 
they are precluded from taking certain major family decisions and may not 
establish their own household without the consent of the family head. Any 
property acquired by unmarried adults falls under the authority and control 
of the head of their household. 
 
In Swazi law and custom, a married woman (umfati) is subordinate to her 
husband’s family under the guardianship of her husband and has no legal or 
contractual capacity. Any property she may acquire belongs to her husband, 
who administers it in consultation with her. There are exceptions to this rule, 
namely instances where her husband has given her a milk cow (inkhomo 
yelubisi) and a ‘liphakelo beast’, which is a gift given to a married woman 
by her husband, or a beast, known as ‘insulamnyembeti’, meaning to “wipe 
off the tears.”  These beasts do not form part of the general household 
property.  
 
A married woman has the capacity to appear in court provided that she is 
accompanied by either her husband or any other member of the family 
delegated by the head of the family. However, she lacks the capacity to 
institute legal action in the absence of her husband or her husband’s family 
representative.  
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In terms of Swazi law and custom, a widow (umfelakati) is considered 
married to her marital family. This is due to the fact that a marriage is not 
considered to be between the contracting parties alone, but between two 
families. When a man dies, his wife remains with his family and the late 
husband’s brother is given to her as first choice partner (uyangenwa).  He 
takes over the guardianship over her.   
 
4.8 FORMALITIES REQUIRED TO BE FULFILLED 
 
According to the Batswana of the North West Province, no specific 
formalities or ceremonies are required for the conclusion of a contract 
(Prinsloo & Vorster 1990a:6). Contracts are usually verbally concluded in 
the presence of witnesses, although the presence of witnesses is not essential 
for a contract to be valid. Nowadays the parties can agree that, once their 
contract is put in writing, it will take legal effect. All transactions relating to 
property and controlled by legislation must be in writing. In Botswana, the 
presence of witnesses only serves an evidential purpose. Their presence is 
not a requirement for the validity of a contract (Schapera 1965:145; Walker 
1969:68). 
 
According to Strydom (1985:515), the presence of witnesses is not a 
requirement for the validity of a contract amongst the Southern Sotho of 
Qwaqwa and only has an evidential value, should a dispute arise from or 
regarding the contract. Among the Imidushane and Amabhele of the Eastern 
Cape, Pauw (1985:114) found that a contract comes into existence if the 
parties have performed in the presence of witnesses. It can therefore be 
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concluded that the presence of witnesses is a requirement for the validity for 
the conclusion of a contract. 
 
Among the Bakwena of South Africa, there are no formal requirements for 
the conclusion of a valid contract (Whelpton 1991:110). The presence of 
witnesses is not a requirement for the validity of a contract, although 
witnesses serve an important purpose in terms of the law of evidence. 
According to Whelpton (1991:111), two or more witnesses are preferable 
among the Bakwena of South Africa.  The local court of the Bakwena people 
display their discontent and reluctance to hear a matter when the parties have 
no witnesses to the transaction.  
 
Among the Swazi, no formal requirements are prescribed to ensure the 
validity of a contract. The parties, must, however, conclude their contracts in 
the presence of witnesses, known as ‘bofakazi’. 
 
4.9 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter indicated that contracts are real in nature, which means a bare 
promise or mere agreement is not sufficient to establish contractual liability. 
Liabilities arise from real (executed) contracts; that is, contracts in which 
one party has partially or totally fulfilled his obligations. A contract is 
basically a voluntary agreement between two parties, imposing obligations 
upon one or both and reciprocally conferring rights upon the other (or both). 
It must be concluded directly between the parties themselves in the presence 
of each other. Among the Swazi, witnesses are not generally essential for the 
validity of the contract but they do serve an important purpose in terms of 
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the law of evidence. Most contracts are still concluded by oral agreement but 
are occasionally put in writing nowadays. Not all persons have legal or 
contractual capacity. The head of the family remains liable for all contractual 
obligations. 
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Chapter 5 
 
BREACH OF CONTRACT  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature reviewed revealed no systematic references to breach of 
contract and the remedies in indigenous legal systems within a theoretical 
framework (cf Schapera 1965:150; Pauw 1985:114; Strydom 1985:520; 
Prinsloo & Vorster 1990a:13; Whelpton 1991:139). 
 
The Swazi view the consequences rather than the actual ‘breach of contract’ 
as the most important aspect thereof. The serious and detrimental effects for 
the whole community are regarded as a crime. For this reason, then, great 
importance is placed on the parties who enter into a contractual relationship 
and all efforts are made to resolve a dispute as soon as possible (cf Whelpton 
1991:139).  
 
The perpetuation of harmony through the speedy resolution of disputes is 
very important to the Swazi. Although there is concern for justice to the 
individual, it must yield to the greater interest of the group as a whole in 
preserving amicability between its members (cf Walker 1969:71).  
Consequently, in a case of breach of contract, the endeavoured is to restore 
each of the parties to the position they were in before entering into the 
contract, rather than the position they would have been in if the contract had 
been executed. When given a choice between awarding damages for lost 
expectations and damages to cover out-of-pocket losses, the  Swazi courts 
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invariably choose the latter for the claimant will not be any worse off than 
before the contract was formed and will be compensated for any actual harm 
(cf Walker 1969:71). 
 
According to Walker (1969:71), “this approach is thought to remove the 
claimant’s basis for complaint by restoring him to his pre-contract status 
while avoiding any lingering animosity on the part of the defendant which 
would result from a more excessive award.”  The nature of contract 
remedies, therefore reflects the desire for amicable settlement. The Swazi 
consider an award of damage for lost expectation unnecessary, and perhaps 
harmfully excessive. 
 
According to Whelpton (1991:140), the Bakwena of South Africa regard 
breach of contract as similar or equal to non-performance; in other words, to 
default on an undertaking to perform or to perform fully (negative and 
positive performance). Due to the concrete nature of the law of contract, 
both forms of performance would only be possible if a contract already 
existed; that is, if one of the parties had performed in terms of the contract. 
 
In addition to non-performance, repudiation and impossibility of 
performance are also forms of breach of contract, referred to as ‘kwephula 
sivumelwano’ among the Swazi. Both these forms of breach of contract are 
known to the Bakwena of South Africa (Whelpton 1991:141). Repudiation 
occurs when a contracting party refuses to meet his contractual obligations. 
An example of impossibility of performance is when it is objectively or 
subjectively impossible for one of the parties to perform in terms of the 
agreement. 
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In the case of breach of contract, the aggrieved party may sue the debtor. 
The creditor does not need to act immediately if the debtor does not honour 
his obligations. He may continue to confirm his rightful claim to his 
obligatory rights by means of periodic demands. The debtor must be given a 
reasonable period to perform and great patience is to be shown. Should the 
debtor’s failure to perform persist, the creditor may take him to the chief’s 
court and institute an action for the rendering of the performance or, upon 
default, claim the return of the performance delivered. No consequential 
damage can be claimed. The aggrieved party may, however, be able to claim 
compensation for expenses incurred if that can be proven (cf Whelpton 
1991:149-150). 
 
Once a contract has been concluded amongst the Swazi, a relationship of 
debt is created between the contracting parties. A debt must be paid on 
demand, or at the time agreed upon, and remains payable, no matter how 
long ago it was incurred. Prescription is therefore unknown in Swazi law and 
custom. The Swazi say: ‘licala aliboli’, meaning “a debt does not decay”. 
 
5.2 DIFFERENT FORMS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT  
 
The various forms of breach of contract are discussed below. 
 
5.2.1 Non-performance  
 
Failure to perform among the Swazi can be compared to the form of breach 
of contract known in western legal systems as mora debitoris. According to 
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De Wet and Yeats (1978:142), mora debitoris is when a debtor drags his feet 
in meeting his obligations. 
 
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:14) give the following example among the 
Batswana of the North West Province: group A enters into an agreement 
with group B in terms of which group B undertaker to thatch group A’s 
building with thatching grass in return for a heifer. The agreement requires 
that the work be done before the rains, which are almost at hand. If B fails to 
commence the work within a reasonable time after reaching agreement, then 
A can pull out of the agreement and advise B accordingly, as at that stage 
there was only an agreement from which no contractual liabilities ensued. 
The same example was put to the Swazi panel of experts and they agreed 
with this conclusion of the Tswana. 
 
According to the Swazi panel of experts, the parties must perform 
simultaneously.  They say: ‘tandla tiyagezana’, meaning “hands wash each 
other”.  The Bakwena of South Africa refer to this requirement as ‘mabogo 
dinku athebana’, meaning “the sheep wash each other’s hands” (Whelpton 
1991:142).  The parties could also agree that one of them may perform at a 
later stage. Usually a specific day is determined for performance, although 
this need not be so. Should a party neglect to perform on the specifically 
agreed day, he is technically guilty of breach of contract. It is not customary 
for the creditor to act immediately. The creditor is expected first to remind 
the debtor of his obligation. The Swazi say: ‘kukhumbuta’, meaning “to 
remind him”. The Bakwena of South Africa refers to it as ‘go gakolola’ 
(Whelpton 1991:142). A court will not give any relief to a creditor if he has 
not first demanded performance from the debtor, even though a specific day 
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was determined for performance. Should the debtor then continue to refuse 
to perform, the creditor can approach the court for assistance. Should no 
specific date be determined for performance, reasonable time must elapse 
before a party can demand performance (cf  Whelpton 1991:142). 
 
Schapera (1970:244) found that the Batswana of Botswana regard one year 
as a reasonable time. If performance has not taken place after a reasonable 
time, the creditor must then demand that the debtor perform (gakolola). 
Should the debtor continue to remain in default, the creditor, together with 
his family members must go to the debtor and, in the presence of the 
debtor’s family, request that he meet his obligations. If, after this process, 
the debtor continues to be in default, the creditor may approach the court for 
relief. The Swazi concurred with this viewpoint of the Batswana. 
 
Omission or failure to perform in terms of an agreement can be compared to 
what is understood as defective performance in western legal systems. In 
Sweet v Ragergahara ((1978) (1) SA 311 (D) 138c), performance in terms of 
an agreement is defined as follows: “Defective performance relates to 
timeous performance not in accordance with the terms of the agreement”. 
 
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990 a:14) give the following example with regard to 
the Tswana of the North West Province:  
 
‘Where group B completed the work but the workmanship was 
shoddy and the roof was not watertight, group A could demand 
specific performance that is proper performance, before they delivered 
the heifer to group B. If group B refused to perform properly, group A 
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could claim compensation for the cost of labour required to correct the 
defect. Inadequate performance might also entitle the creditor to 
withdraw from the contract in appropriate circumstances and demand 
return of his performance in addition to claiming any damages for any 
loss that resulted from the breach’. 
 
A similar example was given to the Swazi panel of experts and they came to 
the same conclusion.  It would thus appear that the Swazi also acknowledge 
defective or inadequate performance as a form of breach of contract.  If the 
creditor is also in breach, he will not immediately take action against the 
debtor, but will first give the debtor the opportunity to remedy the 
inadequate performance. 
 
5.2.2 Repudiation 
 
This form of breach of contract can also be referred to as refusal or negation.  
Amongst the Bakwena of South Africa, breach of contract occurs if the 
existence of a contract is denied, or if the terms of a contract are disputed 
when the other party has already performed (Whelpton 1991:145).  
 
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:14) also identified repudiation as a form of 
breach of contract among the Batswana of the North West Province, and 
point out that since contractual liability is not based on a mere agreement, 
repudiation of a promise before performance does not amount to breach of 
contract. The Swazi panel of experts was in agreement with this finding of 
Prinsloo and Vorster. 
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Among the Swazi, contractual obligations are based on an agreement 
between the parties, but liability arises only after performance by one of the 
parties, in accordance with the agreement. A mere agreement does not give 
rise to liability to perform. An agreement must be followed by actual and 
concrete performance in order to establish contractual liability. Until 
promises to perform are carried out, no remedy is available if one party 
repudiates the agreement, known to the Swazi as ‘kuphuka sivumelwano’. 
They say: ‘Umuntfu ulala agucuka’, meaning “a person changes his/her 
mind” or ‘litsemba alibulali umganga kudliwa bafati’, meaning “hope does 
not kill”. 
 
5.2.3 Impossibility of performance  
 
As already stated, performance must be possible when an agreement is 
concluded. Should performance become impossible after conclusion of the 
contract, due to the fault of any of the parties, the Swazi regard it as breach 
of contract. They refer to it as ‘kungeke kwendeke’.  This was also found by 
Whelpton (1991:146) among the Bakwena of South Africa.  
 
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:14) made use of the following example to 
explain impossibility of performance: “in the event that group B arrives a 
few days after the agreement was reached with grass to begin thatching and 
group A pleads inconvenience and requires them to return later and this is 
repeated until the rains come and the thatching grass that was left at group 
A’s site is damaged, group B might withdraw from the contract on the 
ground of group A’s prevention of the work”. They concluded that the 
impossibility performing due to the fault of any of the parties, is a form of 
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breach of contract. This was confirmed by the Swazi panel of experts with 
regard to the position among the Swazi.  
 
5.3 REMEDIES IN BREACH OF CONTRACT 
 
5.3.1 Specific performance 
 
Western legal systems define specific performance as an order to perform a 
specified act or to pay money in pursuance of a contractual obligation 
(Christie 2006:522). Specific performance is known among the Swazi.  It is, 
however, a prerequisite that the plaintiff should first ask for performance, or 
remind the defendant to perform, which is referred to in siSwati as ‘kucela’, 
from the defendant before he can approach a court. Only then can a court 
order a defendant to comply with his obligation as per the contract. Should 
performance have become impossible, the court cannot order specific 
performance. This is also the situation among the Bakwena of South Africa 
(cf Whelpton 1991:148). 
  
According to Walker (1969:19), the court has discretion to amend the terms 
of the agreement to ensure harmony in the community. Roberts (1970:63) 
disagrees, stating “provided the terms of the contract of exchange are clear, 
these must be strictly enforced”.  
 
According to the Swazi, a lesser performance than that which was agreed to 
would be acceptable in view of maintaining harmonious relationships. They 
say: ‘akufanani nekuhlala’, meaning “half an egg is better than an empty 
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shell” (cf Whelpton 1991:148) for the position among the Bakwena of South 
Africa. 
 
5.3.2 Damages 
 
In terms of western legal systems, damages can be claimed when the 
aggrieved party cancels the contract due to non-performance and then 
institutes legal action for the financial loss that was suffered due to the 
breach of contract (Christie 2006:543). Damages for breach of contract are 
normally not intended to compensate the innocent party for his or her loss, 
but to put him or her in the position he or she would have been in if the 
contract had been properly performed. In the case of Norrick v Benjamin 
(1972(Z) SA 842(A)), the courts ruled that the test to determine whether the 
innocent party had suffered any loss was whether he or she had been placed 
in the position he or she would have been in if the other party had performed 
properly or timeously. 
 
Among the Swazi, the purpose of claiming damages, known as ‘kucela 
sincenphetelo’ is not to place the debtor in the position in which he would 
have been if there had been no breach of contract but, under certain 
circumstances, to remunerate him for damages he had suffered due to the 
breach. Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:8) found that among the Batswana of 
the North West Province, no damages could be claimed as a general 
approach. In terms of Swazi law and custom, a court would also rather 
choose to award damages to cover out-of-pocket losses, than for lost 
expectations.  
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With regard to the Bakwena of South Africa, Whelpton (1991:149) states 
that a party who is guilty of misrepresentation, cannot claim damages for 
costs already incurred in anticipation of fulfilment of the contract or for 
directly related damages. For example, if A bought an ox from B and B is 
not in a position to deliver the ox, A would not be able to claim for costs 
already incurred for the appointment of a herdsman to collect the ox from B.  
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:8), however, found that such a claim is possible 
among the Bakgatla of the North West Province. With regard to the 
Bamalete of Botswana, no such damages are payable (Walker 1969:71). 
Among the Swazi such a claim is not possible, as their desire is for amicable 
settlement.  According to the experts, they do not want to damage the fabric 
of the community but rather to heal the community’s wounds.  
 
Among the Swazi, no damages are claimable when the contract is void on 
the grounds of impossibility of performance (kungeke kwendeke). A party is 
not expected to incur any expenses before the other party has performed. 
Nevertheless, expenses directly related to the fulfilment of the contract are 
allowed (cf Whelpton 1991:149).  
 
5.3.3 Withdrawal (okuphuma esivumelwaneni) 
 
Generally withdrawal is known as a legal action that dissolves the 
commitment of a contract. De Wet and Yeats (1978:194) maintain that it is 
not the contract per se that is dissolved, but the consequences of the contract 
that are rendered null and void. 
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According to Whelpton (1991:152), withdrawal is known to the Bakwena of 
South Africa, but only under exceptional circumstances. Exercising 
withdrawal creates the right to return whatever has been performed thus far. 
No duty of restoration or restitution is created.  
 
According to the Swazi panel of experts, the Swazi would not easily use 
withdrawal (okuphuma esivumelwaneni) as a remedy in breach of contract in 
exceptional circumstances. A party must first demand performance (kucela) 
from the other party before he can withdraw. When a party withdraws, the 
contract dissolves as in the case of western legal systems, but so do the 
consequences. 
 
5.3.4 The right to withhold performance  
 
In western legal systems, the right to withhold performance is known as the 
reciprocal principle. According to Whelpton (1991:153), this remedy relates 
to a reciprocal performance that must not be confused with simultaneous 
performance as in sales agreements, where performance has to take place 
simultaneously. A consequence of this reciprocal principle is that a party can 
withhold his performance until such time as the other party has performed 
fully and properly.  This is also the position among the Swazi.   
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Breach of contract is seen as non-performance among the Swazi. 
Repudiation and impossibility to perform are known to them. Breach of 
contract impacts negatively on a community.  The disputing parties should 
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therefore resolve the dispute as soon (and as amicably) as possible.  The 
Swazi believes that a debt does not decay. Courts may order specific 
performance, but often a reduced level of performance is recommended. 
Damages are generally not payable. A party can usually only expect to be 
placed in a similar position as before entering into the contract, and not in 
the position in which he would have been had the parties performed in terms 
of the contract. 
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Chapter 6 
 
THE TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are distinct similarities with western legal systems in the way in which 
agreements are terminated among indigenous people.  To understand the 
concept of the concrete nature of a contract in indigenous law, and 
particularly in Swazi law and custom, it is important to understand the 
manner in which agreements are terminated. 
 
6.2 PRESCRIPTION 
 
In western legal systems, the time which has elapsed since a contract was 
concluded, has a major influence on contracts.  According to De Wet and 
Yeats (1978:255), prescription deals with the acquisition of rights or the 
exemption of debts after the expiry of a certain period of time, hence, the 
distinction between acquisitive and extinctive prescription.  With acquisitive 
prescription, certain rights are obtained due to the lapse of time.  By 
contrast, extinctive prescription deals with the decay of a debt after the lapse 
of a period of time. 
 
In this chapter the extinctive prescription of debts which arise from a 
contract is discussed.  A debtor can, in terms of western legal systems, after 
the lapse of three years, deny the existence of a debt.  Differently stated, if 
he or she was liable for the debt and the specified period of time has lapsed, 
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the debtor can refuse to pay the debt because the debt has prescribed, based 
on the lapse of time. 
 
A leading case regarding prescription in the indigenous law is Lequoa v 
Sipamla (1944 NAC (C + D) 85), where the court found prescription of a 
debt to be unknown, whether acknowledged or ordered by a court order.  
The court stated (85-86): “But where a debt, claim or liability is open to 
denial or dispute or is a matter where time is important in fixing an event, 
for example, a seduction, or the whereabouts of an individual, for example, a 
catch in an adultery case, delay in instituting action by report, demand or 
summons is regarded in Native law as prejudicing the defence if the delay is 
unreasonable” (cf Whelpton 1991:159). 
 
Bekker (1989:65) is also of the opinion that prescription is unknown in 
indigenous law and that a delay in instituting an action does not deprive a 
person of any right to institute such action.  According to him, the debt 
should, however, be kept ‘alive’ in that the claimant must remind the debtor 
of his debt from time to time.   
 
Schapera (1970:286-287) writes the following with regard to the Batswana 
of Botswana: “It may be noted that there is no law of prescription among the 
Tswana. The saying by the Tswana is ‘molato ga obole, go bola nama’, 
meaning “a debt does not decay, it is meat that rots”.  The Swazi refers to it 
as ‘licala aliboli’. Church (1990:92), Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:20) and 
van Blerk (1990a:72) agree that this position also applies to the Batswana of 
the North West Province. 
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According to Whelpton (1991:159), the concept is known to the Bakwena of 
South Africa.  The legal maxim ‘molato ga obole, go bola nama’, meaning 
“a debt does not decay, it is meat that rots”, also applies to them.  According 
to them, performance does not have to be linked to a time period to have any 
meaning nor, can time replace the truth.  As long as there is a debt, there is 
an obligation which must be met.  In this, legal certainty is gained.  An 
outstanding debt does not offer any room for manipulation by the creditor, as 
a debt is never payable immediately, even if a specific date had been 
determined to perform.  In order to prove the existence of the debt after a 
long period of time has lapsed, it is necessary for the creditor to remind the 
debtor of the debt from time to time so that the debt can be kept alive. 
 
According to the Swazi, a debt must be paid on demand, or at the time 
agreed upon, and always remains payable, no matter how long ago it was 
incurred.  Prescription is therefore unknown in terms of Swazi law and 
custom: in other words, a debt does not decay.  The Swazi say ‘licala 
aliboli’. 
 
6.3 SET-OFF 
 
In western legal systems, two persons who each owe the other a certain 
amount of money, can set-off their debts against one another.  Should the 
amounts be equal in value, the debt is extinguished.  If one amount is larger 
than the other, the smaller amount would be extinguished which would 
reduce the larger amount by means of the set-off (SA Metropolitan Life 
Assurance Co. Ltd v Ferreira 1962:4 SA 213(0)). 
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According to Whelpton (1991:160) set-off is known as ‘tekatekanyo ya 
disuga’ among the Bakwena of South Africa, but is not a way in which an 
agreement can be terminated.  He states that each debt establishes a separate 
commitment between the relevant parties with its own rights and obligations, 
and that each one of those obligations must be complied with in its own 
right.  Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:19) state that set-off is unknown to the 
Tswana.  A debtor’s obligations under one contract can therefore not be 
terminated by an equal obligation by the creditor or in terms of another 
contract.  Equal debts between the parties, but under different contracts are 
therefore not distinguished by way of set-off.  
 
The Swazi panel of experts was also of the opinion that set-off, as known in 
western legal systems, is unknown to the Swazi. 
 
6.4  PERFORMANCE  
 
Writers on indigenous law do not express themselves directly on this form of 
juridical act.  Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:18) write with regard to the 
Batswana of the North West Province, the following: “Contractual 
obligations are terminated by rendering performance, by entering into a new 
agreement and by supervening impossibility of performance.  As soon as a 
debtor has performed properly he has filled his obligation”. 
 
Whelpton (1991:161) states, that according to the Bakwena of South Africa, 
performance is the most common manner in which both parties meet their 
contractual obligations and in terms of which agreements are terminated.  
Unlike the situation in western legal systems, performance can not be 
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rendered by a third party who is not a party to the agreement.  The creditor 
can therefore refuse proper performance if offered by a third party without 
declining into mora creditoris.  Performance by a third party is only possible 
if the original contract between the creditor and debtor terminates and a new 
agreement is established between the creditor and the third party.  In such a 
case, one can no longer refer to performance by a third party.  According to 
the Bakwena of South Africa, it is not customary for a third party to become 
involved in an existing agreement between two parties.  Notwithstanding the 
subjectivity of a contractual relationship, it would leave room for dishonesty 
and would add no value to legal certainty.  Furthermore, Whelpton 
(1991:162) writes that performance must be executed to the creditor himself 
and not to a proxy or a creditor of him.  In addition, the parties can not agree 
that payment can be made to a third party, as a third party does not, in any 
way, form part of the legal relationship which exists between the creditor 
and the debtor.  Nor can the debtor deliver something else as a substitute of 
the agreed and indebted performance unless the original agreement is first 
cancelled and a new agreement is entered into in its place.  The performance 
in terms of the actual, real indebtedness must be delivered.  The debtor must 
deliver full performance unless the debtor arranged with the creditor in 
advance that he will perform in trances.  The debtor must perform at the 
place where the parties agreed performance should take place.  If the debtor 
delivers performance at another place, the creditor is not obliged to accept it 
(Whelpton 1991:162). 
 
Among the Swazi, contractual obligations are terminated by rendering 
performance. They refer to it as ‘kwenta umsebenti wakho nesivumelwano’. 
As soon as a debtor has performed properly, he has fulfilled his obligations.  
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It is however, not necessary for the debtor to perform at the actual place 
where the parties agreed performance should take place. 
 
6.5  RELEASE (Kukhulula) 
 
Release is known in western legal systems as an agreement between a 
creditor and a debtor in terms of which the debtor is released from his 
obligations by the creditor in terms of the agreement.  In western legal 
systems, a single offer by the creditor to the debtor to release him from his 
obligations can be revoked at any time until the debtor has agreed thereto 
(De Wet & Yeats 1978:239). 
 
In terms of English law, consideration was required for absolution but in 
terms of South African law, a mere intent of donation is sufficient.  A ‘free’ 
release ex liberalitate must however, comply with the requirements of 
donations (Coronel’s Curator v Coronel’s Estate 191 AD 323). 
 
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:19) also refer to release.  With regard to the 
Batswana of the North West Province, they write that a creditor may release 
this debtor from performing.  The following example was put to the experts 
by them.  Group A, who is poor, borrowed a large basket of corn from group 
B who is wealthy.  The latter decide to forego their obligatory right and 
inform group A accordingly.  Group B would have to notify group A of the 
release and group A would have to accept the offer to release in order to 
terminate the obligation.  The obligation is not automatically terminated by 
an offer of release: acceptance is necessary.  Because release is a contract 
between a creditor and a debtor, the question could be asked whether, in 
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view of the real, concrete nature of an indigenous contract, some form of 
performance is required to bring about a contract. 
 
Among the Bakwena of South Africa, to whom release is known as ‘golola’, 
mere offer and acceptance as discussed in the above example, are not 
sufficient to release a debtor of his obligations.  Some form of performance 
by group B would be required.  The question then is whether this is then still 
a release, as release can only take place once the parties agree that the debtor 
does not have to perform (Whelpton 1991:164). 
 
The same example above of Prinsloo and Vorster was put to the Swazi panel 
of experts and they maintained that termination of an obligation by 
agreement, may entail release or novation from performing. Release is 
known to the Swazi as ‘kukhulula’. 
 
6.6 NOVATION 
 
According to De Wet and Yeats (1978:239) novation is the discharge of an 
old debt by the creation of a new debt.  This can happen when a new debt is 
created between the same parties, which represents novation in the narrow 
sense of the word, or by substitution of one of the parties, by another.  
According to De Wet and Yeats, novation takes place by agreement between 
the relevant parties, with the intent to substitute the old debt with a new debt. 
 
Whelpton (1991:164) writes that among the Bakwena of South Africa, 
novation is known, but in the sense that an old debt is discharged by a new 
debt.  According to him, it is, however, doubtful whether this is novation as 
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understood in terms of western legal systems.  An example given of 
novation by the Bakwena of South Africa was the following: “A and B agree 
that A will deliver a cow to B in exchange for an ox.  At a later stage, A and 
B conclude a new agreement that A will give five buck to B instead of the 
cow”. 
 
Before a new agreement can be concluded between A and B, performance in 
terms of the initial agreement must first take place. Both parties must then 
perform thereafter in terms of the new agreement.  In this way the initial 
agreement is set aside and replaced by a new agreement.  The initial 
agreement has then been replaced by the new agreement.  As a contract only 
comes into existence by way of agreement plus performance, the parties can 
at a later stage refuse to continue with the new contract and cannot be kept 
liable in terms thereof. 
 
The same example was put to the Swazi panel of experts, and they 
maintained that, before a new agreement can be concluded, the parties must 
first perform in terms of the initial agreement. 
 
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:19) write that novation is known to the 
Batswana of the North West Province.  According to them, liability is based 
on the performance of the creditor in terms of the original agreement and the 
stipulated counter-performance of the debtor in terms of the new agreement. 
 
According to the Swazi panel of experts, this is not possible, as, with 
novation, a new contract comes into existence, from which new liabilities, 
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known as ‘umtwalo’ arise.  The Swazi also maintained that liabilities could 
not arise from two different contracts. 
 
6.7 SETTLEMENT 
 
According to De Wet and Yeats (1978:239) a settlement, in terms of western 
legal systems, is a contract whereby a dispute between parties is resolved. 
 
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:19) state that with regard to the Batswana of the 
North West Province, the change in the original agreement can also be the 
result of a dispute between the parties.  In the example given above under 
Release (6.5), it was, for instance required that group A should return the 
corn within two months, but group A failed to do so.  To be reasonable, the 
parties compromised and determined that instead of returning the corn, 
group A would weed group B’s gardens.  This example creates the 
impression that the writers have settlement in mind, although they do not 
explicitly use this term.  This can however not be seen as an example of 
settlement as there never was a dispute between A and B regarding the 
existence of a valid debt (cf Whelpton 1991:165-166). 
 
It is important to differentiate between novation and settlement. Novation 
differs from settlement in that in the case of novation, the parties are in 
agreement that a valid debt exists, whereas with settlement, a dispute occurs 
as to whether such debt exists or not.  To this extent De Wet and Yeats 
(1984:242) state that, for the validity of a settlement, it is essential that a 
dispute exist between the parties but not necessarily a lawsuit.  The purpose 
of a settlement is to establish certainty (cf Whelpton 1991:166). 
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According to Whelpton (1991:166), the Bakwena of South Africa, agreed 
that if A alleges that B owes him R200,00 in terms of a wager agreement 
and B denies this, but A then, at a later stage agrees to accept R100,00 
instead of the R200,00,  a settlement has taken place between A and B.  
They describe it as ‘gophumula diatla’, which directly translated, means “to 
wipe the hands”.  According to the Bakwena of South Africa, the debt has 
been wiped out and a new agreement has come into being in terms of the 
settlement.  
 
Whelpton (1991:166) furthermore, writes with regard to the Bakwena of 
South Africa that it is doubtful if settlement, in the western sense of the 
word, could be possible among them. The Swazi panel of experts agreed 
with this view of the Bakwena of South Africa. 
 
6.8 MERGER (Confusio) 
 
According to Christie (2006:481), the nature and effect of merger is a 
method of discharging contractual obligations.  He quotes the judgment of 
Innes CJ in Grootschwaing Salt Works Ltd v Van Tonder (1920 AD 492-
497) to give a proper understanding of the concept:  “now confusio in the 
sense with which we are here concerned is the concurrence of two qualities 
or capacities in the same person and in respect of the same obligation.  The 
typical example of confusio and the one mainly dealt with in the books is the 
case of a creditor becoming heir to his debtor or vice versa.  But the same 
position is established whenever the creditor steps into the shoes of his 
debtor by any title which renders him subject to his debt and it is common 
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cause that confusio takes place as between lessor and lessee when the latter 
acquires the leased property.  As to the consequences of confusio there can 
be no doubt that speaking generally, it destroys the obligations in respect of 
which it operates.  A person can neither be his own creditor nor his own 
debtor, and if there is no other debtor then the debt is extinguished.” 
 
A phenomenon which resembles the definition given above of a merger, is 
referred to as ‘kopanyo disuga’, meaning “the meeting of debts”.  This was 
established by Whelpton (1991:167) among the Bakwena of South Africa.  
According to him, the following example was put to the Bakwena of South 
Africa, namely: A owes B R200,00. B dies and bequeaths R300,00 to A.  In 
terms of western legal systems it is understood that after B’s death, the 
capacity of the debtor and the creditor now resides in A.  According to the 
Bakwena of South Africa, a form of ‘meeting’ of rights and obligations has 
taken place between A and B, but definitely not a merger.  A would first 
have to pay the R200,00 to B’s estate before A could claim the R300,00 
inheritance.  This was confirmed by the Swazi panel of experts to be the 
custom among the Swazi. 
 
Prinsloo and Vorster (1990a:19) write with regard to the Batswana of the 
North West Province, that an obligation can also be terminated by way of 
merger.  The following example was given to their panel of experts: ‘Group 
A borrowed a pack-ox (pelesa) from group B. Group A is so taken by the 
animal that they offer group B five sheep for it.  Group B accepts the offer 
and the sheep are delivered, whereupon group A keeps the ox as their own.’ 
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It is maintained that group B could not demand that the original contract of 
loan be honoured by group A, after group B had accepted the sheep.  
According to Whelpton (1991:168), the loan agreement should first be 
terminated by group A by returning the ox before a sale agreement of the 
sheep could take place, as no more than one obligation can flow from the 
same contract without the original contract having first been terminated. 
 
The Swazi panel of experts agreed that only one obligation can flow from a 
contract. 
 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
 
Performance is a well known way in terms of which agreements are 
terminated.  When an agreement is terminated, the contract from which such 
an obligation stems, is also terminated.  Therefore, it is not possible for 
rights and obligations which have been created through a specific agreement 
to be amended or changed, without the initial agreement, from which those 
rights and obligations originated, first having been terminated.  This is the 
reason why set-off is unknown among the Swazi.  Furthermore, prescription 
is unknown, as the lapse of time cannot exempt anyone from his or her 
debts. 
 
 123
Chapter 7  
 
SPECIFIC CONTRACTS  
 
7.1 PERMANENT EXCHANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
7.1.1 Introduction 
 
Regarding the classification of contracts in indigenous law, Walker, 
(1969:66) as quoted by Whelpton (1991:169) states that a major problem in 
dealing with customary law contracts is that of classification, not only to 
determine the scope of the subject matter vis-à-vis other areas of law, but 
also to present the subject matter in a meaningful way. According to Walker 
(1969:66), it is a matter of approach. He writes as follows: “Is there a law of 
contract among the Bamalete or are there many types of contracts, each with 
laws peculiar to it? While the anthropologist’s classification of tribal 
contracts would be according to subject matter, to the law the manner of 
classification should be dictated more by the nature of the rights and duties 
created by the legal acts”. 
 
Walker identifies the groups of contracts: 
• agreements calling for permanent exchange of goods or services, 
including contracts of barter, sale and employment, in the form of credit 
exchange as well as quid pro quo transfers; and 
• agreements calling for temporary  exchanges of goods, including loans 
and bailments (1969:66). 
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This study follows the same approach but has added contracts which have an 
influence on the status of persons, as a further category (See Chapters 7 and 
9). Whelpton (1991:170) points out, that although it is possible to 
differentiate between different contracts, one must at all times keep in mind 
the distinctive nature of each contract. According to Strydom (1985:525), 
agreements are not only concluded to make provision for the material needs 
and requirements of life, but also to strengthen family relationships and 
religious obligations. This was specifically emphasised by the Swazi panel 
of experts. 
 
Bekker (1989:332), discussing the various indigenous contracts, states: “In 
respect of the contracts of sale, exchange and loan for consumption, there is 
no substantial difference between the law of the land and customary law, 
except that no interest is ever stipulated for in the latter system, nor does it 
automatically run from the time the debtor is in mora”. According to Bekker 
it is not always possible to determine from pleadings under which legal 
system the above mentioned agreements were concluded, unless one of the 
parties pleads prescription. 
 
One can agree with Bekker that there are major similarities between 
indigenous law contracts and that of western legal systems. In addition, the 
Western legal concept of prescription is only a defence and it cannot serve as 
a differential characteristic to an indigenous contract. It is also not correct to 
allege that interest is never contended in indigenous law of contracts as this 
is usually left to the discretion of the parties. There are incidence where 
parties claim interest, especially in modern times (cf Whelpton 1991:171). 
The difference between western and indigenous contracts are fundamental in 
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that the nature of an indigenous contract is concrete, where a contract in 
terms of western legal systems is based on consensus only. Important legal 
rules emanate from the fundamental differences which impact on the total 
spectrum of the indigenous law of contract (Whelpton 1991:171). This 
corresponds with the position among the Swazi in the Kingdom of 
Swaziland. 
 
7.2 THE SALE AGREEMENT 
 
With regard to the sale agreement Olivier and others (1989:544) allege in 
general that in the indigenous law of contract in Southern Africa, both the 
sale and exchange agreements are recognised. According to them, the sale 
agreements currently mostly exist in that the relevant parties agree that the 
specific subject matter should be delivered by the one against the payment of 
an amount of money to the other. They write that the use of money has only 
become a commercial medium since interaction with western culture. In 
earlier days, animals and products were offered as a medium which made it 
difficult to differentiate between sale and exchange. In traditional societies, 
the exchange trade was also not particularly comprehensive as each 
household was mostly self-sufficient (Olivier et al 1989:545). 
 
Walker (1969:67) states the following with regard to the Bamalete of 
Botswana: “Traditionally the agreements for transactions amounting to a 
sale of goods were in the form of barter arrangements involving either quid 
pro quo exchange of goods or a transfer of goods by one of the parties in the 
agreed upon expectation of a corresponding transfer of the other party at a 
later time. With economic development and the accompanying introduction 
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of members of tribal society into the cash economy, barter transactions have 
been supplemented by transactions involving the transfer of goods in 
exchange for some medium of exchange, so that today the two types of 
transactions now exist side by side”. Prinsloo (1990b:35) agrees that this 
position coincides with that of the Batswana of the North West Province. 
Gluckman (1965:176-178, 181-182) and Schapera (1970:242-244) confirm 
this with regard to the Barotse of Zambia and in respect of the Batswana of 
Botswana respectively. 
 
Among the Swazi, exchange is a contract whereby both parties undertake to 
deliver to each other a thing or things with the purpose of transferring 
ownership of those things. An example of this contract is where A gives B a 
beast in exchange for B’s five sheep. The siSwati term for exchange is 
‘untjintjiselana’; the reciprocal verb indicates a reciprocal obligation to 
deliver goods. 
 
The features of the contract include performance and counter -performance, 
that both performances exist in delivering a thing or things, and that the 
intention with such delivery is to transfer ownership. In the absence of any 
one of the preceding elements, no contract of exchange comes into being. 
Thus, the following examples do not constitute a contract of exchange: 
where one party must render performance in giving a thing to another; or 
where a party must deliver a bull for the rendering of service. The term ‘sale 
agreement’ is not known to the Swazi. The process is rather seen as 
bartering. 
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In terms of western legal systems, any item can be an object of a sales 
agreement, that is to say, movable or immovable, incorporal or corporal and 
even future goods (De Wet & Yeats 1978:278). According to the Batswana 
of Botswana only corporal moveable goods can be sold. Incorporal and 
future goods cannot be sold. This corresponds with the view of other authors 
of indigenous law cf Schapera (1969:328; 1970:203-205); Vorster 
(1981a:71); Coetzee et al (1985:136); Prinsloo (1990b:29-30) and Whelpton 
(1991:174). 
 
For a valid exchange (kuntjintjiselana) agreement among the Swazi, the 
parties must agree on the things to be exchanged. The property to be 
exchanged must therefore be adequately specified in the agreement. Where 
livestock forms the object of the agreement, the parties must agree on the 
type, size or age, sex and number of the animals. The parties cannot merely 
agree that counter-performance should be reasonable, or that it will be 
agreed upon at a future date. There must be certainty about the performance 
and counter-performance. There can be no agreement if there is a mistake 
about a material element of the agreement, for example, an ox instead of a 
heifer as the object of exchange. This corresponds with Whelpton’s findings 
among the Bakwena of South Africa (1991:175). 
 
According to the Swazi panel of experts, unlawful transactions are not 
recognised. Examples of unlawful contracts in terms of Swazi law and 
custom are the exchange of a field or residential site for livestock or 
movable items, or the exchange of a field for another field without 
permission of the chief (sikhulu). Fields and residential sites (indzawo 
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yokuhlala) are allocated to families for their exclusive use, but are not 
regarded as negotiable things. 
 
7.2.1 Terms of the exchange of contract (kuntjintjiselana) 
 
The Swazi panel of experts pointed out that in the case of exchange by the 
delivery of things, transfer of ownership (kumenta umnikati) is intended and 
it is therefore implied by law that each of the parties must be the owner of 
the thing concerned. It is always understood that nobody other than the 
transferor must have a better title to what is transferred, and that a party who 
knowingly exchanges another’s property is considered to be a thief. If a 
party does not have a valid title, the true owner may claim his property from 
the transferee, and the latter may demand the return of his commodity from 
the other party.  
 
Ownership of the animal or other moveable thing passes on delivery by one 
party to another pursuant to the contract of exchange. For the delivery to be 
perfect, it must be either a physical delivery of the thing or pointing out the 
thing with the intention to transfer ownership. Mere description of the thing 
(kuichaza) without showing it to the transferee is not sufficient for delivery. 
Before delivery of the thing, the risk relating to it remains with the debtor, 
for example, a beast that dies must be replaced by the debtor (cf Prinsloo 
1990b:30-31). Similarly, progeny of an animal or an increase of any other 
thing accrues to the debtor until delivery takes place. After delivery of the 
thing, its loss or other risks are borne by the transferee and any increase 
likewise accrues to the transferee. Should the creditor refuse to accept proper 
delivery by the debtor at or after the stipulated time, he bears the risk from 
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the time of his refusal (cf Whelpton 1991:176). As reported by Prinsloo 
(1990b:31) regarding groups elsewhere in Africa, in the case of exchange or 
sale, the risk remains with the debtor or seller until delivery of the thing, but 
increment accrues to the creditor or purchaser if he has made counter-
performance. 
 
Things are exchanged without warranty against latent defects, irrespective of 
whether the creditor has inspected the thing or not. According to Prinsloo 
(1990b:31), things are exchanged “voetstoots”, that is without warranty 
against latent defects, irrespective of whether the creditor has inspected the 
thing or has not done so. Prinsloo furthermore writes that “among the 
Bahurutshe, Bakwena and Bafokeng the parties can expressly agree to a 
warranty against a specific defect, for example that the cow concerned is 
without mastitis and if the defect is afterwards discovered, the thing must be 
replaced”.  Such an agreement is unknown among other groups studied (cf 
Prinsloo 1990b:31).  A party who, being aware of a defect, denies it, may be 
held liable for replacement of the defective thing. Generally, according to 
the Swazi panel of experts, performance and counter-performance must take 
place simultaneously.  According to Prinsloo (1990b:32), it is implied or 
natural terms of barter that performance and counter-performance must take 
place simultaneously, and that the offeror takes his commodity to the place 
of the offeree where the exchange of the things concerned will take place.  
However, it will all depend on the terms of the contract and what the parties 
agreed upon. The parties may expressly agree that the things must be 
delivered at another place. However, a place other than the address of either 
party is considered very unusual. It may also be agreed that the counter-
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performance will take place on a future date, for example, after the start of 
the ploughing season (cf Whelpton 1991:176). 
  
Prinsloo (1990b:32) writes that, although the Batswana of the North West 
Province do not have a standard medium of exchange, some groups have 
fixed equivalents, such as one beast and five sheep or a pot and the grain it 
holds. 
 
A standard medium of exchange exists among the Swazi, for example, 
eleven goats for one cow (ten female, one male); six goats for one cow (five 
females, one male). However, it seems as if there is no established rule that 
restricts the parties to the established equivalent or in any other way with 
regard to the value of their performance (cf Prinsloo 1990b:32). 
 
7.2.2 Remedies for breach of contract 
 
According to Prinsloo (1990b:32), if a debtor fails or refuses to perform 
when he is liable to do so, he may be ordered in an ensuing case to deliver 
the thing concerned. An order for the return of what has been rendered by 
the creditor is the obvious one when the creditor asks for it or when the thing 
owed by the debtor is no longer available. Schapera (1938:239; 1965:151; 
1969:327), Gluckman (1965:180) and Ghai (1969:342-343) as quoted by 
Prinsloo (1990b:33), state that an order to implement the terms of the 
agreement and one for cancellation of the contract and the return of the 
creditor’s goods, are also alternative remedies for breach of contract in 
Botswana, Zambia and Kenya.   
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Prinsloo (1990b:32) furthermore states that whether the creditor chooses to 
insist on implementation of the contract or on rescission, he is not entitled to 
damages in the form of reimbursement for his expenses incurred in 
anticipation of counter-performance by the debtor, for example by building a 
kraal or obtaining fodder for the livestock to be delivered. The expression 
that one cannot make a kaross for the baby before the child is born is also 
used to explain that one should not incur expenses before one is in 
possession of the thing concerned.  Among the Bakgatla, Bakwena and 
Batlhaping, expenses incurred by the creditor with regard to the counter-
performance, such as hiring a herdsman to fetch the animal owed by the 
debtor, are recoverable.  Damages for expected profit are, however, 
unknown.  Among the Tswana of Botswana, damages or loss flowing from 
breach of contract are allowed and this fact is viewed by Gluckman 
(1969:77) as exceptional in Africa. 
 
Prinsloo (1990b:33) points out that it is reported for Botswana that the court 
can alter an agreement to avoid hardship by ordering a creditor to accept 
what is offered to him in full settlement of a debt, lest he may receive 
nothing. If the creditor is prevented from performing by the debtor, for 
example, if the debtor has received the five sheep as counter-performance 
but cannot deliver the ox because he has sold it to another person in the 
meantime, the creditor may either insist on the implementation of the 
contract or rescind the contract and ask for the return of his five sheep. The 
debtor is bound to the contract, if the creditor so chooses, because the 
impossibility of his performance is of his own making. This was also 
observed by Whelpton (1991:177) among the Bakwena of South Africa.  
Among the Batswana of the North West Province, the court cannot alter an 
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agreement but can advise the creditor to accept a reasonable offer where his 
claim would cause hardship to the debtor.  The purpose thereof is to assist 
the parties in reaching a settlement (Prinsloo 1990b:33). 
 
According to the Swazi panel of experts, a similar approach is followed by 
the Swazi. 
 
7.3 RENDERING OF SERVICES 
 
This concept corresponds with the Roman law locatio conductio operarum, 
where the acceptance of work can be compare with the Roman law concept 
locatio conductio operis. The various forms of rendering services, which are 
known to the different indigenous peoples are discussed in this study as well 
as those in terms of Swazi law and custom. 
 
7.3.1 Renting and letting of services 
 
Vorster (1990c:152) refers to this form of rendering of services, as 
supervision and management.  According to him, this form of rendering of 
services is known among various Tswana tribes. Vorster points out that the 
Bakgatla ba Mosetlha refer to this service as ‘go thapiwa’ and differentiate it 
from independent services which is known as ‘boitiredi’. According to him 
one can therefore assume that the service agreement is known among 
indigenous peoples and that the terminology used distinguishes the different 
forms of service rendering. 
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Types of services, discussed by Vorster (1990c:152) are scuffle (tlhagolo) 
and housework (tiro ya gae). According to him, there are no formalities to 
be met when entering into a service contract. An individual could initially 
not bind himself independently to rendering a service whereby in the modern 
indigenous law certain categories of persons are now seen to have the 
capacity. According to Vorster (1990c:154), no particular fee is specifically 
agreed to under the Batswana of the North West Province, but that in 
practice, forms of remuneration existed, for example, that a specific portion 
of a crop be given if the services related to work done in the fields. Schapera 
(1970:254) confirms this finding of Vorster. Vorster (1990c:154) further 
states that an important principle applied in the original indigenous law is 
that the full remuneration or fee is given at the proper completion of the 
service or period of service. Should the renderer of services not complete the 
task or service period, he was not entitled to any payment. The western 
practice of a pro-rata portion of fees paid for partial work done, did not exist, 
even if the non-performance was due to the employer. An example Vorster 
gives is where the employer had to supply the goods to enable the worker to 
do the job, and he failed to do so, as the employer was only obliged to pay 
once the task is completed in its entirety. Vorster points out that the 
Batlhaping indicated that they know the practice of a pro-rata payment 
although other tribes mentioned that this was not an acknowledged principle 
with them. Furthermore, Vorster (1990c:154) states that payment can be 
made partially in cash and partially in goods, or just by way of a cash 
payment. 
 
Whelpton (1991:184) writes that, according to the Bakwena of South Africa, 
a service agreement terminates upon completion. It can also be terminated 
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by mutual agreement. According to Vorster (1990c:155) the illness or death 
of the employer has no effect on the executability of the contract, as the 
agnatic group of the employer remain liable for any obligation and becomes 
a substitute of the employer. As contracts are nowadays, mostly concluded 
between individuals, death or illness will impact on the contract. If the 
parties do not specifically agree that a distinct person should do the work, 
the employee could then, in a case of illness, send a substitute (moemedi) to 
do the work on his behalf. However, such a person is not a party to the 
contract, but takes the place of the ill employee on a temporarily basis. This 
position was confirmed by the Swazi panel of experts. 
 
According to Schapera (1970:250) servants are used on a great scale by the 
Tswana.  They are in the service of the tribal chief, his family and other 
wealthy people. Persons serving as body and domestic servants are fed by 
their masters, dressed and given housing facilities. Sometimes gifts such as 
cattle or goats are given to them, and these become their property. 
Apparently, servants working on such basis do not have the capacity to 
enforce payment for their services and therefore one cannot refer to a 
contractual relationship between them. This position still to a greater extent 
also prevails among the Swazi in the Kingdom of Swaziland.   
 
According to Whelpton (1991:185), the service of an individual or a group 
can be hired. An example of services rented by a group is known among the 
Bakwena of South Africa as ‘go jaka’. ‘Go jaka’ refers to a situation where a 
number of workers from an area execute a specific task somewhere else, for 
example when a farmer requires the services of a group of persons during a 
specific period to assist with harvesting. Earlier, these people were paid from 
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the proceeds from the harvest with a few bags of corn or wheat, but 
nowadays, money has become the preferred method of payment. 
 
‘Go jaka’ has gained a further meaning among the Bakwena of South Africa, 
as it now also refers to other types of tasks by individuals or groups of 
people in other areas, such as contracts concluded to work on mines in 
Gauteng or elsewhere. It is then also acceptable to refer to these people in 
their re-located working areas as ‘ba ile majakong’, meaning “people left to 
go and attend a specific task” (Whelpton 1991:186). This practice is 
unknown among the Swazi. 
 
A further custom which does not comply with the requirements of a contract, 
but which could possibly be associated with the aforesaid practice, is the use 
of groups of people working together to execute a specific task for someone 
else. These customs are known as ‘kutlwano’ among the Bakwena of South 
Africa and are characterised by the fact that no payment is made for work 
done (Whelpton 1991:186). Based on this, it can, according to Whelpton 
(1991:186), not be seen as a contract. These groups of people mostly exist of 
family, neighbours and friends and nowadays even strangers can participate. 
They are not referred to as employees, but guests ‘balalediwa’.  This 
phenomenon was also confirmed by the Swazi panel of experts as to existing 
among the Swazi.  
 
According to Schapera (1970:254), the custom of ‘letsema’ is the clearing of 
trees and bushes from a field, weeding, and reaping, threshing corn, building 
the wall of a hut, fencing of a field or cutting rafters. Schapera states that this 
is a well known labour contract. Whelpton (1991:86) is of the opinion that 
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this is rather a form of aid which is given on a reciprocal basis to complete a 
major task as quickly as possible. According to Vorster (1990b:53), it is a 
peculiar institution that serves to facilitate co-operation and goodwill within 
a community. The Swazi panel of experts agreed with Vorster’s point of 
view. 
 
Whelpton (1991:187) states that it is important that the person for whom the 
work is carried out is present whilst the work is done as it must be done in 
terms of his instructions. The Bakwena of South Africa refer to it as ‘letsema 
le thatha ka mong wa lona’.  
 
The Swazi panel of experts confirmed that the person for whom the work is 
done must be present. They say: ‘lilima liyaphekelwa’. The person to whom 
the services are rendered, usually supplies food and drinks to the workers to 
show his hospitality and also to assist the workers to do their work 
comfortably. The Tswana refer to it as ‘thatha ka moswang’. This must, 
however, not be seen as remuneration for the work done. Strydom 
(1985:451) states that a similar custom applies with the Southern Sotho of 
Qwaqwa. Schapera (1970:254-255) states that a similar custom exists among 
the Tswana (go tsaya letsema) in terms of which a group of people are 
invited to come and share in meat with the understanding that they must then 
at a later stage assist in a specific task to be undertaken. The Bahurutshe of 
the North West Province know this custom and refer to it as ‘go tsaya 
mogwang’ (Vorster 1990b:52). The meaning of ‘go tsaya mogwang’ 
according to the Tswana is to incur a debt and it does not relate to any form 
of ‘letsema’. 
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Among the Swazi, manual labour is known where one man may hire another 
to perform work for him (kuncusa), such as building, thatching the roof of a 
hut, clearing a field for cultivation, cutting rafters for a hut, digging a well, 
or fetching a load of firewood. Most of these activities are paid for at a 
standard rate, such as a heifer for clearing a new field or roofing a hut; but 
the nature and extent of the work to be done, and the payment to be made for 
it, must be specified before the commencement of the work. As a rule, 
payment is made when the work is done, and if it is delayed for too long, the 
workman may sue for it. He cannot claim it while the work is incomplete, or 
if he does, will receive less than they had agreed to. He must fulfill his 
contract before he is entitled to receive any payment. 
 
There is a special form of labour contract among the Swazi, known as 
‘lilima’. When a person has a big task on hand which he wishes to complete 
in a short time, such as clearing trees and bushes from a field, weeding, 
reaping, threshing corn, building a wall of a hut or fencing a field, he may 
invite his friends and neighbours to help him on an appointed day. All those 
coming to assist are paid for their labour, usually in beer or tobacco. If they 
finish their work on the same day, the payment is regarded as sufficient. If it 
is not completed, they may come again the next day if there is more beer or 
whatever commodity has been used as payment; but if there is nothing left, 
they are not bound to put in any more work. 
 
7.3.2 Acceptance of services  
 
There are very few scholars of indigenous law who have researched this 
form of service. With regard to the Batswana of the North West Province, 
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Vorster (1990b:45-60) discusses it comprehensively and refers to it as an 
independent service. According to him, it is work that is not of a continuous 
nature. The most important characteristic of this service contract is, 
according to him, the fact that the person who executes the work, does it 
independently from the ‘owner of the work’. The usual requirements for the 
validity of a contract are also applicable to this service contract. In addition, 
the parties must specifically agree to the nature and extent of the work. It is, 
however, not necessary for the work to be fully described, general terms are 
acceptable. Vorster (1990b:46) gives, inter alia, as examples of independent 
service contracts, the building of a hut, fetching of wood, digging of a well 
and looking after live stock. Standard remuneration was known under the 
Batlhaping, whilst the Barolong, Batlharo, Bahurutshe, Bakgatla and 
Bafokeng indicated that the parties have to agree among themselves on the 
payment for such service.  
 
Whelpton (1991:188) indicated that the Bakwena of South Africa doubted 
that the taking care of live stock at the cattle post of the owner could be 
referred to as an independent service. Vorster (1990b:48) says in this regard 
that “the herdsman (modisa) is not under the constant control of the owner of 
the cattle, although he is bound to general instructions. He is left more or 
less to himself and may in this sense be regarded as an independent worker”. 
According to him, the Bahurutse and the Bafokeng of the North West 
Province allege further that the contract usually lasts for one year, after 
which it is renewed.  
 
According to Whelpton (1991:188) the Bakwena of South Africa was of the 
opinion that the herdsmen, due to practical reasons, are not under the 
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permanent control of the owner of the livestock. They act under specific 
instructions such as which sections of the pastures should be utilised, when 
the cattle should be dipped or when the calves should be separated from the 
cows. In addition the purpose is that the herdsmen out at pasture should be 
of a more permanent nature. To encourage this, they are often given some of 
the offspring of the live stock. The herdsman is in the same employment 
relationship as those in a hire and letting of services. Any damages caused 
by the animals of the owner is the responsibility of the owner, he is therefore 
liable. Should the damage be the result of negligence or intent by the 
herdsman, the owner can claim the damages from the herdsman.  
 
The Batswana of the North West Province, according to Vorster (1990b:49), 
hold the owner of the live stock liable for the damages by the livestock 
whilst under the supervision of the herdsman. It is a specific characteristic of 
an independent service contract that the acceptor of the work himself is 
liable for any damages which may flow from his activities and not the 
‘owner of the work’. Vorster (1990b:50) mentions that there are variations in 
the different tribes and that there are tribes in the North West Province, who 
view this form of service rendering as an ordinary employment contract. 
 
According to Whelpton (1991:189), it seems strange that Vorster (1990b:51) 
discusses ‘letsema’ under this type of service agreement. The Bakwena of 
South Africa say that, ‘letsema’ is not a contract, but rather a form of service 
by friends, although it is also done under the supervision of the ‘owner of the 
work’ and no payment is made to the workers. Vorster (1990b:52) states in 
this regard: “The participants work as a team according to the instructions of 
the principal (mong ‘a tiro). They do not, however, work under his 
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supervision. This does not, however, imply that the work of the participants 
should be regarded as independent service. They are not invited for their 
particular skills but rather for their labour.” The Bakwena of Mogopa of 
Hebron, according to Whelpton (1991:190), do not agree with Vorster’s 
statement that the workers do not work under the supervision of the owner of 
the work. They rely on the legal maxim ‘letsema le thatha ka mong wa 
lona’, meaning “the team is strong through the owner thereof”. According to 
them, the owner must be present whilst the work is done, which can be 
interpreted that the workmen work under the owner’s supervision.  
 
The Swazi panel of experts agreed with this point of view. They refer to it as 
‘lilima liyaphekelwa’. 
 
According to the Bakwena of South Africa, a notable characteristic of an 
independent service is specific knowledge or capacity which is required 
(Whelpton 1991:190). Examples of such independent services are the 
erection of a building, welding, plumbing and electrical works. They pointed 
out that the person who undertakes to do a specific piece of work is the 
lessee as he rents the work and the person who offers the work, is the lessor 
as he lets the work. The parties must reach consensus about the specific task 
to be done as well as payment for such services. The contract commences as 
soon as the workers begin their task, or if the parties (lessor) for whom the 
task/work is undertaken, has paid the workers, partially or in full. It is, 
however, not custom to make payment of the full amount upfront. The 
payment must be in money form, otherwise it is not a rental agreement. It is 
not conditional, but nowadays, it is the custom that the contract should be 
reduced to writing (Whelpton 1991:190). 
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The acceptor of the work is not entitled to payment if the work has not been 
completed in totality. Schapera (1965:149, 1969:324, 1970:245) confirmed 
this finding. Walker (1969:72) holds an opposing viewpoint. He states that 
in an exceptional case, where all moneys have been paid before completion 
of the work, the value of the money that exceeds the value of the work 
completed can be recovered. According to Vorster (1990b:47), the Barolong 
and the Batlharo of the North West Province, are of the opinion that one can 
only insist on payment if the work has been altogether completed. Moneys 
paid in advance cannot be recovered. 
 
According to the Swazi, one can insist on payment if the work has been 
altogether completed.  Moneys paid in advance can be recovered if the work 
is done. The contract terminates as soon as the work has been satisfactorily 
completed, or if it becomes impossible to perform in terms thereof, due to 
death or force majeure (superior powers). If the work is only partially 
completed by the acceptor, and remains in default, he can be held liable for 
direct damages which the owner of the work as a result thereof, may suffer. 
The contract can be terminated by way of a demand in the presence of 
witnesses, should the acceptor remain in default. 
 
7.3.3 Specific services 
 
According to the Swazi panel of experts, this form of service embraces the 
services of a professional nature which are applicable to specific service 
relationships and which are not sought in the normal cause of business.  An 
example is the acquisition of the services of a traditional healer, known as 
‘kubita inyanga’. 
 142
Whelpton (1991:192) states that such services relate to services of ‘dingaka’ 
and medicine people under the Tswana tribes. Various literature by authors 
Pauw (1985:130), Strydom (1985:432), Schapera (170:255) and Vorster 
(1990b:53) refers to the various tribal customs that relate to these services. 
 
Schapera (1970:255) writes that these services are applied in the protection 
of people and homesteads as a protection against sorcery (boloi) and of 
fields, cattle and women for fertility.  
 
The Swazi panel of experts confirmed that traditional healers undertake such 
work as divination, medical treatment, and the ‘doctoring’ of people and 
homesteads as a protection against sorcery, fields, cattle and woman for 
fertility, which confirms Schapera’s (1970) view on other indigenous 
communities. Among the Swazi there are two types of agreements that may 
be concluded. The first one is with an ‘inyanga yekubetsela likhaya’ (for 
protection of the home) for a period of five years. He performs these tasks 
and occasionally checks on his work. If the customer is satisfied, he will 
return to repeat the whole process. The second type of agreement is with the 
‘inyanga yemkhuhlane’ (for healing). 
 
Among the Swazi, a traditional leader, when summonsed by a client, 
generally first ‘throws the bones’ to divine the nature of the sickness or other 
problem, he is required to remedy. The ‘inyanga’ usually demands a fee 
called ‘inkanyiso’ to begin the process. This must be paid immediately 
before the divination is performed, in order to ‘make the bones speak’. The 
fee for the ‘doctoring’ itself varies according to the nature of the work to be 
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done. The fee is always paid after the doctoring has been done. It seems to 
be a universal rule, however, that no fee is payable if the treatment has not 
been successful. If it has been successful and the fee is not paid within a 
reasonable time, the traditional healer has the right to sue for it. 
 
Olivier (1989:550-551) also mentions that the use of people such as a witch 
doctor or medicine doctor is a general practice among the indigenous people. 
They are paid for their services by way of skins, wheat or money and they 
can enforce such payment if the treatment or service is successful. 
According to Whelpton (1991:192), the services of a medicine doctor 
(ngaka) or a fortune teller (maitseanape) among the Tswana are often called 
for various purposes, for example, to heal a sick person, to protect a home, 
to ensure the successful and profitable trading of a business or to allocate 
lost goods. A contract is concluded as soon as an agreed amount of money 
has been paid to the ‘ngaka’ to diagnose (temogo) the kind of service 
required. Once the diagnoses had been made, the ‘ngaka’ will indicate if he 
can render the service and whether the client wants to make use of it. If the 
client decides that he wants to make use of the services, he must pay an 
additional amount of money (go khunolola moraba) cf Vorster (1990b:54). 
Instead of money, sheep can also be given to open the bag. Medicine is then 
given to the client that he has to drink or to hide in his business, whatever 
the problem is that needs to be resolved. According to Vorster (1990b:54), 
the commencement of such treatment is known among the Tswana as 
‘sethatho’ (desire). 
 
Traditionally, among the Swazi an ‘inyanga’ could not demand payment if 
the treatment did not produce the desired outcome, but in modern times he 
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can demand payment notwithstanding whether treatment was successful or 
not. Regarding the Batswana of the North West Province, Vorster (1990b:55) 
states that failure to cure is looked upon as improper performance and 
therefore as non-performance and the ‘ngaka’ is not entitled to any further 
payment. The experts for the Bafokeng maintained that in such 
circumstances the ‘ngaka’ would not be entitled to the second payment, that 
is payment after the treatment. The further payment referred to is the 
payment to be made after the treatment and it is not clear whether this 
payment forms part of the agreed amount. If the latter payment is part of the 
agreed amount, it is payable, according to the Batswana of the North West 
Province, payable (Whelpton 1991:193). 
 
With regard to the Bakwena of South Africa, Whelpton (1991:194) states 
that it is important to conclude such contract in the presence of witnesses, 
should a dispute arise at a later stage. These witnesses can be family or 
friends. Earlier, the presence of witnesses was linked to scorcery practices. 
The function of the witnesses was to ensure that the ‘ngaka’ did not partake 
in such activities. This corresponds with the position among the Swazi in the 
Kingdom of Swaziland. 
 
Another form of rendering services among the Swazi take the form of the 
magic services to protect homes, cars or livestock. For each service, a 
separate amount is first paid before the service is rendered. The parties agree 
beforehand for how long these services will be applicable. Usually it is only 
for a specific, fixed period, for example the transport of people to a specific 
place and back. If the service was not successful, one cannot demand a 
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refund. This was also recorded by Whelpton (1991:194) as being the 
position among the Bakwena of South Africa. 
 
7.4 THE EXCHANGE AGREEMENT 
 
As stated under 7.2, exchange among the Swazi is a contract entered into 
with the purpose of transferring the ownership of things. According to 
Whelpton (1991:1979), the Tswana tribes understand exchange as a contract 
by way of which each party delivers a subject matter to the other with the 
intent that ownership of the thing should pass (tumelano ya kanayo). Unless 
otherwise agreed, the parties must deliver the things simultaneously. The 
reciprocal principle can be deducted from the verb ‘go anaya’, which means 
“for one another”. The legal maxim which applies to this among the Tswana 
is ‘mabogo dinku athebana’, meaning “the sheep washes the hands of one 
another.” The exchange contract must comply with the requirements of a 
valid agreement. An exchange agreement comes into being once one of the 
parties delivers the agreed thing to the other party. The parties are entitled to 
change their mind without any legal consequences, at any time prior to any 
one of them performing in terms of the agreement. Consensus without any 
performance cannot force anyone of the parties to perform or to deliver (cf 
Prinsloo & Vorster 1990a:10). 
 
According to the Swazi, the parties must specifically agree on the things to 
be exchanged and must personally point it out to each other. The parties 
must be the owners of such things, and unless agreed otherwise, it is 
assumed that the exchange goods are free from any defects. The parties must 
however familiarise themselves with the condition of the things and if they 
 146
fail to do so, which is seen as being negligent, they will bear the 
consequences thereof. Intentional misrepresentation is seen as fraud, and the 
prejudiced party has the choice of setting (cancel) the agreement or 
demanding due performance. This is also the position among the Bakwena 
of South Africa (cf Whelpton 1991:180). 
 
According to the Bakwena of South Africa, the following things cannot form 
part of an exchange contract: household goods, family goods, heritant goods, 
and moveable goods for immoveable goods (Whelpton 1991:181). Vorster 
(1981a:71) and Coetzee et al (1985:136) state that other groups in the North 
West Province, may also not exchange land for moveable goods. 
 
Schapera (1970:217) states that pots, baskets and skin rugs were exchanged 
for small stock (sheep and goats) and that small stock were exchanged for 
cattle. According to him, barter was traditionally not cumbersome as each 
household was self-sufficient. Contact with western lifestyles, however, 
brought about major changes in barter. In recent times it is not unknown for 
stock to be exchanged for a vehicle or tractor. The exchange contract where 
the subject matter is livestock, is however, the generally known contract. A 
book is kept especially for the purposes of exchange of livestock, where 
ownership thereof changes, which is completed before witnesses at the 
office of the tribal authority. Full details of the parties are inserted, the sex 
and colour of the animals and the date of the transaction as well as the brand 
mark of the animals. Theft of stock is seen as a very serious crime and 
therefore proper precaution is made to prevent this (Whelpton 1991:181).  
The Swazi panel of experts concurred that nowadays, proper records are 
kept of things exchanged. 
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7.5 GOODS GIVEN ON LOAN FOR CONSUMPTION  
 
The available literature on indigenous law makes little reference to loan for 
consumption. Olivier (1989:548) only mentions in general that, under this 
agreement, goods are loaned to a person with the understanding that this 
person will use them and will then, at a later stage return the same goods in 
equal quantities. Strydom (1985:465) writes with regards to the Bakwena of 
Qwaqwa, that they acknowledge the principle of loan, namely the intention 
that equal quantities of a similar product must be returned. According to 
him, the goods so returned must be of the same, or approximately of a 
similar quality. This is in accordance with the Swazi in the Kingdom of 
Swaziland. 
 
Whelpton (1991:195) states that, according to the Bakwena of South Africa, 
a loan is a contract which is generally used. The extent of the contract is 
where one party will loan to another party for example a bag of maize for 
consumption and that the other party would then, at a later stage, return a 
bag of similar quality and quantity. Ownership of the subject matter passes 
as the lessee must have the right to consume it. The subject matter is, 
therefore, a consumable but also a replaceable item. Money is also often 
given on loan. 
 
Pauw (1985:125) mentions with regards to the Imidushane and Amabhele of 
the Eastern Cape that, where money is the subject matter of a loan, it 
depends on the parties whether interest will accrue. Whelpton (1991:195) 
confirmed that this practice is also prevalent under the Bakwena of South 
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Africa, and that the borrowing of money in certain areas, implies that 
interest will be paid. 
 
Amongst the Swazi, a loan for consumption is a contract whereby one 
person delivers a fungible thing to another, who must return the same thing 
of the same kind, quantity and of similar quality.  The Swazi refer to it as 
‘kwenanisa’. There must be an obligation on the receiver to return an 
equivalent to what he had received. If it is agreed that it is not to be repaid, 
the transaction is not a loan. A fungible is something which can be 
measured, counted and weighed. Loans for consumption are used to meet 
economic emergencies and are an integral part of life. Thus, where a man 
suffers a poor yield of grain, it is usual for him to borrow his neighbour’s 
surplus so that his family may be fed, and to re-deliver a similar amount of 
grain to the lender after the following harvest, or as soon as he is able. 
 
7.6 DONATION  
 
Generally a donation can be defined as an agreement in terms of which one 
person donates patrimonial goods to the other, without compensation, with 
the understanding that the person to whom it has been donated becomes the 
owner of the goods and has accepted such a donation. According to 
Whelpton (1991:196), a mere promise to give a gift among the Bakwena of 
South Africa, is not sufficient to enforce a valid contract: ‘tsholofelo ga e 
tlhabise ditlhong’, meaning “a promise does not enlighten the heart” is the 
legal maxim used in this regard. Schapera (1970:142) writes that among the 
Batswana of Botswana a mere promise is sufficient to bind the parties and is 
a valid and enforceable contract. 
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According to Whelpton (1991:196), two kinds of gifts are distinguished 
among the Bakwena of South Africa, namely ‘mpho’ (a gift) and ‘etshwaelo’ 
(where a father chooses a certain animal to become his son’s property).  
Schapera (1970:239) mentions that these forms are also known among the 
Batswana of Botswana. Van Niekerk (1990a:37) came to a similar 
conclusion with regard to the Batswana of the North West Province. 
According to Whelpton (1991:196), there is a distinction between 
conditional and unconditional gifts. A gift can therefore be made subject to 
some or other condition. ‘Mphi’ (a gift) among the Bakwena of South Africa 
is an example of an unconditional gift where proprietary rights immediately 
passes to the receiver thereof. With ‘setshwaelo’, meaning “where a father 
chooses a certain animal to become his son’s property”, the ownership of 
this gift will only take place at a later stage, for example, the death of the 
father. Until such time, all rights and control remain vested in the father and 
the recipient will only receive these rights when the father dies. 
 
A gift that has been given cannot be reclaimed back: ‘seyamosateng ga se 
boe’, meaning “that which goes home, cannot come back”, that is to say, a 
gift is a gift (Whelpton 1991:197).  
 
According to Olivier (1989:547), the head of the family has a discretion to 
give family goods to another as a gift, and to this extent there are no specific 
differences between common law and customary law.  
 
The Swazi could not conceptualise the concept of a donation, being a 
contract. They do however, donate things to each other, but do not regard 
this as a contract. 
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7.7 MARRIAGE CONSIDERATION (EMALOBOLO)  
 
‘Emalobolo’ is one of the main requirements or elements for a marriage to 
come into being in terms of Swazi law and custom. The process and 
ceremony of delivery of emalobolo, or at least the negotiations which result 
in a guarantee of delivery of emalobolo, form part of the whole process of 
the marriage negotiations which initiate the creation of a marriage between 
two families.  The Swazi refers to it as ‘kuhlanganisa bukhoti’.  
 
Traditionally, several types of implement and livestock could be delivered as 
emalobolo. These include ploughing implements (inkhubazana), goats and 
cattle. ‘Inkhubazana’ was a special valued hoe made of cast iron. Its value 
was equivalent to that of a cow. As a result of progress, however, the use of 
implements and goats has fallen into disuse, and cattle remain the dominant 
form of emalobolo. Some families use money as a form of emalobolo. This 
is an arrangement reached between the two families who also agree on the 
specific amount for each beast that has to be delivered. 
 
• The significance of emalobolo 
  
The main purpose of emalobolo among the Swazi is to strengthen the 
relations between the family of the bride and that of the bridegroom 
(kuhlanganisa bukhoti). Emalobolo also vests guardianship of the children 
born of the marriage in the father’s family. If a child is born without 
emalobolo having been delivered, or agreed on, it belongs to the family of 
the mother (cf Fannin 1967:13). 
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Nhlapo (1992:48) with regards to the Swazi, refers to ‘lobola’ as a “factor in 
the settlement of disputes between man and wife”. A husband who ill-treats 
his wife until she is compelled to return to her home may forfeit the lobolo 
cattle. 
 
According to Fannin (1967:13), referring to the Swazi, ‘lobolo’ means: 
“cattle (or their equivalent in money) which the bridegroom, his father or his 
guardian agrees to deliver to the father or guardian of the bride for the 
purpose of ratifying the matrimonial contract between the group of the 
bridegroom and the group of the bride and of ensuring that the children of 
the marriage adhere to the family of the bridegroom.” 
 
Nhlapo (1992:48) writes the following with regard to the Swazi: “It now 
appears fairly settled that an important rationale in the minds of those who 
practise the custom is that the cattle transferred to the woman’s family 
compensate them for the loss of their daughter and her reproductive 
capacities.”  According to Nhlapo (1991:48), these cattle are then used to 
‘marry’ a bride for one of her brothers, thus bringing in another 
‘reproductive unit’ and keeping the groups in a state of equilibrium. 
 
Conversely, if the woman is at fault, her father may have to return the cattle 
to the husband.  According to Kuper (1963:16), the underlying assumption 
in all this is that no Swazi wants to part with cattle.  Marwick (1966:133) 
referring to the Swazi, observes: “The whole question of divorce brings on 
the readiness and ability of the woman’s father to repay the lobolo or portion 
of it”. 
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• Time of delivery of emalobolo 
  
There is no prescribed time for the delivery of emalobolo among the Swazi. 
Negotiations for the delivery of emalobolo start on the day the man’s family 
comes to the woman’s family to ask for her hand in marriage (batomcela). 
Usually emalobolo is delivered immediately after the marriage ceremony 
(kugidvwa kwemtsimba). That is why Swazi usually say: ‘kulotjolwa umfati’ 
(you deliver emalobolo to a married woman). If the delivery of emalobolo is 
not affected as a result of the agreement between the families, the 
outstanding emalobolo becomes a debt against the groom’s family. In fact, it 
may well be that the delivery of emalobolo is deliberately staggered because 
the Swazi believe that ‘umfati akacedvwa’, meaning “that it is not proper to 
effect full delivery of emalobolo at once”. It should be noted, however, that 
non-delivery of the full emalobolo has no bearing on the validity of the 
marriage. 
 
• The number of emalobolo 
  
The number of beasts (cattle) required for emalobolo among the Swazi is 
prescribed by the parents of the woman when the prospective groom’s 
family come to ask for her (kucela). This number will depend on the other 
variables such as the status and rank the woman holds in society and within 
the family. Thus, the following ranking described below is observed when 
prescribing the number of cattle to be delivered for emalobolo.  
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If the woman is a daughter of: 
• a king, no fewer than 50 beasts are prescribed; 
• a prince, no fewer than 30 beasts are prescribed; 
• a chief, no fewer than 20 beasts are prescribed; or 
• an ordinary person, no fewer than 15 beasts are prescribed. 
 
The first-born girl (inkhosatana) and the last-born girl (litfumbu 
lentfombatana) are also ranked higher and more emalobolo will normally be 
rendered for them than for the other girls in the family. 
 
In addition to the prescribed number of emalobolo mentioned above, the 
groom’s family also delivers the ‘lugege’ and ‘insulamnyembeti’ beasts. The 
‘lugege’ beast is a beast given by the groom as a gift to the bride and the 
‘insulamnyembeti’, literally meaning “to wipe off the tears”, is a beast given 
to the bride’s mother. These beasts must be delivered, irrespective of 
whether or not there is an agreement regarding the delivery of emalobolo at 
a future date. The ‘lugege’ beast will not be slaughtered if no agreement has 
been reached (Kuper 1963:22). 
 
It is incumbent on a father to provide emalobolo to each son for his first 
wife. If the father dies, the obligation descends to his successor. 
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• The source of emalobolo 
  
The father of the groom may refuse to provide such cattle under certain 
circumstances, for example when he does not really like the daughter-in-law. 
However, he may be persuaded by the family to assist the son. Cattle for the 
wife of a son may be taken from cattle obtained from the marriage of 
daughters of that house (such as the son’s uterine sisters). If a younger 
brother borrows cattle from his house to provide emalobolo for his wife, he 
is required to return these cattle when he receives emalobolo for his eldest 
daughter. 
 
Since the delivery of emalobolo may be deferred, it may also be promised in 
respect of cattle not yet received as emalobolo of a daughter who is yet to be 
married. A mother may also provide emalobolo for one of her sons, using 
the offspring of her ‘insulamnyembeti’ beast meaning “to wipe off the tears”. 
This becomes a debt in the estate of the mother which the son must repay 
even if the mother is deceased. If the mother is deceased, the debt must be 
paid to the last-born son. 
 
• Distribution of emalobolo 
  
Emalobolo received from the marriage of the eldest daughter of each house 
accrues to the estate of the head house ‘indlunkhulu’. Emalobolo received 
from the marriage of subsequent daughters of each house accrues to their 
respective mothers’ houses. 
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• Return of emalobolo 
  
Emalobolo may be returned among the Swazi, but only under most 
exceptional circumstances. Reasons for the return of emalobolo include: 
 
- where the wife dies without bearing children and her parents do not 
send someone in her place; and  
- where the woman leaves her marital home (kwemuka), and, when 
confronted, refuses to go back to her husband. 
 
The maxim goes: ‘ukhiphe tinkhomo emlonyeni weyise’, meaning “she has 
taken the cattle out of her father’s mouth.” The exact number of cattle paid 
as emalobolo is returned even if the cattle had multiplied over the years 
(tinkhomo temabheka atitali). 
 
7.8 CONCLUSION 
 
It appears that most writers on the indigenous law agree on the principles of 
the sale, exchange and donation contracts. There are noteable differences 
regarding the grouping of types of contracts within the service contract as 
well as some uses of these.  Although different types of contracts are 
recognised, one must always bear in mind that the nature, formation and 
consequences differ. It is important to determine whether a contract is an 
exchange or a loan for consumption, as each one is distinct in what subject 
matter may be exchanged or loaned. 
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Progress has been made in indigenous law in distinguishing different forms 
of contracts. It is also interesting to note that certain contracts have 
undergone some changes to adjust to current circumstances, such as the 
‘lilima’ contract which now has a further meaning in that, other than in the 
past, it also now refers to individuals rendering their services in urban areas, 
such as in the mining industry. Although it is not a requirement, it is 
nowadays preferred that contracts be put to writing and interest has become 
part of the negotiations. 
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Chapter 8  
 
SPECIFIC CONTRACTS  
 
8.1 NON-PERMANENT EXCHANGE OF GOODS, INCLUDING 
BAILMENT AND MANDATE 
 
8.1.1 Introduction 
 
Generally, non-permanent exchange of goods occurs when transfer of 
ownership does not pass over to the other party. There is, however, a 
differentiation between situations where the exchange or loan for use, 
takes place either with or without remuneration. 
 
8.1.2 Loan agreements 
 
According to Whelpton (1991:200), a loan agreement is fairly well 
known under the Bakwena of South Africa and is called ‘dikadimo’. 
Although it would appear that a loan and certain lease agreements relate 
to one another, the difference between a loan and a lease agreement is 
that, with a loan, no payment is made. A party may, however, feel free to 
hand the other party something as a gesture of appreciation, especially 
where the subject matter has been on loan for a lengthy period of time. 
When a loan is required, the request will be addressed in the following 
words, namely ‘ke a kopa’ (I ask). The request is not made in a manner 
of demand. The Swazi refer to it as ‘ngiyacela’ (I ask). 
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A loan is usually arranged in respect of movables, such as animals, 
farming equipment and household items. Strydom (1985:465) writes that 
in respect of the Southern-Sotho of Qwaqwa, loans are entered into with 
a specific purpose of meeting certain obligations, e.g. the contribution 
(ditsua) that a uncle should make towards the maintenance of his niece or 
contributions made for the ‘lobolo’ of a son of a family member or 
friend. Whelpton (1991:201) confirmed that these loans are also known 
to the Bakwena of South Africa. They made it clear however, that it is a 
loan, which had to be repaid. A specific date is usually agreed upon, on 
which the borrowed item should be returned. If no specific dated is 
settled, the item must be returned by the borrower, as soon he has 
stopped making use of it. Schapera (1970:245) writes with regard to the 
Batswana that “if the borrower fails to return the article borrowed and it 
is of little value, the owner does not usually press the matter but will 
refrain from lending him anything more in future. If, however, the article 
is of some value, and the borrower after several requests, fails to return it, 
he can be sued. The court will then order him to return it, or else pay the 
owner what it is worth”. According to Whelpton (1991:202) the Bakwena 
of South Africa follow the same procedure as stated above by Schapera. 
 
Loan for use is whereby one person hands over something to another 
freely for the latter to use in a particular manner, after which the things is 
returned to the lender (kweboleka) (Whelpton 1991:202). Loan for use is 
a contract which is gratuitous. If the lender is to receive any remuneration 
from the borrower, the contract is one of lease.   
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Loan contracts are also known among the Swazi.  They refer to a loan as 
‘kusitana’. The term is used to indicate the bilateral nature of the 
contract. Where no period for the return of the item has been agreed 
upon, the borrower may use the item for the purpose for which it was lent 
for as long as is deemed necessary. Such things as household utensils and 
cattle are the objects of a great deal of borrowing and lending. Farming 
out (kusisa) cattle, which will be discussed in 8.1.4, may not be lent. 
 
Where an item which is known to be defective is borrowed from another, 
for example, where a sick animal is borrowed, the borrower has no 
recourse against the lender if the animal should die while in his 
possession. The lender likewise, has no action against the borrower, who 
is obliged to report to the lender if the property has been destroyed or 
damaged. The borrower must generally exercise the care of an owner 
over the thing lent to him. Where it is agreed that damage to, and 
destruction of, the thing will be made good by the borrower, the latter 
will be liable in terms of the agreement. Liability will also attach to the 
borrower if there was negligence involved. However, if the loss or 
damage was a mere accident, the two parties will negotiate the issue. If 
the owner is not satisfied, he will not take the meat and skin of the animal 
with him, signifying his anger.  
 
Loans only bring benefits to the borrower.  The lender does not enjoy any 
benefits. Should remuneration be part of the contract, it can be seen as a 
lease. 
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8.1.3 The lease agreement 
 
The available literature makes little reference to this form of contract. 
According to Van Blerk (1990b:73), a lease was initially unknown to the 
Batswana of the North West Province. Today leases are more frequently 
seen under the Barolong, Batlharo and Bakgatla, which compares to the 
position of the Bakgatla of Botswana, referred to by Schapera (1970:245-
246). According to him, an ox wagon would be rented out for two 
baskets of grain. 
 
Van Blerk (1990b:73) mentions that the Tswana term for lease is ‘go 
jaka’ and ‘go hira’. Van Blerk does not discuss the principles on which 
this form of contract is based, nor does he state specifically if it is seen as 
a contract per se. Whelpton (1991:203) states that the Bakwena of South 
Africa distinguished between these two terms and pointed out that ‘go 
jaka’ could not be used for the lease of goods but rather for the renting of 
services. 
 
Pauw (1985:121) mentions with regards to the Imidushane and Amabhele 
of the Eastern Cape that various goods can be leased, such as animals, 
farm equipment, cultivable fields, cars and tractors. According to Pauw, 
it depends on the parties whether it would be done in terms of a lease or 
whether as a loan. Pauw states that the lessee must maintain the leased 
goods, he must replace it or ensure that it is properly repaired. A lessee 
cannot claim damages if the lessor re-claims the thing leased before the 
end of the lease period. If he has already paid in full he can only claim 
back the balance relating to the unexpired period of the lease. 
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Whelpton (1991:203) writes that the Bakwena of South Africa could 
relate to Pauw’s findings. According to them, the lessor is not entitled to 
reclaim his property before the lease expires unless otherwise agreed. If 
no specific agreement was reached, the lessor would be entitled to do so, 
but not without proper discussion, consultation and good reason. 
According to Whelpton (1991:204), various forms of lease agreements 
are known to the Bakwena of South Africa. Like to any other contract, a 
lease agreement is concluded once an appointment has been made and 
performance or partial performance by one party has taken place. The 
parties must reach consensus with regard to the following - what will be 
leased and the amount payable in terms of the lease. The lease agreement 
is a reciprocal agreement, that is to say that both parties have rights and 
obligations. Both have to perform. 
 
According to the Swazi panel of experts, lease agreements are known to 
the Swazi. Various things may be hired or leased. These could be 
movable or immovable, as in the case of the Bakwena of South Africa 
(Whelpton 1991:204). Usually they are items used in daily life, such as 
cattle, equipment and plougable lands. The lessor must, however, be the 
owner of the goods. If they belong to someone else a valid lease 
agreement cannot be concluded.  The rental amount is usually payable at 
the end of the period. The parties can however agree that a portion of the 
payment can be made, for instance, where it is cultivated land, with the 
fruits delivered from the land. The parties must also agree to the period of 
the lease. If no fixed terms have been negotiated, either of the parties can 
cancel the lease after consultation and proper notice. A lessee will not be 
able to cancel a lease agreement before the crop has not been reaped off 
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by the lessor. A lessor may also not sell the leased item whilst it is leased 
to another until the expiration of the lease period. The agreement in terms 
of the contract must first end, before a new commitment can be entered 
into. 
Among the Swazi, land can be “lent” without permission of the head 
house (indlunkhulu) if it is used for ploughing.  If land is “lent” for 
building, even if it is a temporary structure, the permission of the head 
house (indlunkhulu) needs to be sought.  A person may allow someone 
else to use his land if he is unable to use it himself. This is however, a 
temporary arrangement that does not require the permission of the chief 
(sikhulu).  Swazi law and custom recognises the right of an individual to 
control the use of specific pieces of land, but there is also the implicit 
assumption that he will occupy and utilise that land, either in his own 
person or through his dependents.  From this flows the rule that if a rights 
holder fails for an appreciable time to occupy or utilise land over which 
he has been granted rights, then any tenancy right he may have is 
automatically weakened. 
  
8.1.4 Farming out (kusisa) 
 
Farming out is well known as a contract in indigenous law under various 
terms. The Zulu refer to it as ‘sisa’, the Xhosa as ‘ngoma’, the Tsonga as 
‘fuyira’, the Sotho as ‘mafisa’ and the Swazi as ‘kusisa’ (Whelpton 
1991:206). 
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Some writers state that this contract has the same characteristics as the 
English Law “agistment”. Walker (1980:4) writes that the contract is one 
whereby one man takes another’s cattle, horses or other animals, to graze 
on his land as a reward and to deliver them on demand. Nathan 
(1990a:61) writes that if another thing is involved, it is seen as a loan. 
 
Schapera (1970:246) writes with regards to this custom. “Lending out 
cattle in this way is a very common practice. The herdsman derives 
considerable benefit from the cattle thus entrusted into his care. The 
owner’s task of herding his cattle has been greatly simplified by placing 
the cattle under the care of a herdsman. The practice serves also to insure 
against total loss from disease or some other agency which might 
annihilate a man’s cattle should they all be concentrated in one kraal. It is 
also a means of disguising the full extent of his wealth, and by doing so, 
of escaping the jealousy and evil desires of less fortunate neighbours. 
 
According to Whelpton (1991:207), this custom was earlier well known 
to the Bakwena of South Africa. Nowadays, due to the limitation on the 
amount of cattle they can keep, it is no longer practised. Younger people 
working in urban areas sometimes buy cattle with their income and then 
farms them out to relatives in the peri-urban and farming areas. These 
contracts have to be recorded at the local tribal office. 
 
Bekker (1989:338) refers to this contract as a loan whereby the lender is 
entitled to a benefit for the use of the stock. Coetzee (1985:49) mentions 
that the loan agreement used to be an important form of the ‘mafisa’ 
custom, “om ‘n ander mens op te tel.” Pauw (1985:126) and Strydom 
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(1985:468) also write that ‘mafisa’ is a loan contract. According to 
Whelpton (1991:207), the Bakwena of South Africa were uncertain about 
calling it a specific contract and pointed out that it should rather be seen 
as a distinctive kind of an agreement. 
 
Whelpton (1991:208), with regard to the Bakwena of South Africa, states 
that farming out initially took place between family groups. Nowadays, 
individuals can also conclude such a contract, subject to their having 
contractual capacity. Women were initially not allowed to enter into 
‘mafisa’ (farming out) contracts but today exceptions are made in respect 
of widows and certain woman who earn an income in urban areas. 
Olivier (1989:569) confirms this principle that woman should not 
conclude mafisa-contracts. Bekker (1989:340) disagrees and states that 
there should be nothing to prevent a woman from receiving ‘mafisa’ 
cattle and that a contract should be concluded with the approval, even if 
tacit, of the head of the family. 
 
According to Schapera (1970:246) a ‘mafisa’ contract can be terminated 
by any one of the parties, and at any time. Bekker (1989:340) mentions, 
however, that an owner would usually not terminate a contract shortly 
after its commencement, as ‘mafisa’ contracts are usually concluded for 
several years. Nathan (1990a:66-67) writes: “The usual form in 
Bophuthatswana is that no agreement is made as to the duration of the 
contract and it is then implied that it will last for a reasonable time, that 
is, a time that will allow for a reasonable benefit to pass to the keeper. 
Usually this is not less than a season or less than a year. The possibility 
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of an express and specific agreement as to the period is not excluded 
since there is no rule to exclude such an agreement.” 
 
Whelpton (1991:211) writes that after a reasonable time, the owner will 
request that his cattle should be returned, whereupon the holder will do 
so. The death of the holder will only terminate the contract if the 
deceased’s successor is unable to maintain the contract. Should the owner 
die, and the cattle must be divided between the heirs, the cattle will be 
collected. 
  
Amongst the Swazi, farming out (kusisa) is a contract whereby the owner 
(umsisi) places certain animals under the control of another (umsiselwa) 
for an indefinite period. This is done on the understanding that the keeper 
will enjoy the use of the animals, but that the ownership will remain with, 
and accrue to, the depositor. It is clearly a specific contract in its own 
right, with its own characteristics.  The underlying specific common 
intentions as to the nature of a transaction, are the animals involved, the 
right to use the animals and any proceeds flowing from such use. The 
terms, in other words, the implied rights and duties of the parties, are, for 
example the right to be rewarded, the duty to take care of the animals, to 
account for the animals, their progeny and the consequences of 
termination. 
 
Both parties  to the transaction may benefit from it, although the 
overriding sentiment is that the keeper should benefit. The keeper enjoys 
the use and proceeds of the animals, other than progeny, and the owner is 
relieved of the task of taking care of the animals. A domestic animal may 
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be farmed out, though commonly it is cattle that are farmed out. In the 
case of the farming out of cattle, the keeper approaches the owner 
(umsisi) and makes the offer to ‘sisa’ the cattle. However, in the case of 
goats, it would be the owner who would make the offer to the keeper. 
 
It is not necessary for ‘kusisa’ cattle to be kept apart from any cattle the 
herdsman may possess himself. The keeper may use the oxen for 
ploughing, the cows for milk and generally use the  animals in the same 
manner as if he was the owner. Whatever is earned from the produce of 
the cattle, for example from the sale of milk, belongs to the keeper. The 
keeper may not slaughter an animal or use it to pay for his marriage. Nor 
may he lend the cattle to a third party. 
 
The idea that an owner retains ownership is firmly engrained in the value 
system of the people so that if the keeper has incurred debts, ‘kusisa’ 
cattle cannot be attached to satisfy those debts. ‘Kusisa’ animals may be 
seized from the keeper to satisfy the debts of their owner and the keeper 
cannot demand that the animals may be replaced. The keeper is 
responsible for the well-being of the animals while they are in his 
keeping. He must exercise the same degree of care and diligence in 
looking after ‘kusisa’ animals as he would if they were his own. 
  
When the owner (umsisi) visits the animals from time to time, the keeper 
must account to him satisfactorily for the condition of the animals. The 
keeper has a duty to restore the animals to the owner whenever they are 
claimed and he must diligently account for all losses not previously 
reported and also for all increases. Losses through death, theft or other 
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causes must be immediately reported to the owner and where an animal 
has died, the skin must be produced. 
 
Failing to report a loss to an owner in the proper manner will render the 
keeper liable to make good the loss. In such circumstances he is therefore 
held strictly liable to replace the animals and he is generally allowed to 
keep the meat of the animal.  
 
The keeper takes sole charge of the animals for an indefinite period that 
can be brought to an end at any time by either party. As a rule no 
agreement is made as to the duration of the contract and it is then implied 
that it will last for a reasonable time. The possibility of an express and 
specific agreement as to the period is not excluded, since there is no rule 
to excluding such an agreement. 
 
Over and above the use of animals, the keeper is entitled to one of the 
progeny (sisinga) after a satisfactory end to the transaction. A calf may, 
however, be given as a token of appreciation (kubonga) at the end of the 
period. Where the animals farmed out are pigs, the owner must give the 
keeper a sow and a boar, so that the keeper may have his own pigs in 
future. 
 
After a reasonable time has lapsed or after a longer period, the owner 
(umsisi) will claim his animals and once the claim had been made, the 
keeper must return them. The keeper may terminate the contract at any 
time, but he should first discuss this with the owner so that the owner can 
receive proper notice and make his arrangements accordingly. It is usual, 
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as a matter of courtesy, for the keeper to give the owner reasonable 
notice. Although it is not usual to stipulate a specific period, if such a 
specified period has been determined, the owner cannot terminate the 
contract at will. The owner may, however, terminate the contract 
prematurely without incurring any liability if he or she has good reason 
for doing so, that is, if the keeper is not taking proper care of the animals.
  
8.1.5 Bailment (kubambisa) 
 
According to Whelpton (1991:211), bailment is known to the Bakwena 
of South Africa and the term used by them is ‘go boloka’. The contract is 
concluded when one person, the bailor, entrusts to the other person, the 
bailee, movables and the bailee undertakes to either keep it in bailment, 
either free of charge or against payment and to return it to the bailor 
when he is requested to do so. 
 
The bailee is not entitled to use the item but must take proper care thereof 
and is liable if it is damaged or destroyed due to his negligence. This is 
also the position in western legal systems (cf Hosten et al 1980:460). 
According to Nathan (1990b:74), this contract is also known to the 
Bafokeng, Bakwena and Batlhaping. She points out that with the 
Barolong, no remuneration is payable and that the bailee must take care 
of the item as if it were his own. The bailee is also liable for any losses 
whilst looking after it. According to Whelpton (1991:212) with regards to 
the Bakwena of South Africa, the forms of bailment known to them 
reflect comparisons to that known in Roman Law. Three types of a 
bailment contracts are known to them, namely bailment in distress, 
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bailment when a dispute arises as to ownership of a thing and bailment of 
money. According to Whelpton (1991:213), bailment must be 
distinguished from a loan, as the bailee is not entitled to use the item and 
also from consumption, as the identical item must be returned. The bailee 
must return the item in the condition it was received at bailment. Where 
the bailment is free of charge the bailee is only liable for damages caused 
by his intent or gross negligence. The bailee will be liable for ordinary 
damages if bailment was agreed to against the payment of remuneration. 
 
Bailment, referred to by the Swazi, as ‘kubambisa’ is known among the 
Swazi. An example is where persons working in urban areas, would leave 
money with family and friends to look after. The bailee does not become 
the owner of the money and may also not use it. No interest can be 
negotiated. The bailee can be remunerated for his services but only after 
all the money had been returned to the bailor. 
 
8.2  CONCLUSION 
 
From the literature it is clear that the writers mostly agree on the nature 
and substance of the respective indigenous contracts. It does however 
appear as if in most instances one can distinguish bailment from loan and 
loans for consumption. The individual character of each contract must 
always be kept in mind, such as farming out (kusisa), which is a well 
known contract peculiar to the Swazi. 
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Chapter 9 
 
SPECIFIC CONTRACTS 
 
9.1 CONTRACTS WHICH INFLUENCE THE STATUS OF 
PARTIES 
 
9.1.1 Introduction 
 
De Wet and Yeats (1978:4-5) write with regard to contracts in general that 
“’n kontrak waaruit verbintenisse voortvloei, moet onderskei word van ander 
kontrakte wat regsgevolge het. ‘n Huwelikskontrak het altyd vermoëns–
regtelike gevolge en kan selfs verbintenisse in die lewe roep, soos 
verbintenisse tot wedersydse onderhoud, maar dit word gewoonlik nie 
gesluit met die oog op die skepping van verbintenisse nie, en word dan ook 
nie deurgaans beheer deur die beginsels wat op kontrakte van toepassing is 
nie”. An engagement is thus also a contract sui generis and differs in many 
aspects from other contracts. One should, therefore, not apply the general 
principles applicable to contracts and marriage. 
 
9.1.2 Status 
 
Status, known to the Swazi as ‘sigaba’ or ‘sitfunti’, is the condition of 
belonging to a family, to which is ascribed a set of rights, duties, powers, 
liabilities, privileges and disabilities. Unlike contractual rights and duties, 
which, in principle, are voluntarily chosen, the rights and duties associated 
with status are imposed by law (ex lege). Thus although a person may, by an 
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act of volition (such as marriage), acquire a certain status, the rights and 
duties attached to it are ascribed by law and do not vary. A person’s status is 
derived from membership of a category of people, and the most common 
criteria for constituting these categories are age, gender and marriage. One 
status of a father is relative to that of a child, woman is relative to man and 
minor is relative to that of a major. In consequence, the rights attributed to 
status must find their correlative duties expressed in a complementary 
category. A person’s status within his or her family, for example, is 
influenced by various factors and may either give or deny a person certain 
competencies; for example, young boys and girls may not marry, and a 
feebleminded man may not succeed to a position of power (cf Whelpton 
2005:169). 
 
Marriage means a change of status to both man and woman. In all cases it 
means more capacity. A married woman can exercise her share of custody 
over her children. She can expect from her marital group to protect and care 
for her and her children, also after her husband’s death. She holds an 
important share in the house property and her husband has to discuss any 
actions regarding the house property with her. She has to produce children to 
the marital group, even after her husband’s death, if she can still bear 
children. Furthermore, she has to fulfil all household obligations and has to 
cultivate food for her household (cf Myburgh 1985:77-83). 
 
A man’s status is elevated through marriage, as he becomes head of the 
family and represents his family in legal actions and lawsuits. He exerts his 
power over his wife and children if necessary, by way of chastisement. 
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Furthermore, he has to maintain his wife and children inter alia by way of 
making available ploughable fields (Myburgh 1985:82-83).  
 
9.1.3 Marital status 
 
Vorster (1981b:93) defines a marriage among indigenous peoples as an 
institution in terms of which a man and woman is united with the primary 
purpose or goal of producing children lawfully. Sexual intercourse is 
however not the most important social consequence of a marriage. It is 
indispensable for the existence and survival of a family and other social 
groups which are based on consanguinity. Vorster (1981b:93) writes that, 
even though there are no legal restrictions preventing a man from marrying 
more than one woman, today one seldom finds polygamy obligations. 
According to him, the reason for this is primarily the fact that, in terms of 
Western legal systems, a man cannot be married to more than one woman, at 
any point in time. Woman nowadays also demand to get married either in 
church or before a magistrate. Furthermore, the disapproval and rejection of 
polygamy by churches, have virtually caused this custom to disappear (cf 
Whelpton 1991:21-232). 
 
Among the Swazi the family (umndeni) is founded upon marriage 
(kwendza). Like any other social relationship, a marriage establishes special 
rights and duties among the people concerned. In terms of Swazi law and 
custom, a marriage is a relationship which concerns not only the husband 
and wife, but also their respective families. The formation of marriage 
creates a series of reciprocal rights and obligations between the spouses for 
which their respective families are collectively responsible. Thus, although 
 173
the personal relationships between the families form part of a Swazi 
marriage, in the broader sense the wife is, in fact, united to her husband’s 
family. After his death, she continues to be part of his family. Marriage does 
not contemplate its termination – whether by death or divorce, and lastly a 
marriage is potentially polygynous (sitsembu). 
 
Nhlapo (1992:71) defines a marriage in terms of Swazi law and custom as 
follows: 
 
“A valid marriage by Swazi law and custom comes into being when a 
woman of marriageable age is anointed with red ochre (libovu) by 
members of a man’s family during an appropriate ceremony with the 
intention of making the woman the wife of such man, provided that 
negotiations for the transfer of lobolo by the man or his family to the 
guardian of the bride have been, or will subsequently be, completed to 
the satisfaction of both contracting parties.” 
 
Amongst the Swazi a marriage brings about a change in the legal and social 
status of both husband and wife. In all cases, it is accompanied by increased 
powers. Both of them are now seen as mature persons. The relationship of 
the spouses and their relationship with their children and families are 
governed by a code of customs, morals standards and beliefs, all of which 
serve to underwrite the principle of patriarchy. In general, the woman passes 
from the legal control of her parents into that of her husband’s family, who 
now become her guardian and as such are responsible for her actions. 
However, in practice, the woman’s family remains responsible for any 
serious marital offences she may commit against her husband or his family. 
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She cannot, as a rule, sue or be sued except through them (or in certain 
cases, such as divorce proceedings, through her father or his representative). 
 
A married woman may exercise her share in the guardianship, referred to by 
the Swazi as ‘kuphatfwa emndeni’ over her children among other things, by 
means of discipline. She can expect that her marital group will protect her 
and her children even after her husband’s death. She has an important share 
in the property of her house and her husband must consult her in the disposal 
of house property. She may also acquire property by her own industry, for 
example, by making sleeping mats, or raising her own chickens.  
 
In Swazi law and custom, a woman’s status determines house rank.  The 
Swazi refer to it as ‘kudla umuti’. 
 
9.1.3.1 Rank (lizinga) 
 
Rank (lizinga) plays a significant role in Swazi law and custom and may 
influence a person’s status. Thus, each of the wives of a polygynist has a 
particular rank, as does each of their houses. Each member of the family also 
has a particular rank, in accordance with the order of seniority within the 
family. 
 
The Swazi distinguish between “family rank” and “house rank”. Family rank 
refers to the hierarchy of family members among themselves, while “house 
rank” refers to the hierarchy of the various houses in a household. 
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9.1.3.1.1 Family rank (lizinga lemuti) 
    
The Swazi family forms an ‘umndeni’. The family comprises the eldest male 
member, his wives, his unmarried brothers and sisters, married sons and 
their wives and children, and unmarried daughters. However, when the 
family is larger than this, it forms a family council (lusendvo). These are 
family members of the same lineage (intalelwane). While they commonly 
build their homesteads in close proximity to each other, members of the 
family council (lusendvo) may actually be spread over a larger geographical 
area, coming together for issues affecting the lineage. 
 
Males occupy a higher rank than females. This is because they are expected 
to perpetuate the family (bavusa likhaya) whereas daughters will leave the 
family upon marriage. Female are always under the authority of males, and 
only males can become family heads. Within the context of the family, a 
person’s rank is determined by the principle of primogeniture. The eldest 
son has a higher rank than his younger brothers, and younger brothers 
therefore, rank below their elder brothers. The same principle applies to 
sisters. 
 
Within the broader family, the rank of children is qualified by their father’s 
rank within his family of origin. If the father is the eldest brother, his 
children hold a rank higher than that of any of his brother’s children. 
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9.1.3.1.2 House rank (lizinga lendlu) 
 
House rank determines family rank. House ranking is done through the 
social status of a woman when she joins her new family upon marriage. For 
example, a woman bearing the same surname as the family’s head’s 
grandmother is most likely to be the woman to bear the family’s successor 
(inkhosana). Therefore, her household ranks highest and is referred to as 
‘indlunkhulu’, meaning the household which bears the successor 
(inkhosana). The following are the house ranks among the Swazi; each of 
these bears the successor (inkhosana) in cases where they rank highest: 
 
• a woman of Royal blood; 
• a daughter of a chief (sikhulu);  
• a woman who bears the same surname as the husband’s paternal 
grandmother (umfati longugogo);  
• a wife who has been negotiated for a man by his parents (umfati 
lokhiwe); this wife has the next highest rank in relation to other 
subsequent wives; 
• a woman married following an arranged marriage where her parents 
would have approached the man’s family and offered her as a wife to 
their son (umfati lowendzisiwe); and 
• a woman married through the ordinary process of courtship (umfati 
losingani). 
 
In order to avoid conflict, this combination of wives is not encouraged. The 
order of marriage is important only if the wives are all of the same social 
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status. However, it becomes irrelevant when the social status changes and 
the wife coming in with a higher social status is said to take seniority (kudla 
umuti) because for purpose of bearing the successor (inkhosana) she will 
rank higher than any other wives she finds in the marriage. Therefore, 
ranking of wives for purposes of determining succession becomes pertinent 
only upon the death of the family head. 
 
The other highest rank household is that which produces the ‘lisokanchanti’, 
who is the first-born son of the family head. 
 
9.1.4 The engagement 
 
Myburgh (1985:83-84) describes an engagement contract among indigenous 
peoples as a particular contract. The elements of this contract, are according 
to him, the contract plus performance or partial performance by the family of 
the man. This performance involves the delivery of all or some of the 
marriage goods plus other gifts. 
 
In earlier years, a ‘child engagement’ was known among indigenous 
peoples.  In terms of this engagement, a man and his wife’s brother would 
conclude an agreement that their children, when marriageable, would get 
married, but currently this is no longer a known practise. Matthews 
(1940:19) and Schapera (1970:130) discuss this form of engagement in their 
writings. They also refer to engagements of unborn children. The last 
mentioned engagement is totally unknown to the Swazi or to the Bakwena of 
South Africa (cf Whelpton 1991:224). 
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Among the Swazi, an engagement (kuqabangula) is a contract concluded 
between the fathers of the man and girl, in terms of which they undertake to 
let their children marry. The right to dissolve such a contract is determined 
by the children. However, any legal action which may result due to the 
dissolution of the contract, resides with the fathers. Currently, more focus is 
placed on the individual choice of the man and woman. The community will 
not acknowledge an engagement where the consent thereto by the man and 
girl has not been obtained. 
 
Among the Swazi people, there are various forms of engagements or ways of 
courtship.  The most important are set out below.  
 
9.1.4.1 To steal herself (kutiba) 
 
In this instance, a young woman will, following an understanding between 
herself and her lover, invite several other girls to the lover’s homestead 
(bayogidza umtsimba). The young woman will do this without her parent’s 
knowledge. When this kind of betrothal is used, the man’s family will not 
have to deliver a beast, known as a beast to ask (inkhomo yekucela) to the 
bride’s family to ask for the hand of the bride. 
 
9.1.4.2 A form of betrothal (kuqabangula) 
 
Kuqabangula is also a form of betrothal, although not well known. The 
process is initiated by a young woman. She will go to the lover’s homestead 
to ask for marriage goods (emalobolo) on behalf of her parents. The Swazi 
say ‘ayocela umbhidvo’, meaning “she is going to ask for red ochre”.  This 
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indicates that she wants to get married.  She is accompanied by several 
maidens from her area and an old woman from her homestead. Through the 
older woman accompanying her, she will inform the man’s parents that her 
parents have sent her ‘to ask for the red ochre’ (kutocela imbhidvo). She will 
then produce a stick which has some markings on, it indicating the number 
of cattle to be delivered as emalobolo. After this, the process ‘to ask’ 
(kucela) will follow. 
 
9.1.4.3 Courtship (Kujuma)   
 
In terms of this form of courtship, the young woman has already accepted 
her suitor. Lovers may now visit each other’s homesteads to spend a few 
days (not exceeding three) with the other’s family. For these visits, a woman 
will be accompanied by another young woman from her area. During these 
visits, lovers may not sleep together, let alone have sexual intercourse. 
 
The Swazi refer to it as ‘akungenwa esibayeni sendvodza’, meaning you 
may not enter into the kraal of the man. These visits are so that the families 
may be informed of their respective children’s intentions. 
 
It is also during this courtship (kujuma) that the man’s family may, when the 
woman returns to her family, put a porcupine quill (injelwane) on her head 
to indicate to her family that they are ready to have her married to their son. 
The porcupine quill signals to the woman’s family that they should prepare 
her for marriage. This includes the shaping of her hair into a wig (head gear) 
(sicholo), then she becomes known as a grown woman (ingcugce). On a 
subsequent courtship (kujuma) visit, a second porcupine quill (injelwane) 
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will be put in the woman’s headgear (sicholo) confirming beyond any doubt 
that the man’s family approve of her as a potential member of their family. 
 
9.1.5 Contracting a marriage in terms of Swazi law and custom 
 
9.1.5.1 Introduction 
 
According to Nhlapo (1992:59), there are four types of marriages in 
accordance with Swazi law and custom, though some categories may 
overlap.  He mentions love marriages, preferential marriages, devised or 
arranged marriages and private marriages.  
 
A love marriage can be initiated by either party and is the culmination of 
courtship in the ordinary way between two young people.  Marriages within 
certain kinship categories are preferred in Swazi culture and confer a high 
status on the wife.  These marriages are referred to as preferential marriages.  
Prominent among these is the marriage of a man to his grandmother (gogo), 
used in the sense to denote any woman who bears the same clan name as the 
husband’s maternal or parental grandmother or grandfather (Kuper 1963:95).  
Private marriages are the most interesting of the various types of marriages.  
These cover all those situations where the woman is smeared with red ochre 
without the prior permission of her parents and, in some cases, without her 
own consent or that of the man (Nhlapo 1992:61). 
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9.1.5.2 To ask for a girl’s hand in marriage (kucela) 
 
This marks the beginning of formal negotiations between the bride’s family 
and the groom’s family regarding the marriage of their respective offspring. 
It is initiated by the groom’s family, who sends a delegation to the bride’s 
family to request her hand in marriage. To ensure that they are well received, 
the groom’s family, represented by its delegation, may come bearing gifts of 
goodwill. These may include a beast referred to as ‘a beast asking for the 
bride’ (inkhomo yekucela).  
 
9.1.6 Features of an indigenous Swazi marriage 
 
The most important features of a Swazi marriage is that a marriage is a 
union between two people and their respective families. The Swazi refer to it 
as ‘kuhlanganisa bukhoti’, meaning to bring two families together. The 
principle of continuing relationships is closely connected with the institution 
of marriage goods, known as ‘emabheka’ or ‘emalobolo’. The procreation of 
children, both male and female, is of the greatest importance. Generally 
speaking, the legitimate birth of a child can take place only after a legally 
recognised marriage between the parties. Marriage sets up various 
relationships of authority between spouses, as well as between parents and 
children. Marriage is the culmination of a series of events, rather than a 
specific event. The conclusion of a marriage is therefore a lengthy process. It 
is usually accompanied by a variety of ceremonies.  Some ceremonies are 
merely customs, but others have a specific legal meaning.  
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9.1.7 Impediments to marriage 
 
9.1.7.1 Physical and mental defects (e.g. insanity, physical 
deformity, deafness, dumbness, blindness). 
  
Generally, these are not a bar to a valid marriage among the Swazi. 
However, it is for the families of the spouses to determine whether or not a 
particular member can enter into a marital relationship. The family members 
of a disabled person will normally undertake to bear the responsibility for 
such a person. According to the Swazi, disability is the will of God and will 
therefore not be a factor in determining the number of emalobolo cattle to be 
delivered (cattle delivered to a bride’s father and family by the groom and/or 
his family). 
 
A person suffering from grave mental defectiveness (e.g. a person who strips 
naked publicly or who is violent), is not permitted to marry. 
 
9.1.7.2 Infertility and impotence 
 
Neither infertility nor impotence seems to be a bar to a marriage among the 
Swazi. Again, the families play an important role in determining and curing 
the defect with the use of mixture of herbs and roots used for traditional 
medicine (timbita). If this is not successful, the woman’s family must send a 
subsidiary wife (inhlanti) to bear children for the husband. If a wife dies 
without bearing her husband any children, the cattle delivered as emalobolo 
may be returned. Therefore, if the woman’s family wish to continue the 
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relationship with the husband’s family, they will send a substitute. This will 
also allow them to keep the cattle. 
 
9.1.7.3 Marital status 
 
Among the Swazi, a woman may not enter into a subsequent marriage 
during the existence of her marriage, but a married man may do so. 
 
9.1.7.4 Persons of the same gender 
 
Persons of the same gender may not marry. However, the Swazi do have a 
practice whereby a woman will marry another woman and ask a male 
relative to relate sexually with her wife. Children born out of such a 
relationship belong to the woman. 
 
9.1.7.5 Prohibited degrees of consanguinity (blood relationship) 
and affinity 
 
Swazi law and custom contain certain impediments to a marriage between 
persons who are related to each other within certain degrees of 
consanguinity. 
 
9.1.7.6 Consanguinity in the direct line 
 
Persons who are ascendants or descendants of one another, for example, 
father and daughter, grandfather and granddaughter, may not marry. 
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9.1.7.7 Consanguinity in the collateral line 
 
Blood relations who are related to one another by a common ancestor may 
not marry. A brother and sister, two cousins, an uncle and niece are all blood 
relations in the collateral line and may therefore not marry each other. 
 
9.1.7.8 Relationship by affinity 
 
Persons related to one another by affinity (the relationship that comes into 
being between a married person and the blood relations of his or her spouse, 
as a result of the marriage) may, in certain cases, not marry. Thus a man is 
not permitted to marry his wife’s mother, grandmother or granddaughter. He 
may, however, marry his wife’s sister. He may also marry his wife’s 
brother’s daughter after his father’s death. 
 
9.1.7.9 Other prohibited relationships 
 
In addition to the above categories of persons, no person among the Swazi 
may marry anyone bearing the same clan name (sibongo) as he or she does. 
People who share common ancestors as indicated in their clan praises 
(tinanatelo) even if not sharing the same clan name, may also not 
intermarry, for example Dlamini/Magogo, Simelane/Ntsingila, 
Shongwe/Kunene, and Mahlalela/Maziya. 
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9.1.8 The requirements of a marriage in terms of Swazi law and custom 
 
There are certain requirements for a marriage in terms of Swazi law and 
custom of which the following are the most important: 
 
9.1.8.1 Smearing with red ochre (libovu) 
 
The smearing of the bride with red ochre seems to be “the single most 
legally significant event in the formation of a marriage in accordance with 
Swazi law and custom” Nhlapo (1992:45).  Engelbrecht (1931:17) who 
gives a detailed account of all the activities that take place during the 
wedding ceremonies up to the point when the bride distributes gifts to her in-
laws, writes the following with regard to the Swazi: 
 
“Immediately these presents have been handed over any old woman 
seizes the bride and puts her down on a mat already spread in the 
courtyard.  A little girl is made to sit next to her and both are rubbed 
in with a mixture of fat and red clay.  This is considered the final act 
necessary to make the marriage binding; and that the girl will from 
now on act as her helpmate”. 
 
Nxumalo (n.d.), as quoted by Nhlapo (1992:45), writes as follows about the 
actual process of being anointed with red ochre: 
 
“When a Swazi bride has been anointed her marriage is complete.  
The anointment ceremony called ‘kugcotshiswa libovu’ involves 
smearing the face and body of the bride with a red substance (libovu), 
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a type of clay mixed with fat.  This substance is commonly smeared 
on the face in the form of a cross across the forehead and down the 
nose.  Anointment marks the end of the marriage ceremony”. 
 
According to the Swazi a woman can only be smeared with red ochre 
(libovu) once in her lifetime.  In rare cases where she remarries, she is 
smeared with animal fat (liphehla) in stead of the red ochre (libovu). 
Immediately after the marriage gifts (umhlambiso) have been given, an old 
lady of the man’s family will lead the bride (makoti) to the kraal.  She will 
make her sit on a small mat (sihlantsi) and smear her with red ochre (libovu) 
from head to toe.  During this process, the bride is expected to cry.  She is 
then given a small child, referred to as ‘umntfwana welibovu’ whom she in 
turn will smear with animal fat (liphehla).  This is the child whom the new 
bride will send around on errands. 
 
The principle contained in these accounts, has been confirmed in several 
decisions of the High Court and is thus now beyond dispute. 
 
In R v Fakudze and Another (1970-76 SCR 422), the High Court, sitting 
with assessors, approved the above-mentioned rule. The court stated: 
 
“There are a number of ceremonies performed at the wedding, but the 
legally significant one is the anointing of the bride with red ochre 
(libovu). Unless and until this has been done, she is not regarded as 
having been married.” 
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In R v Timothy Mabaza and Another (1979-81 SCR 8), the High Court again 
expressed itself on the issue.  The court held that, if the smearing with red 
ochre has been done, though not at the proper place, the women smeared 
will nevertheless “be considered as married under Swazi customary law, 
even if no lobolo has been paid”. 
 
The above-mentioned judicial authority has been of immense value in 
confirming the specific point at which a marriage in accordance with Swazi 
law and custom comes into existence. 
 
According to the Swazi themselves, red ochre is their equivalent of the 
wedding ring and is infinitely more binding (Nhlapo 1992:47).  They take 
pride in the fact that the red ochre ceremony is a once-in-a-lifetime affair.  
This is also the starting point for the argument that a divorce is unknown in 
Swazi law and custom. 
 
9.1.8.2 Marriage consideration, (emalobolo)  known to the Swazi as 
‘Emabheka’ 
 
The delivery of marriage goods seems to be the second most important 
feature of a marriage in terms of Swazi law and custom.  According to 
Nhlapo (1992:47), some would even argue that it is the most important 
feature.  The Swazi, however, say ‘kulotjolwa umfati’ meaning you deliver 
emalobolo only for a wife. 
 
The process and ceremony of the delivery of emalobolo, or at lease the 
negotiations which result in a guarantee for delivery of emalobolo, are part 
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of the whole process of marriage negotiations which initiates the creation of 
a marriage between two families (kuhlanganisa bukhoti). 
 
Traditionally, several types of implements and livestock could be delivered 
as emalobolo.  These include ploughing implements (inkhubuzana), goats 
and cattle. 
 
9.1.8.3 The lugege beast must be slaughtered 
 
There is apparent unanimity about the significance of the ‘lugege’ beast 
(Nhlapo 1992:65).  Its delivery and slaughter mark the conclusion of the 
affinition agreement between the parties: from that point on, the two families 
are obliged to proceed to marriage.  Nhlapo (1992:65) emphasises the fact 
that it is not a betrothal.  According to him, it is a step deep into the marriage 
process itself through which the wife-givers indicate their satisfaction with 
the arrangements made by the wife-takers with regard to their daugther’s 
passage into her new family, specially the question of lobolo. 
 
The delivery and slaughter of the ‘lugege’ beast thus mark the conclusion of 
the agreement between the parties.  This indicates the wife’s group’s 
satisfaction with the arrangements regarding the question of emalobolo made 
by the husband’s group. 
 
As a sign of acceptance of the emalobolo, the bride’s father will give the 
groom’s people a beast referred to as ‘sidvudvu semyeni’, which is 
slaughtered. The giving of this beast signifies that the ownership of the 
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emalobolo has passed to the bride’s family.  At the slaughtering of this beast, 
the ‘lugege’ beast is also slaughtered. 
 
The ‘sidvudvu semyeni’ and ‘lugege’ beasts are stabbed by the main male 
person co-ordinating a traditional marriage, known by the Swazi as ‘gozolo’.  
As he stabs the ‘lugege’ beast, it is supposed to bellow, otherwise it is 
believed that its failure to do so indicates that the ancestors are not pleased 
with the marriage. 
 
Early the next morning after the slaughtering of the two beasts, the two 
beasts are properly divided up in preparation for cooking.  Several meat 
portions from the ‘lugege’ and the ‘sidvudvu semyeni’ carcasses are 
exchanged between the parties.  The exchange of portions is done in such a 
way that each party ends up with a whole beast to signify the further 
cementing of relations.  Some of the meat portions are important, and the 
exchange of these meat portions is significant, as they are to be eaten by 
certain persons of the families. Some of the meat portions exchanged are 
listed below. 
 
• The stomachs (sisu) of the beasts are exchanged. 
• The heads of the beasts are exchanged. 
• A leg of one beast is exchanged for a leg of the other. 
• Meat from the sides (imihlubulo/tinhlangotsi) of each of the beasts is 
exchanged.  
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• One forequarter portion of the sidvudvu semyeni meat is given to the 
bride to eat, since she cannot partake in the eating of the lugege meat. 
• Hooves (emasondvo) of the beasts are exchanged. 
• Special meat from the insides (umsasane) is given to the bride’s 
grandmother and children who have not reached maturity to eat. 
• The tail (umsila) is to be cooked and given to the bride’s brothers to 
eat. 
• A meat portion from the leg of the lugege beast (sibumbu) is 
exchanged. 
 
9.1.8.4 The insulamnyembeti beast must be delivered 
 
This is a beast that should be given to the bride’s mother and means “to wipe 
off the tears”. 
 
9.1.9 Capacity to marry 
 
In terms of Swazi law and custom, there is no fixed age for entering into a 
marriage.  A person would be of marriageable age once he or she has 
reached puberty.  This usually coincides with the incorporation into an age 
regiment.  A male person should become a member of a regiment of young 
men (libutfo lemajaha), and a female person a member of the regiment of 
young women (libutfo letintfombi). If a person marries before his regiment  
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(libutfo) has received permission to marry, he is fined a beast known as 
‘inkhomo yemabhaca’. 
 
9.1.10 Consent (kuvuma) 
 
The consent of all the parties is a necessary element of a marriage in terms 
of Swazi law and custom, and there are various ceremonies whereby consent 
is confirmed. The biting of a kind of stick referred to as ‘umgoqo/umvalo’ 
signifies a woman’s consent following her coming out of the hut and hitting 
the gate with a spear, or when she agrees that a goat they show her after the 
marriage ceremony (teka) be killed.  Although a Swazi marriage is an 
agreement between two families, the consent of the bride and groom is not 
secondary to that of the two family groups.  However, it is important that the 
spouses’ families support their relationship. If the families do not support the 
relationship, it may not be successful. 
 
It should be noted that in the process of when the girl’s father makes the 
approach (kwendzisa), the girl may not always consent willingly but could 
be coerced in certain instances to consent. 
 
When the girl’s father makes the approach, it may arise from her parents’ 
need for cattle.  A girl may then be forced to consent, as one  of the 
participants recounted: “I know a certain man whose daughter refused 
‘kuyokwendziswa’. Her own brothers took her forcefully to the man’s place 
and when they arrived there, they made sure that the teka ceremony was 
performed after which they left her there.”  In another incident the girl and 
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her mother were locked inside a hut. Leaves were burnt inside so that they 
had to inhale the smoke until they consented to the arranged marriage. 
 
Nhlapo (1992:60) asserts that consent is an essential requirement for a 
marriage.  He writes however, that not all the parties involved have the 
ability to render the proposed marriage null and void by withholding, or 
failing to signify their consent.  According to Nhlapo (1992:67), consent is 
hierarchically ranked for purposes of determining whether or not its absence 
renders the marriage null and void.  The only consent without which there 
cannot be a valid marriage is, according to Nhlapo (1992:67), that of the 
family of the bride. 
 
9.1.11 The coming into being of a marriage in terms of Swazi law 
and custom 
  
9.1.11.1 Courtship (kugana) 
 
The formation of a marriage among the Swazi, begins with the courting of a 
young woman by a young man. The courting may extend for up to three 
years. There are several options open to a young woman to mark the end of a 
period of courtship. Generally speaking, a young man will court a young 
woman for a lengthy period (of between two to three years). When she 
consents to his proposal, she will make one of the things listed below to 
indicate her consent, which is called ‘kugana’. 
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- Beads (kugana ngelicube/lijuba/ingeje) These are beads that a girl will 
make specifically to give to her suitor to wear around his neck. She will 
usually give these beads to a friend to give to her suitor. 
 
- ‘lucube’ This is a bead necklace made from a single string of an 
assortment of beads in red, white and black with ‘lijuba’. Only an even 
number of strings is used, because the use of uneven numbers reflects 
uneven love. 
 
- ‘lijuba’ This is a bead necklace made from a single string of blue beads 
with smaller white beads on the side and one heart bead in the position 
next to the man’s heart. 
 
- ‘ingeje’ This is a bead necklace made from lijuba beads, brown and 
yellow, and two heart-shaped or egglike beads in the middle, also yellow. 
One view was that this is not worn around the neck, but tied to the man’s 
lion skin (emabhebha). 
 
- ‘luhlongwa’ This is a grass bangle which is sometimes used instead of 
beads. Following this, the young man’s family will initiate the process of 
asking for the young woman’s hand in marriage (kucela). 
 
9.1.11.2 Invitation of peers (kugana ngekuhlehla) 
 
When a young woman reaches a decision to accept a suitor’s proposal, she 
indicates this by inviting several peers from her area. These are young 
woman in her age group. They wear their traditional attire (imvunulo) and 
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will gather at the suitor’s homestead to sing and dance, so that others who 
are watching know who the parties involved are. The women mention the 
suitor’s name in their songs, inviting him to come (batomgana). In turn, the 
prospective bride breaks away from the formation of the other women and 
dances apart, singing in praise of all his attributes. After a while, the women 
leave and return to their various homesteads. After a few days, young men 
(emajaha) and young women (tintfombi) from the woman’s and suitor’s area 
meet at an agreed spot and acknowledge the acceptance of the proposal 
(batobonga indzaba). This process of asking for the bride’s hand in marriage 
(kucela) will then follow.  
 
As a general rule, a marriage is initiated following the above process. 
However, owing to factors other than the desire of lovers to marry, a 
marriage may result when the woman’s father makes the approach 
(kwendzisa), or when the man’s father makes the approach (kukhiwa). Such 
cases are very rare today, as most young women consent to men of their own 
choice. 
 
Parents of a man may also choose the family and sometimes even the 
woman they wish their son to marry. They will then approach the parents of 
the woman and request her hand in marriage on behalf of their son. If the 
marriage takes place, this woman ranks high when it comes to the ranking of 
wives. She is the woman known as ‘umfati wekukhiwa’ or ‘umfati 
lowakhiwa’, meaning “the woman who was ‘picked’. 
 
When the woman’s father makes the approach (kwendiza), it is usually to 
seek some economic advantage. A poor man may wish to secure his 
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daughter’s future by marrying her into a wealthy family or may be seeking a 
loan of cattle, and will approach the man of his choice and offer his daughter 
in marriage. Marriage negotiations then proceed as above, except that the 
‘beast to ask’ (inkhomo yekucela) is not delivered to the woman’s family. 
This woman will rank first in the hierarchy of wives. She is the woman 
known as ‘umfati lowendziswa’ or ‘umfati wekwendziswa’ (an arranged 
marriage). 
 
9.1.12 The marriage ceremony (umtsimba) 
 
The marriage ceremony, known as ‘kugidza umtsimba’ signifies the official 
entry of a woman into the home of her in-laws as a wife. As a rule the man’s 
family will indicate that they are now ready to receive their bride and ask for 
the marriage ceremony (umtsimba). In some cases, the marriage (umtsimba) 
can take place after the woman has been smeared with red ochre (libovu) and 
is resident in her in-laws’ homestead. 
 
9.1.12.1 The assembly of bridal goods (kulungisa umhlambiso) 
 
In preparation for the marriage ceremony (umtsimba), the family of the bride 
will assemble bridal goods which will include these objects listed below. 
 
- A beast which must be paid by the woman’s family (inkhomo 
yemgano) 
  
This is a beast that the bride gives to her in-laws as a sign that she is willing 
to join the marital family. Ideally, the beast is delivered on the wedding day, 
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but if it is not available, it can be delivered on a later day. Once the 
‘umtsimba’ ceremony is over, the ‘umgano’ beast is slaughtered. The only 
people to eat the meat of the slaughtered beast are the members of the man’s 
family, including the daughter-in-law. These people are referred to as 
‘bomakoti’.  
 
- Skin skirt (sidwaba) 
  
This is a skirt made of cowhide which is worn by married women of 
marriageable age. As the bride is now entering womanhood, her family 
presents her with this skirt. 
 
- A shawl made out of cattle tails (sigeja) 
 
This is a shawl made of cattle tails worn by royalty. Thus, not every bride 
would wear this. Even a bride from a senior house does not wear a ‘sigeja’. 
 
- Gifts that the bride presents to various members of her in-laws 
(umhlambiso) 
 
The choice of those to receive gifts is left to the groom’s family, who will 
communicate this in advance to the bride’s family. Although there are 
variations, depending on individual families, the people who are to receive 
gifts will generally include the groom’s grandparents, parents, heads of 
certain houses within the family council (lusendvo), the wives of the heads, 
their first-born and last-born children (umyeni), the leader of the party 
bringing emalobolo (umntfwana welibovu), a young man who serves as a co-
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ordinator during all the occasions that mark the marriage process (gozolo) 
and the groom (umkhwenyana).  
 
Umhlambiso goods comprise general domestic wares, such as sleeping mats 
(emacansi), grass mats (titsebe), clay pots (tindziwo), traditional sieves 
(tikhetfo), strainers (emahluto), wooden meat platters (imigcwembe), dishes 
(titja) and brooms (imitsanyelo).  Nowadays, there is a tendency to present 
modern goods, such as bedroom suites, blankets, beds and other such items.  
 
9.1.12.2 The bridal party (ludvwendvwe / umtsimba)  
 
A Swazi wedding ceremony is a communal activity. The families invite not 
only members of the family council (lusendvo), but also neighbours who 
join the bridal party. The persons who play an important role within the 
bridal party (umtsimba) are listed below. 
 
- Representatives of a chief (umphakatsi) 
  
Usually the chief of the bride’s in-laws will send a messenger (umgijimi) to 
represent him. This presupposes notification of the marriage to the chief as 
well. The messenger’s role is that of an independent witness. He will ensure 
that important ceremonies are performed. He may be called in case disputes 
arise later on in the marriage. 
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- Leader of the bridal party (umphatsi-mtsimba) 
  
A respectable elderly man who is not a relative is chosen by the father of the 
bride to be the leader of the bridal party and his spokesperson. It is important 
to note that it is contrary to custom for parents of the bride to accompany 
their daughter and be part of the bridal party (umtsimba). 
 
- The woman who acts on behalf of the bride (bomake bejudlalisela) 
  
It is customary that the mother of the bride does not accompany her 
daughter, but chooses women who will act on her behalf. Their duties during 
the ceremony include dressing the bride, taking care of the bridal goods and 
ensuring proper behaviour by the maidens. They also play a significant role 
during discussions with the groom’s family and when the bride is being told 
about the marriage etiquette (ayalwa). They also ululate and dance. 
 
- Young men who form part of the dancing party (emajaha) 
  
These are young men, including the brothers of the bride, who form part of 
the dancing party and who will assist in different tasks that are undertaken, 
such as slaughtering of beasts. In addition, particularly the bride’s brothers, 
have a specific role in the special dance for their sister (kugiyela 
dzadzewabo). 
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- Ladies who form the main bridal dancing party (tintfombi) 
 
These ladies, who include the bride’s sisters, are divided into three groups, 
namely ‘emachikiza’, ‘ematjitji’ and ‘tingcugce’. Collectively, they are the 
main bridal dancing party. Their other important role is to assist the bride in 
the singing of bridal songs (amekeza) and carry marriage gifts (umhlambiso) 
and other bridal goods. 
 
9.1.12.3  The departure of the bridal party (kuphuma kwemtsimba) 
 
The bridal party departs early in the evening as it is expected to arrive at 
night. Before the departure, certain rituals are performed by the bride’s 
father. They slaughter a goat or a cow from which a bile sac (inyongo) is put 
on the bride’s forehead to show she has departed from her parents. The bride 
and the family council (lusendvo) enter the main house (kagogo) where she 
is counselled by the elders to be a good ambassador, in her new home. They 
then proceed to the kraal (esibayeni), where she is made to bath (naked) and 
is then dressed in her traditional gear (avunule). She is led to the entrance 
(esangweni) where her father or brother pins a feather (lusiba) on her. The 
bridal party then depart singing ‘incangosi’, following each other in a 
straight line (ludvwendvwe).  
 
There are several specific dances that are performed, including ‘sigiyo’ 
which is a special dance where the bride dances with her sisters and 
brothers. It is during this time that the beast which must be paid by the 
bride’s people (inkhomo yekugana) is shown to the man’s family.  
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After the dancing, the members of the bridal party proceed to their hut and 
spend the second night there. The groom may invite the bride to spend the 
night with him. One girl in the bridal party accompanies her in order to 
identify the hut in case the bride is needed. 
 
On this occasion, the bride gives gifts to certain members of her marital 
family. To start with, the bride must give gifts to the ancestors. These are left 
at the kraal gate (enshungushwini) and comprise a clay pot and sleeping mat 
(imbita nelicansi). Thereafter, the gifts are given to people in order of 
seniority, starting with the fathers, the father of the groom and his brothers, 
the mothers-in-law, starting with the groom’s mother, and also to siblings of 
the groom. The last person to receive a gift is the groom. 
   
9.1.12.4 The groom’s party (bayeni) 
 
A few days after the marriage ceremony, the husband’s father, with the 
assistance of his relatives, assembles emalobolo and designates a man 
(umyeni) to take them into his care and to go and present them at the bride’s 
homestead. On a date previously agreed to by both families, a small party 
accompanies them, carrying the groom’s luggage. 
 
The groom’s party is supposed to arrive at the bride’s homestead after 
sunset. On arrival at the bride’s kraal, the groom shouts: “Siyalobola gogo” 
(“we have come to deliver emalobolo grandmother”). They mention the 
number of beasts including the ‘lugege’ and ‘insulamnyembeti’ beasts.  
Thereafter, a young maiden comes out to take the groom’s luggage and lead 
the party to a hut prepared for them. 
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In the morning, the head of the family will inform all the relatives that the 
groom’s party (bayeni) has arrived. The relatives will gather in the hut of the 
groom and greet the visitors.  
 
After this exchange of greetings, the groom (umyeni) will inform the bride’s 
family of the purpose of their visits, namely the delivery of emalobolo. The 
bride’s people and the groom’s party will proceed to the cattle kraal to view 
the emalobolo. As a sign of acceptance of the emalobolo, the bride’s father 
will give the groom a beast referred to as ‘sidvudvu semnyeni’ or ‘inhlabisa-
bayeni’ which is slaughtered. The giving of this beast to the groom’s party 
signifies that the ownership of emalobolo has passed to the bride’s family. 
 
9.1.13 Subsidiary wife (inhlanti) 
 
Since the Swazi’s do not contemplate the possibility that a marriage may be 
dissolved, they put in place measures to prevent any events which may 
eventually lead to the dissolution of a marriage, namely the barrenness of a 
woman and her death. 
 
On the day of the groom’s party, the wife’s family identify a potential 
subsidiary wife who is usually his wife’s younger sister or a paternal niece. 
The potential subsidiary wife identified may also be the wife’s younger 
brother or a paternal nephew. In this event, it is hoped that the actual 
subsidiary wife will be a female offspring of the brother and nephew. There 
seem to be very few cases where the subsidiary wife is still provided today. 
Where provided, a young boy rather than a girl is usually offered. This can 
be ascribed to the influence of women’s rights organisations. Christianity 
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and education have also influenced most Swazi not to demand the subsidiary 
wife, as it is said to be against Christian principles. Another reason could be 
that most Swazi are now moving away from the polygynous families.  
 
9.1.13.1 A subsidiary wife (inhlanti) in the case of barrenness 
 
One of the major reasons for a couple to enter into marriage is the 
procreation of children. It is known, however, that the ability of a woman to 
bear children cannot be controlled by human beings. The Swazi therefore 
accept this possibility of barrenness and minimise its impact on the marriage 
by providing a subsidiary wife who, if the woman prones unable to bear 
children, steps into the shoes of that woman and fulfils that function. 
However, the subsidiary wife does not influence the status of the barren 
woman as a wife. Any children she bears are presumed to be the wife’s. 
 
9.1.13.2     A subsidiary wife in the case of death 
 
In terms of Swazi law and custom, the death of one of the spouses does not 
necessarily terminate a marriage. If the woman predeceases her husband, a 
subsidiary wife is provided to levirate that woman and to occupy the 
position of wife to the widower and mother to any children of the deceased 
woman. 
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9.1.14 The consequences of a marriage in terms of Swazi law and 
custom 
    
The consequences of a marriage in terms of Swazi law and custom concern 
interpersonal relationships and patrimonial relations. Interpersonal 
relationships refer to relationships between the parties involved in the 
marriage. In the first place, these relationships include relations between 
husband and wife, but later also the relationship between parents and 
children. A marital union, however, is not confined to the husband, wife and 
children. It extends much further, since it is the concern of the two family 
groups. 
 
Moreover, the marital union creates a unit of assets and liabilities. These 
assets and liabilities are called the “family estate”. Through this marriage a 
series of reciprocal rights and obligations is created for which the respective 
families are responsible. 
 
9.1.14.1 General consequences of a marriage in terms of Swazi law and 
custom 
 
The legal consequences fall into various categories which are discussed 
below. 
 
- A new and separate household comes into being, which in the course of 
time, together with related households, develops (through the husband) 
into a homestead. 
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- The rights of the bride’s family in respect of guardianship over her are 
transferred to the husband and his family. Children born of the marriage 
fall under the guardianship of their father and his family. In her own 
house, the wife enjoys a considerable degree of independence, but she 
does have to consult her husband on important matters. The husband, as 
the head of the family, has particular rights. He represents his household 
in external matters, and is responsible for order and discipline within his 
household as well as for its needs and interests. The marital power of a 
husband, however, does not include the right to administer corporal 
punishment to his wife. 
 
- The marital union results in the establishment of a new estate.   Initially, 
this is controlled by the man’s father, but the son’s rights gradually 
increase. The overall control by the man’s father means that the wife and 
her house are protected against possible mismanagement of household 
property by her husband. 
 
9.1.14.2 Personal consequences 
 
Each wife in a polygynous marital relationship occupies a particular rank 
within the greater composite homestead. Her rank influences her status, her 
relationship with her husband’s other houses and her children’s rights of 
succession. 
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9.1.14.3 Relationships between husband and wife 
 
- The man and woman must live together as husband and wife. The 
wife must live wherever her husband establishes a household at the 
time of the marriage, and each wife is entitled to a separate house 
(indlu) in the homestead. 
 
- The husband and wife have a mutual duty of support. 
 
- The husband and wife have a mutual duty to afford each other 
conjugal rights. The man has to initiate sexual intercourse. A woman 
can never initiate sexual intercourse. This presumes that the man has 
more control over this process than the woman.  
 
- Husband and wife have a mutual duty to procreate a family. 
 
- The husband and wife share in the duty to care for their household. 
   
- The wife is under the guardianship of her husband, but he has no right 
to administer corporal punishment to her. If he persists in doing so, 
she can report him to the family council or to the leader of the party 
bringing emalobolo (umyeni), who should then resolve the issue. If the 
husband’s family fail to prevent him from administering corporal 
punishment, she can escape to her parental home or to any relative’s 
place (kwemuka). 
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9.1.14.4 Patrimonial consequences 
 
The marriage creates a separate household with its own household property 
which is shared by all members of that household. The members also have a 
duty to contribute to the property. The husband controls the property on 
behalf of the house. 
 
One house may not be enriched at the expense of another house. The transfer 
of property between houses must be reasonable and for a just cause, for 
example: 
 
- if a house has to repay a particular debt and does not have the 
necessary property to do so. 
 
- if cattle of one house are used as emalobolo for a son from another 
house. 
 
The transfer of a property from one house to another results in a debt which 
must be repaid. 
 
9.1.15 Dissolution of a Swazi marriage  
 
A marriage cannot easily be dissolved according to Swazi law and custom. 
A Swazi marriage, as mentioned above, involves a union, not merely 
between the spouses, but between groups of kin. Therefore, the death of one 
or both of the spouses will not terminate a marriage relationship (cf Nhlapo 
1992:75). Consequently, Swazis when talking, will say ‘akuqatjanwa 
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ngekufa’, meaning “the family’s relationship will not be distinguished just 
because one of the spouses has passed away”. 
 
A marriage may, however, be dissolved as a last resort. It is not a common 
practice, however, and is not encouraged by the Swazi. One view is that it 
may be dissolved even at family level. Another view is that it can only be 
dissolved in the chief’s court (umphakatsi). When either of the couple 
prenounces the words ‘angisamfun’ (I don’t want him/her any longer) before 
a council (libandla), the marriage is dissolved. The spouse who pronounced 
the word is said to lose the marriage, meaning the woman has deprived her 
family of emalobolo and children, or that the man has forfeited the 
emalobolo and the children (ukhiphe tinkhomo emlonyeni) (cf Nhlapo 
1992:76). 
 
Kuper (1963:90) also declared: “Divorce is extremely rare among the 
Swazi”. Nxumalo (n.d.) wrote: “Swazi tradition does not accept divorce in 
the Western sense”.  By far the most often quoted is the statement by 
Marwick (1966:33): “Divorce is extremely difficult to obtain among the 
Swazis – it is difficult to separate from a wife”.  Marwick (1966:33) also 
gives the reason: 
 
“The Swazis have an almost illimitable capacity for 
compromise, and it will only be in the most stubborn case 
where there is grievous cause for complaint that the separation 
will be effected.” 
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These writers all assert that the marriage among the Swazi is a union of great 
stability, yet hint at the possibility of divorce in extreme or special cases. 
 
9.1.16 Death 
 
According to Swazi law and custom, death does not necessarily dissolve a 
marriage. The death of one spouse simply ushers in a new phase in the 
relationship between the families of the spouses who, after all, were the 
parties to the marriage contracts. 
 
There are certain processes and expectations that apply when one of the 
spouses dies. When the husband dies, his wife is expected to remain with her 
in-laws, who take care of her. After the mourning period has elapsed, her 
marital family will settle the issue of whether the levirate custom (kungena) 
should be invoked, whereby a relative of the deceased, usually a younger 
brother or a male relative (cousin) of the deceased, is chosen to cohabit with 
the widow. 
 
The consent of the widow must be sought for entering into that relationship, 
as well as concerning the identity of the man chosen for her. She may well 
refuse to engage in such a relationship with any of the suitors. Whatever the 
case, she still stays on as part of the family. If she accepts the man to engage 
in sexual relations with her, any children born to the wife as a result of this 
relationship belong to the deceased husband’s family, not to the levirate 
partner. The latter receives a beast (inkhomo yemadvolo) for his exertions on 
behalf of the deceased. 
 
 209
When a wife dies, the relationship between the families of the spouses 
continues to exist. A subsidiary wife (inhlanti) may be provided by the 
wife’s family. Emalobolo is also delivered for a subsidiary wife (inhlanti) 
that is, five cows if she has been sent by her family. If the husband has made 
a private arrangement with her, he has to deliver full emalobolo for her. 
 
9.1.17 Separation 
   
Separation of the spouses can happen, even though it is very rare and 
happens only in extreme or special cases. It has been held that this is more 
applicable, or more evident as far as women are concerned, because of the 
golden rule that “once smeared with red ochre, a Swazi wife remains 
obligated to perform certain duties towards her in-laws for the rest of her 
life”. This is taken so far that even if she has been separated from her 
husband for a long period, she is still required to come back on the death of 
her husband to mourn him as his widow for as long as is required by custom. 
Even if a woman dies while separated from her marital family, her body is 
fetched by her in-laws to be buried by them. 
 
The fact that a marriage cannot easily be terminated is further confirmed by 
the fact that a woman cannot legally get married and be smeared with red 
ochre again (libovu aliphindvwa). 
 
The following factors are considered to be grounds that can lead to a 
separation of the spouses: 
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9.1.17.1 Adultery (kuphinga) 
 
Adultery is committed when a married woman has sexual intercourse with a 
man other than her spouse or by a married man when he has sexual 
intercourse with a married woman other than his wife. Fannin (1967:32) 
gives a more comprehensive and more technically correct definition: 
“Adultery is the carnal connection of a male person with a married woman, 
during her husband’s life time or after his death while she is cohabiting with 
her levirate (kungena) consort”. 
 
Where the woman is accused of committing adultery, it must be proved. An 
inquiry will be conducted by the family council (lusendvo). If found guilty 
of such a misdeed, she may be sent away to her parental home. However, it 
is expected that this will only be for a short while because her parents will 
send her back, requesting an explanation as to why she was sent to them. 
The matter may also be reported to the chief who, upon inquiry, will cause 
the man who committed adultery with the woman, to pay a fine. The fine 
referred to as ‘siti’ may amount to about five beasts. A further two beasts 
will be paid by the father of the woman to her in-laws as a fine “to clean the 
sleeping mats” (tinkhomo tekugeza emacansi) (cf Nhlapo 1992:79).  
 
9.1.17.2 Witchcraft (kutsakatsa) 
 
This involves the actual or suspected practice of sorcery by the wife. Where 
a wife is accused of witchcraft, the family may decide to approach 
traditional diviners who will conduct a witch hunt, known as ‘kunuka’. If it 
is confirmed that she is guilty of witchcraft, the family members will send 
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her back to her parental family. A meeting of the two families then convenes 
and her family may call for a second opinion. If a diviner of their own 
choosing again identifies the woman as the sorceress, the wife may be sent 
back to her parental home. This does not terminate the marriage relationship 
between the two families. Indeed, reconciliation may be negotiated between 
the families at some stage. However, if the woman is brought back to her in-
laws, she will not be returned to the main homestead. A new house will then 
be built for her at some distance from the main homestead. 
 
Both Rubin (1965:23) and Fannin (1967:10) assert that a divorce on the 
grounds of witchcraft can be obtained at the initiative of either spouse.  This 
research, however, casts grave doubts on such an assertion (cf Nhlapo 
1992:81). 
 
9.1.17.3 Refusal of conjugal rights 
 
This is according to Nhlapo (1992:86), ‘a potential ground whose effect is 
difficult to guage with accuracy’. 
 
In the Swazi way of life, the duty of both spouses to afford each other 
reasonable sexual privileges is taken very seriously. Nevertheless, refusal to 
render conjugal rights by either spouse will not lead to separation. There are 
certain situations where the wife’s refusal of conjugal rights to her husband 
would be regarded as reasonable, namely, when the woman is ill, is in an 
advance stage of pregnancy, is menstruating, is in mourning, or has given 
birth within six months (Nhlapo 1992:86). 
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Fannin (1967:8) does not mention these grounds at all, though he recognises 
that: “The husband has exclusive rights of sexual intercourse with his wife, 
who may not refuse to have connection with him except on reasonable 
grounds”. 
 
9.1.17.4 Desertion (kwemuka) 
 
This occurs when the husband leaves the household with no intention of 
returning, or where the wife returns to her father’s home also without 
intending to return (cf Nhlapo 1992:87). This does not necessarily end the 
marriage relationship, since the spouses may return at any time they choose. 
The woman may be returned by her husband’s family either to mourn her 
husband or to be buried at the marital home. This may happen even if she 
has in the meantime engaged in sexual relations with other men, and even if 
children have been born of such relationships. She will be fetched back 
together with any children she may have had subsequently. These children 
are said to belong to the marriage family, even if biologically they belong 
elsewhere. 
 
9.1.17.5 Gross disobedience or disrespect 
    
Nhlapo (1992:87) writes that “Swazi culture is based on respect. Respect for 
the king, for the chief, for older people, for society.  A wife is expected to 
respect her husband and her in-laws, and to defer to the husband in all 
things”.  Disobedience or disrespect is, however, not grounds for divorce, 
but may lead to desertion. 
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9.1.18 Consequences of Separation of Spouses 
 
9.1.18.1 Vis-à-vis the families 
 
As stated above, a marriage according to Swazi law and custom creates 
strong ties between the family groups of the spouses. These ties or bonds are 
so strong that everything is done to ensure that they are not shaken or 
dissolved until the death of every member of that family. Thus, even the 
death of either or both of the spouses will not terminate this relationship. 
The families will continue to aid and support each other at all times. That is 
why Swazi law and custom has put in place customs such as providing a 
subsidiary wife (inhlanti) when the woman in a marriage dies, or ‘kungena’ 
custom, to ensure the perpetuation of this relationship for the two groups. 
 
Even desertion by one or both spouses merely means a separation of the 
spouses, which has little effect on the relationship between their respective 
families. The man may well disappear for the rest of his life, but that does 
not mean that the woman can leave her marital home. She will be 
encouraged to stay on, and another male relative may even been given to 
cohabit with her. Children may even be born from this relationship. 
 
9.1.18.2 Vis-à-vis the spouses 
 
As it may be held that a marriage relationship cannot be terminated 
according to Swazi law and custom, in practice a marriage relationship 
between spouses may indeed end. The separation between spouses may last 
for their whole lifetime and may even terminate all their marriage 
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expectations. Such expectations include the duty to support one another, as 
well as the duty to cohabit. The parties may even resume such duties with 
someone else, spending more than half of their lives with the other persons. 
Thus, even if their marriage is held to be indissoluble, it will survive in 
theory only, with very few, if any, obligations remaining as far as the parties 
to the marriage are concerned. 
 
9.2 CONCLUSION 
    
Among the Swazi people, the family is founded upon marriage which unites 
not only the man and woman but also the two family groups. Even though a 
Swazi marriage is a process that includes a series of events, certain 
requirements are essential for the validity of the marriage. One of the 
reasons for entering into a marriage is the procreation of children.  A 
subsidiary wife is therefore provided if the wife is unable to bear children. A 
marriage is not dissolved by death or divorce. Adultery, witchcraft, refusal 
of conjugal rights and desertion are factors that may lead to the separation of 
spouses.  The concept of a marriage in terms of Swazi law and custom is 
fundamentally different from its civil or Christian counterparts.  It emerged 
to serve different social, economic and spiritual needs and is based on a 
different value system. 
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Chapter 10 
 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study was to give a proper exposition of the indigenous 
Swazi law of contract with specific reference to underlying values and legal 
principles. Particular attention was paid to how legal rules function in the 
social processes of the Swazi people and how these legal rules are 
sometimes manipulated by the various processes. This necessitated a 
contextual, holistic and comprehensive approach in which legal rules were 
distilled from customs. 
 
10.2 THE ARTICULATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A HUMAN 
RIGHTS CULTURE IN THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND 
 
The promulgation of a new Constitution (Act 01 of 2005) in the Kingdom of 
Swaziland with a justifiable Bill of Rights brings Swazi law and custom into 
the domain of public law. It guarantees every person’s fundamental rights 
and freedoms subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others, and for 
the public interest (See Chapter 1.4.2). 
 
In terms of the new Constitution, the existing law, shall as far as possible be 
continued with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and 
exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the 
Constitution. (See Chapter 1.4.3).  Transformation of Swazi law and custom 
 216
may thus be necessary to adapt to antiquated rules, with regard to the law of 
contract and other aspects of the law. This includes what is known in other 
African countries as the liberalisation of customary law. In this regard it is 
directed more specifically at the elimination of certain inequalities which 
people experience on the basis of gender and other related factors. The 
Kingdom of Swaziland will, therefore, have to make a specific movement 
towards a Bill of Rights in order to articulate and enforce a human rights 
culture. This would also give to Swazi lawyers a potential for innovation, for 
creativity and for social engineering, which could bring for themselves and 
for the nation they seek to serve, new levels of energy and fulfillment. 
Constitutional law may come to occupy the centre stage of the jurisprudence 
in every relevant field of legal endeavour.  
 
The first and preliminary question in the future construction of statutes in the 
Kingdom of Swaziland will therefore no longer be, what did parliament 
intend by the statute, but rather whether the statute is constitutional. The 
important question to be asked in the application of the laws of Swaziland 
will not be the content of the laws in its application to a relevant problem, 
but whether the laws of Swaziland in that respect are consistent with any 
applicable provision of the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
Equally, in any examination of whether the administrative action of the state 
official were legally assailable, the first question will not be whether the 
official exercised his or her discretion in good faith, or whether he or she 
properly applied his mind, but whether, assuming that he or she did so, he or 
she offended any fundamentally rights contained in the Constitution. In 
every field of legal relevance, lawyers will have to be vigilant to ensure that 
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the Bill of Rights is not wittingly or subtly, directly or indirectly, 
transgressed in a manner not permitted by the Constitution of Swaziland. 
 
Enforcement will call for the exercise of legal disciplines and social 
engineering on levels beyond the rigidity of the Swazi traditional roles of 
legal thinking. The interpretation of a constitution requires an approach 
which is qualified differently, and is more exact than the approach which 
traditional institutions adopt. This important difference is a necessary 
consequence of the special character of a constitution and more particularly 
of the  fundamental rights therein (cf Whelpton). 
 
10.3 THE AFRICAN WAY OF ACKNOWLEDGING AND 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
  
According to Whelpton (1997:148), the African way of acknowledging and 
protecting human rights is not compatible with that of westerners, and there 
is a significant difference in the way they define the concept itself. This 
difference stems from the confusion resulting from two philosophies, 
namely the Western concept of “human rights” and the African concept of 
“human dignity”. The Africans’ concern for human dignity is central to a 
traditional view of life and they do not understand “human rights” in the 
same way as westerners do, namely that all human beings are entitled to 
these rights simply by being members of humankind. In this regard, Howard 
(1986:1879) comes to the following conclusion: 
 
‘The so-called African concept of human rights is therefore, 
actually a concept of human dignity. The individual feels respect 
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and worthiness as a result of his or her fulfillment of the socially 
approved role. Any rights that might be held are dependent on 
one’s status or contingent on one’s behaviour. Such a society may 
well provide the individual with a great deal of security and 
protection, one may even argue that people may value such dignity 
more than their freedom to act as individuals. In relatively 
homogeneous static and small-scale societies these tendencies are 
likely to be stronger than the tendency towards individualism. In 
other words, those who claim the existence of a native system of 
human rights, confuse human dignity (the end) with human rights 
(the means) (Bennett 1999:4)’. 
 
To discover what the most appropriate means are, is, however, more 
important than debating the problem of confusing ends and means. If it is 
accepted that ethical systems indigenous to Africa (including laws and 
customs) were designed to sustain human dignity, then the question should 
be asked whether the western instrument for achieving the same goal, that is 
formal legal rights, would be more effective. This question can be answered 
only if we appreciate the differences between the way in which the 
individual is perceived in Africa and in the West, and if we give some 
account of the differences (Bennett 1999:4). 
 
Among the Swazi, as among other African peoples, “various principles can 
be distinguished within the organisation of their social life, emphasizing 
commitment to the group, uniformity and communality. The African 
philosophy of life is tempered by the principle of survival of the total 
community and a sense of cooperation, interdependence and collective 
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responsibility” (Whelpton 1997:148). It must be noted that each member of 
the extended family has a social function to perform and to conform with, to 
ensure that the family functions as a reproductive and economic unit. In this 
regard, Mbiti (1970:141) says the following: “For the African, a philosophy 
of existence can be summed up as: ‘I am because we are, and because we 
are, therefore I am’.” The Swazi put it this way: ‘Umuntfu ngumuntfu 
ngebantfu’ (literally: ‘a person through persons’), that is, a person is a 
person in relation to (other) people (Whelpton 1997:149). 
 
The complexity of rights and duties in the Swazi community can be 
described in terms of three underlying principles, namely respect, 
commitment and responsibility. The Swazi refers to these principles as 
‘inhlonipo’, ‘kutinikela’ and ‘umtfalo’ respectively (Whelpton 1997:149).  
 
Respect is the most important principle. It governs behavior “in a family and 
societal context and bears no relation to any attributes other than a person’s 
seniority or place or rank in family within the context of the agnatic group” 
(Whelpton 1997:149). 
 
Genealogical rank is of paramount importance in Swazi society and 
underlies their status consciousness. According to WLSA (1994:38) a form 
of class distinction is embodied in custom which does not apply to those 
holding high public office, such as the chiefs (tikhulu) or the king 
(ngwenyama), but which is extended to the descendants of the ruler. The 
respect rulers have in their communities is extended to their families. The 
principles of equality are seen to undermine the hierarchical ranks in rural 
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communities, and also the belief in ancestors who sanction the principle of 
seniority in which senior persons play an active role. 
 
Commitment is the principle that makes it possible for commonality to exist 
within the context of the family and the wider community. This simply 
means that individuals are not separate from the group, and that individual 
rights should always be weighed against the needs and interests of the 
agnatic group. Marwick (1966:281) has written as follows: 
 
‘In the Swazi society the individual is moulded so that his 
behaviour in everyday life is determined by habits of mind and 
body, and certain dispositions and sentiments which are the 
result of his training. The individual is taught certain norms of 
conduct towards members of his family and to people outside 
that family. In the same way he acquires sentiments in regard to 
the economic pursuits of horticulture, tending cattle, hunting, 
domestic work, religion and every sphere of national life.’ 
 
Rights are mainly held by family groups. Each member shares in those rights 
according to his or her rank within the family group concerned. Therefore no 
member (and also no woman), is without rights, and all members are full, 
but not equal, participants in these group rights (Whelpton 1997:148). 
Dlamini (1990:84) has the following to say in this regard: 
 
‘Individualism is based on the false assumption that all people 
are equal or rather that they are equally self sufficient in all 
material and non-material respects. This assumption may arise 
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from a misinterpretation of the principle of equality of 
treatment. Equality of treatment should not be confused with 
the equality of people. But, people are not equal in many 
respects. Equality of treatment simply implies that no person 
should be subjected to an individual’s discrimination on the 
ground of some involuntary attribute’. 
 
One can thus conclude that the family group specifically, and the community 
at large, therefore, constitute the framework within which individuals 
exercise their political, economic and social rights and freedom (Whelpton 
1997:149). It would, therefore, be correct to say that the rights of individuals 
are often limited by the rights of the community, since the individual forms 
part of Swazi society. The emphasis is, however, not on the individual as 
such, “since communal ethics is the first priority and rights are understood 
within the context of the agnatic group which functions as a corporate legal 
entity and which also underlies the group-directedness of Swazi life” 
(Whelpton 1997:141). 
 
10.4 THE COMPATIBILITY OF SWAZI LAW AND CUSTOM 
WITH NORMS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
  
This research has shown that there are certain rules in Swazi law and custom 
that are inconsistent with the norms of international law, and in particular, 
with accepted fundamental rights. Women, and certain category of 
individuals, have for example no capacity to enter into contracts (See 
Chapter 4.7). The principle of patriarchy, as reflected in Swazi law and 
custom, may also be regarded as constituting an infringement of various 
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fundamental rights, and especially the rights of women, such as the rights of 
dignity and equality, as well as the rights associated with participation in the 
economic sphere, social mobility and justice.,  
 
The Constitution of Swaziland does not contain any specific indications as to 
how to address this problem. The solution to conflicts between Swazi law 
and custom and fundamental rights must therefore be sought outside the 
parameters of the Constitution, and in this process, factors such as the social 
implications of instituting fundamental rights could be explored (cf Vorster 
1993:552 and Whelpton 1991:9). 
 
10.5 THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS BY THE COURTS 
  
Swazi law and custom are now subject throughout to the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights in the new Constitution.  In terms of Section 14(21) of the 
Constitution, fundamental rights are applicable to all legislation in force, and 
also to Swazi law and custom, and no fundamental rights will be infringed 
by an obligation in common law or Swazi law and custom (See Chapter 
1.4.7). 
 
The usual understanding of a justifiable bill of rights is that the rights are 
applicable only to relationships between citizen and government, not to 
individuals in their private relationships. It is common knowledge that Swazi 
law and custom, being unspecialised in nature, contains but few formal rules 
governing the rights and obligations of members of the family group inter 
se. Since these rules are foreign or unknown to westerners, they are often 
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used out of context: a good example here, being women’s rights to dispose 
of property under Swazi law and custom. 
 
This position has changed with regards to modern indigenous law.  Members 
of a household are now seen as individuals, each of them with specific rights 
and obligations.  It could therefore be argued that the equality principle per 
se in the Constitution guarantees each person, notwithstanding his or her age 
or gender, comprehensive rights in respect of all and any goods he or she 
may acquire. 
 
It would appear from the terms of the Swaziland Constitution, however, that 
constitutional norms are always to prevail. Article 14(2) of the Constitution 
of Swaziland could support this proposition, but its wording is somewhat 
ambiguous. It provides that: ”the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined 
in this chapter shall be respected and upheld by the Executive, the 
Legislature and Judiciary and other agencies of government and where 
applicable to them, all natural and legal persons in Swaziland, and shall be 
enforceable by the courts as provided by the Constitution.” 
 
10.6 THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATOR AND COURTS 
 
As already mentioned (see Chapter 1.3) Swazi law and custom has been 
recognised in the new Constitution as part of the existing laws in the 
Kingdom of Swaziland. The result of this is that the courts are now bound, 
where applicable, to apply Swazi law and custom (sec 137).  The 
Constitution must further be interpreted in accordance with the values of an 
open and democratic society, based on freedom and equality (sec 14).  
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Courts now have the difficult task not only of identifying and interpreting 
these values but also of harmonising existing and known rules of Swazi law 
and custom with these values.  
 
The fact that Swazi law and custom has now been recorded may simplify the 
court’s task. The recording could give clear guidelines to courts to assist 
them with problem related matters regarding Swazi law and custom. It could 
also play an important role in the further development of Swazi law and 
custom.  
 
As the legislator bears the principal responsibility for advancing human 
rights, new legislation may have to be enacted in the Kingdom of Swaziland. 
In instances of controversy the legislator will even have to take the initiative 
to implement the bill of rights and it cannot only be left to the courts of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland. Polygyny and the transfer of marriage goods 
(emabheka) are relevant examples. Feminists maintain that both these 
institutions have helped to maintain the social inferiority of women. It is, 
however, impossible to prove empirically that such inferiority can be 
ascribed to polygamy and the transfer of marriage goods. Given the 
underlying philosophy of these institutions, the courts ought not to interfere. 
The legislator will have to approach such matters with particular 
circumspection, since these institutions cannot be separated from the belief 
in ancestors and the interest that the ancestors, as custodians of tradition, 
have in preserving these institutions (cf Whelpton 1997:147).  
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10.7 THE FUTURE OF SWAZI LAW AND CUSTOM 
 
As it is an indispensable ingredient of the Swazi society, it should be 
obvious that Swazi law and custom, too, stands to contribute to the future 
development of the Kingdom of Swaziland. The future of Swazi law and 
custom is important in the sense that a substantial part of it is still living law 
(Whelpton 1997:20). The continued application of Swazi law and custom is 
therefore also guaranteed in the new Constitution of Swaziland (See Chapter 
1.4.1).  
 
Swazi law and custom will, however, as has been the case in the past, 
continue to undergo constant change as it has the capacity to adapt to 
changes in all spheres of life. Its adaptation should, however, not be initiated 
by a Bill of Rights as an instrument of entrenching western values, but 
should be adapted in harmony with its underlying principles (Whelpton 
1997:150). 
 
10.8 LEGAL DOMAINS TO BE ADDRESSED – ILLUSTRATIVE 
EXAMPLES 
 
Although the Swazi Government can make use of legal reform to attain 
some of its objectives with regard to development, the law has certain limits.  
The efficacy of the law is dependent on the community’s perception and 
acceptance of what the law should be and should accomplish.  Examples of 
laws not expressing the people’s values, but rather reflecting the 
developmental objectives of new African elite, abound in several African 
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countries.  In this context a distinction can be made between ‘paper law’ and 
‘living law’ or ‘the people’s law’ (cf Whelpton 1997:20).   
 
The following are examples of legal domains that could possibly be 
addressed by the Government of Swaziland: 
 
• the potential basic conflict between the individual rights orientation of 
the general common law and statute, and the communal rights and 
obligations orientation of Swazi law and custom; 
• people’s dissatisfaction with the results of applying the general law’s 
individual orientation -  given that their expectation is often in line with 
Swazi law and custom; 
• the emphasis of the Bill of Rights on rights as opposed to Swazi law and 
custom principle of duties and patriarchy, which qualify such implied 
freedom by virtue of the respect paid to persons of high social and 
political rank; 
• women’s rights to dispose of property; 
• polygymy and the transfer of marriage goods (emabheka) with due 
recognition of the influence of the ancestral world in the marriage system 
of the Swazi people; 
• the locus standi in judicio of Swazi women with due recognition of the 
fact that under Swazi law and custom she, after marriage, becomes a 
member of her husband’s family group with concomitant guardianship; 
• the variation of legal values and norms in the urban areas as opposed to 
the law found in rural areas; 
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• choice of law – the possibility of obtaining equality by choice of law 
(common law or Swazi law and custom) rather than by the horizontal 
application of constitutional rights or legal reform; and 
• reform and professionalisation of the Swazi National courts which 
implies the upgrading of courts and the training of court officials. The 
existing courts of first instance should be turned into magistrates’ courts 
of a special class (cf Sanders 1986:128). 
 
10.9 CHANGE AND LEGAL VALUES 
 
The study has shown that Swazi law and custom has its own identity and has 
the capacity to adapt to changes in all spheres of life, as it has done in the 
past. 
 
Although the Swazi law of contract shows signs of adjustment and change in 
new circumstances, there is evidence that proven legal principles and 
community values are kept intact. The changes and adjustments that take 
place are distinct and can be typified as either traditional or western.  In 
some cases, the influence of western cultures has meant that traditional 
values are less adhered to.  The influence of such western values has 
however, not replaced Swazi legal principles and values. In this regard, one 
can refer to bartering, the engagement and the marriage contract (See 
Chapter 7.4, 9.1.4 and 9.1.5). 
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10.10 THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT OF 
THE SWAZI IN THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND 
 
Although it is possible to identify general principles and different contracts 
among the Swazi, the individual character of each contract must always be 
borne in mind, since a contract is more than a device for establishing the 
economic and legal implications of a transaction.  Contracts are real in 
nature which means that no contractual liability arises from a mere promise 
or an agreement (See Chapter 3.2). Among the Swazi, the emphasis is rather 
on what the parties do in stead of what they intended to do.  The 
manifestation of the intention is important and not the intention itself.  As a 
result, contractual liabilities are created through the performances of the 
parties.  Contracts are not first concluded and then executed.  Performance is 
rather the acknowledgement of an agreement as being the reason for the 
enforcement thereof.  It is the performance that is of importance, and not the 
agreement itself (cf Whelpton 1991:253).  Therefore, tacit agreements are 
not grouped separately. Performances that result from agreements must be 
performed personally.  No obligations can be created through a third party.  
This explains the absence in Swazi law and custom of phenomena such as 
representation and stipulation in favour of a third party (See Chapter 3.8).  
Notwithstanding the influence of cultural factors such as westernisation, 
modernisation and Christianity on the culture of the Swazi, they still use 
Swazi law and custom as their principle law.  Social and economical 
changes have resulted in the traditional small scale economy being changed 
by a monetary system.  Compensation and even ‘emalobolo’ are nowadays 
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primarily given in cash. In spite of the abovementioned influences, the 
Swazi’s legal values have not been replaced by western legal institutions but 
have given rise to distinctive value systems. 
In some instances however, it was clear that the influence of western culture 
caused that certain contracts are concluded in its own distinctive way.  The 
emancipation of unmarried Swazi’s, which shifted the emphasis according to 
western values from the group to the individual, played a major role in this 
regard.  The same emphasis is no longer placed on a group-orientated way of 
life, although it will never totally disappear because of the unity constantly 
created within the group.   
The influence of western cultures has meant in some instances that 
traditional values are followed to a lesser extent without being replaced by 
or supported by western values.  The western individualism has resulted in 
the watering down of family ties.  This research clearly shows that the 
current Swazi law of contract still reflects certain characteristics of the 
traditional law of contract, although this may be in a pure, adjusted or 
reduced way.  Examples of this are found throughout the whole spectrum of 
the law of contract, for example the real concrete nature of contracts, the 
informal way of concluding contracts, the fact that a contract can only be 
concluded in the presence of the parties (see Chapter 3.3), the unknown 
phenomena of prescription and set-off (see Chapter 6.1 and 6.2), the fact that 
interest is not negotiated in general, indigenous betrothal procedures and the 
delivery of ‘emalobolo’ as such. In spite of the explicit adjustment on the 
ideal and concrete levels of organised systems, adjustments are also taking 
place on the conflict dispute settlements levels with a view to managing and 
solving personal dispute settlements (See Chapter 3.7). 
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Most of the contractual disputes are settled outside the official settlement 
mechanisms.  For this purpose, use is made of negotiations and mediation. 
Because of the fact that the dispute resolution in these instances is rather 
related to people’s perceptions and values, the adjustment is further 
perpetuated.  Even if the parties can not reconcile their differences, and the 
matter takes its course, the traditional courts would still endeavour to settle 
the matter amicably by way of conciliation and mediation.  
 
10.11 LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND PARADIGM 
 
Swazi law and custom is recognised in the Constitution as part of the 
existing laws of the country and is still relevant in the lives of the Swazi 
nation. The social changes the Swazi people of the Kingdom of Swaziland 
are undergoing must be reflected therein.  Their living law, legal principles 
and values must be taken into account. 
 
Most aspects of the law of contract were addressed, while shortcomings and 
contradictions in the available literature have been identified and structured 
accordingly.  A systematic exposition of the indigenous law of contract of 
the Swazi has been presented within a theoretical frame work which will 
facilitate further legal reform and development.   
 
Although it is true that a contract in the first instance implies the concept of 
an obligation, and that non legal obligations can be discussed in general 
terms and their existence can be identified as moral and social phenomenon, 
it is not easy to separate its impact from the interaction of the legal and 
moral interpretation and understanding of a contract.  One can therefore not 
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accept that the concept of contract would fall outside of the legal framework 
and that the law merely controls this legal phenomenon (See Chapter 3.8). 
 
Only with the assistance of the law itself, can one determine what the law of 
contract involves and what a contract specifically is.  One could most 
probably also argue that the concepts that relate generally to the law of 
contract, such as promises and agreements, could be identified without the 
assistance of the law, and then conclude that the law of contract deals with 
promises and agreements.  This study has, however, shown that these 
concepts already exist as a substantial part of the law (See Chapter 4.2).  
When these concepts are more closely studied, various problems are 
identified.  Not all promises and agreements can always serve as a valid 
basis for a contract.  One must first establish whether the promises and 
agreements comply with the requirements which determine the legitimacy 
thereof.  There are others who approach the question by first determining 
whether a promise or and agreement has come into being, and secondly 
whether those promises and agreements could juridically be acknowledged 
as promises and agreements which result in obligations. It would, however, 
appear that none of these conclusions are correct. A promise or an agreement 
cannot merely be identified as a fact. A promise or an agreement is a social, 
moral or legal construction and therefore already absorbed in social, moral 
and legal objectives. Besides, it is also not desirable to create an ethical or 
legal world in which the acknowledgement of a promise or an agreement is a 
mere formality (See Chapter 3.3).  When one endeavours to describe 
contracts, one should not think of a contract as being one central 
paradigmatical type of action but rather of a situation with various 
possibilities.  
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10.12 INDIGENOUS CONTRACT AND INDIVIDUALISM 
 
The major urbanisation of the Swazi has caused them to enter into a new 
period during which they have not only become aware of their values, but 
also one in which valid, social and economical changes have taken place. 
Many Swazi’s find themselves nowadays in a social structure where the 
individual enjoys far more personal freedom than before.  An individuals’ 
status or rank is no longer the prominent social factor, although it still has an 
important role to play, specifically with regard to the marriage contract (See 
Chapter 9.1.3).  Each person is seen to be equal and is not subordinate to 
another.  This principle is also enshrined in the new Constitution by a Bill of 
Rights.  Accordingly, an individual is free to bind him or herself legally and 
this ability is increasingly seen as a fundamental right.  This means that 
parties are free to give any validated contents to their agreements and amend 
the living law to suit their personal circumstances.  This also means that one 
cannot ex post facto interfere with a contractual relationship and that the 
agreement should be enforced as the parties had agreed. 
 
The question, however, arises as to whether this new awareness of individual 
capacities and values is not giving rise to over-idealised self-image and 
confidence with the studied people, namely that each one will be capable, in 
a rational way to act in his or her own interest.  The realities of the western 
economy and its trading activities that flow from these, contradict the idea of 
the individualistic, unattached, creative human being. Conclusion of 
contracts, which is the result of negotiations between two willing individuals 
have in the urban areas, to a greater extent, been replaced by mass 
contracting during which little or no negotiations have taken place.  The 
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modern western view of a contract, namely that it is a result of consensus 
between parties, implies that each party has certain expectations regarding 
the contract and that each is satisfied with these expectations. If all parties 
enter into an agreement willingly and each party is able to take into account 
his or her own circumstances and needs, the contractual legitimacy comes to 
its rights if their reasonable expectations are fulfilled.  Contractual 
legitimacy is however, dependent on the nature of the community in which it 
functions and the community’s belief in this legitimacy.   
 
In any principally capitalist society, an agreement remains the most 
important medium whereby legal relationships and the exchange of property 
can take place and, therefore one must define contractual legitimacy within 
these constraints (cf Whelpton).  Among the Swazi, contractual obligations 
lies mostly in exchange (quid pro quo), although reasonable expectations are 
seen to be executed. Contractual freedom as a principle does not enjoy 
priority over contractual legitimacy (See Chapter 7.2.1). 
 
It is clear from this study that, due to the fact that Swazi law and custom is 
now subject to the new Constitution and the Bill of Rights, further legal 
reform in Swazi law and custom can be expected. The Bill of Rights grants 
freedom of rights to the individual who previously, could not enter into 
negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement, e.g. woman, who also 
could not own property, and who could not in marriage determine her own 
destiny (See Chapter 1.4.5).  
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10.13 RECORDING AND CODIFICATION 
 
Recordings and codifications of indigenous legal systems are often criticised 
as if the intent was to record or codify the traditional law of Africans, rather 
than an effort to reflect on the living law of the specific group studied at a 
given point in time. The critics have created the impression that customary 
law consists of immutable rules but have overlooked the fact that customary 
law also consists of processes and is quite capable of adapting to changing 
social-economic circumstances (cf Dlamini 1990:4). 
 
Although the general point of view is against codification of indigenous 
legal systems, the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland has opted to 
codify Swazi law and custom.  The researcher has therefore taken the liberty 
of preparing memoranda for the codification of the Swazi law of contract 
and the law of marriage because those contracts that have an influence on a 
person’s status are reflected in the law of marriage. It is intended to submit 
these memoranda to the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland after this 
thesis has been submitted to and accepted by the examiners (see Annexure A 
and B). 
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akunasivumelwani nemtwana you cannot conclude a contract with a minor 
akungenwa esibayeni sendvodza lovers may not sleep together let alone have 
sexual intercourse 
ayocela umbhidvo to ask for red ochre, meaning to ask for 
somebody’s hand in marriage 
emaswati akamtsatsi kati asesakeni a Swazi does not buy a cat in a bag for 
himself 
indlela yekuphila kwethu our (the Swazi) way of life 
inhlamba iyagezwa literally, an insult should be washed, which 
means a person who has been insulted must 
be compensated 
inkhomo yelubisi/yeliphakelo a beast given to a woman by her husband 
which allows her to eat certain food at her 
in-laws, which otherwise she was not 
allowed to eat, such as milk and milk 
products 
inkhomo yemadvolo  literally, the beast of the knees which means 
a man penetrating a woman from behind 
inkhosi ibusa ngebantfu the king rules by his people 
inkhosi iyabonya the king is sick, meaning the king is dead 
inkhosi ngiyo lenemukhwa wekusika 
live 
the king is the only one with powers to 
demarcate the boundaries of the country 
inkhosi yenthosi ngebandla a chief rules by way of his councils/a king is 
a king through his councils 
Ikhotseme the king has died 
kubika sisu an act of reporting a pregnancy to the family 
of the man responsible 
kuchitsa umhlolo literally, to chase the bad omen 
kudla umuti literally, “to eat the home”; stated with 
reference to a woman who ranks higher than 
other wives in a polygynous household 
kufakwa esiwini literally, to put a child in someone else’s 
womb, which means to adopt a child 
kuhlanganisa bukhoti to strengthen the relations between the 
family of the bride and that of the 
bridegroom 
kukhotsama kweNgwenyama the death of a king 
kukhumbuta the creditor must first remind the debtor of 
this obligation 
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kulotjolwa umfati you may deliver emalobolo at a future date 
kumikisa umtfwana emshini a minor ritual performed to mark the end of 
the period of confinement of a newborn 
baby 
kumitsisa literally, to impregnate, but used in context 
to refer to the act of impregnating an 
unmarried woman 
kuncutsa taking samples of the person’s possessions 
for the purpose of bewitching him or her 
kungcina inyongo a game on bayeni day 
kuphatwa emndeni a married woman may exercise her share in 
the guardianship 
kuphuka sivumelwano no remedy is available if one party 
repudiates an agreement 
kushone lilanga the king has died 
kutsebula turning a person into a zombie 
kuyekela the party that has been mislead may resile 
from a transaction 
kuyokwembula ingubo enkhosini an appeal to the king 
kwenta umsebenti wakho 
nesivumelwano 
contractual obligations are terminated by 
rendering performance 
kwephula loko lokuhlonishwako if one breaks any of the numerous taboos 
lebakholelwa kutsi Bangakwana from what the (the Swazi) believe they 
ought to do 
lelive lemaSwati ngawo emabutfo the pillars of authority in the kingdom 
libovu aliphindvwa  a woman cannot legally get married and be 
smeared with red ochre again 
licala aliboli a debt does not decay 
licala litekwa ngalelinye a case is decided, based on another 
comparable one 
lilima liyaphekelwa the person for whom the work is performed 
should always be present 
liSwati liyatalwa a person is born as a Swazi by birth 
litfumbu lentfombatana the last born girl 
litsambo lemuntfu alidliwa literally, a person cannot chew somebody’s 
bone, in context, the paternity of a child or 
person lies with one person – the father 
lubane bewitching a person – means a fire starts 
 
SWAZI LEGAL MAXIMS AND PROVERBS 
253 
spontaneously with no known source 
luswati a beast paid as a fine 
sikhulu Sikhulu ngebantfu a chief is a chief through his people 
sikhulu Sikhulu ngelibandla a chief is a chief through his councils 
sikhulu siyatalwa a chief assumes his position through 
hereditary right 
tinkhomo tekugeza emacansi beasts to wash the sleeping mats (adultery 
fine paid by the woman’s family) 
tinkhomo temabheka atitali the exact number of cattle paid as 
emalobolo is returned even if the cattle have 
multiplied over the years 
ukhiphe tinkhomo emlonyeni weyise she has taken the cattle out of her father’s 
mouth 
ulitfwala licala nobe ungakalenti he becomes responsible for offences which 
he himself did not commit 
umfati akacedvwa it is not proper to effect full delivery of 
emalobolo at once 
umfati longugogo a woman who bears the same surname as 
the husband’s paternal grandmother 
umfati lokhiwe a wife who has been negotiated for a man 
by his parents 
umfati lowendzisiwe a woman  married following an arranged 
marriage where her parents would have 
approached the man’s family and offered 
her as a wife to their son 
umfati wekukhiwa an arranged marriage 
umhlamba ubitwa esibayeni summoning the nation to the cattle byre 
kraal 
umlomo longacali manga the mouth that never lies, referring to the 
king 
umonakalo no damages are claimable when the contract 
is void on the grounds of impossibility of 
performance 
umuntfu ngumuntfu angatalwa a person is only a human being once he or 
she has been born 
umuntfu ngumuntfu asesiswini a person’s legal subjectivity begins at 
conception 
umuntfu ngumuntfu ngebantfu a person is a person through a person  
umuntfu ulala agucuka a clever man changes his mind 
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ungayibambi inhlwa ngenhloko 
isaphuma 
do not catch an ant before it comes out of its 
hole by itself 
usule sibaya sendvoldza damages are paid because less emalobolo 
will be received for a girl when she falls 
pregnant before marriage 
utawutsatsa impunzi utsatse licala he inherits his father’s debts, as well as his 
assets 
uvule sibaya sendvodza literally, an act of having sex with an 
unmarried woman; in context it means 
impregnating a girl to the detriment of the 
father who is the girl’s guardian 
uyabekwa he is placed in a position of authority 
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amekeza bridal songs 
ayalwa marriage etiquette 
babe lomsikati lomdzala a senior aunt 
bafati a married woman 
bandlancane a small council of the chiefdom; the 
committee functions as an executive 
committee of the chiefdom 
bandlakhulu a large council of the chiefdom 
involving all adults 
bantfwabenkhosi princes/princesses 
bantfwabenkhosi bendzawo princes of the chiefdom 
batobonga indzaba acceptance of a proposal 
batomcela to ask for the bride’s hand in 
marriage 
batomgana inviting the man to participate in the 
women songs 
bayeni the groom’s party 
bayogidza umtsimba the lover’s homestead 
bavusa likhaya they perpetuate a family 
bofakazi witnesses 
bomakoti widows 
botlhaswa negligence 
bukhosi kingship 
budzala age or seniority 
bulili gender 
egumeni IeNdlunkhulu royal enclosure 
emabandla councils 
emabheka marriage goods (emalobolo) 
emabutfo regiments 
emacansi sleeping mats 
emadvuna leaders who are senior to tikhulu and 
have followers of their own; they 
organise their own emabutfo and 
have their own inhlambelo, such as 
the Mamba clan 
emahambate chiefdom where there are no chiefs 
(tikhulu) 
emajaha warriors or men’s regiments 
emakhosatana princesses who are designated to 
perform important national duties 
emakhosi kings 
emalawini the regiment quarters at the royal 
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residence 
emalobolo cattle delivered as marriage goods to 
a bride’s father and family by the 
groom and his family 
emalobolo marriage goods 
emalungelo rights 
emasondvo hooves 
emihambo yetfu our Swazi traditions 
emphakatsini chief’s headquarters 
endlunkhulu at the head home  
eNgwenyameni at the king 
enshungushwini the side entrance of the kraal 
esangweni entrance 
esibayeni at/in the cattle byre 
esikhulwini at the chief’s residence 
fakazi wemehlo an eyewitness 
gogo grandmother 
gozolo master of ceremonies at a traditional 
marriage 
imigcwembe wooden meat platters 
imihlubulo meat from the sides of each of the 
beasts that are exchanged 
imimango chiefdoms 
imiphakatsi residences of chiefs 
imisibenti  duties 
imiti yebukhosi or tigodlo royal residences 
imitsanyelo brooms 
imvulalisango a small gift preceding marriage 
goods 
imvunulo traditional attire 
incangosi singing (at a traditional marriage 
ceremony) 
incwala  national ceremony of the first fruits 
indlu a hut 
indlunkhulu head home 
indlovukazi literally – elephant referring to the 
queen mother 
indvodza a man 
indvodza letsetse a married man 
indvuna headman 
indvuna yebafati a headman a who is a commander of 
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women’s regiment 
indvuna yemabutfo a headman who is a commander of 
the regiments 
indvuna yemajaha a headman who is a commander of 
the warriors 
indvuna yemcuba the main headman in a chiefdom 
indvuna yesifundza yemutia 
webukhosi 
a regional headman 
indvuna yetintfombi a headman who is a commander of 
girls’ regiments 
indvuna ye tinkhundla  a supreme headman who is 
responsible for all the chief’s centres 
indvuna ye sikhulu the main headman of a chief 
indzawo yokuhlala fields and residential sites 
ingcugce a grown woman 
ingece some form of skin bracelet worn on 
the right arm 
ingeje a traditional bangle made of grass  
ingwe a skirt made of leopard skin worn 
during the incwala 
ingwenyama  literally lion referring to the king 
inhlambelo a sanctuary 
inhlanti a younger sister who joins a married 
sister in her marriage, either for the 
purpose of bearing children on her 
behalf or as a replacement on her 
death 
inhlawulo a fine 
inhloko yemuti head of the family 
inhlonipo respect 
inhloso intent or with intention 
injelwane porcupine quill 
injobo some kind of skin which 
differentiates regiments 
inkanyiso a fee paid to a traditional healer 
inkhomo (yinkhomo) a beast (is a beast) 
inkhomo yekucela 
 
 
the beast delivered to the bride’s 
family by the man’s family to ask for 
the hand of the bride 
inkhomo yekukhonta a beast given to the chief for granting 
land 
inkhomo yelisango a cow that is given as a fine and 
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which is kept by the chief 
inkhomo yembhaca the beast a man is fined with if he 
marries before informing his 
regiment 
inkhosi ibusa ngebantfu a king rules by his people 
inkhosi isebandla the king in council 
inkhonyane  a skin belt across the chest 
inkhosana a family successor 
inkhosikati a wife to the king 
inkhubazana ploughing implements 
inkhundla/ plural tinkhundla the common delineated constituent 
area for both local and national 
government (originally the area in 
front of a cattle kraal) 
inqaba kanqofula the song that is sung at the end of the 
ceremony of the first fruits 
insulamnyembeti literally, “to wipe away tears”; a 
beast given to the mother when 
emalobolo is delivered for her 
daughter 
intalelwane family members of the same lineage 
intfombi a young woman 
inyanga  a traditional medicine man or a 
diviner 
inyanga yemkhuhlane an agreement for healing by a diviner
inyongo bile sack 
kuba to steal  
kuba ngumtsakatsi practising witchcraft 
kubambisa bailment 
kubeka to grant land 
kubita inyanga to acquire the services of a 
traditional healer 
kubonga to thank 
kucela to ask for a girl’s hand in marriage 
kucela sincenphetelo claiming damages 
kuchinsa to exchange 
kudiza/kudizela to bribe 
kugagadlela/kadlwengula to rape 
kugana courtship 
kugidvwa umtsimba traditional wedding ceremony 
kuhlambisa bridal gifts 
kuhlanganisa to reconcile 
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kuhumusha to defraud 
kuichaza thing 
kujuba emabutfo the creation of age regiments 
kujuma courtship 
kukhiwa when the man’s father makes the 
approach for a marriage 
kukhonta to request for land in a chiefdom; to 
pay allegiance to a chief 
kukhontela sibhedlela to request another chiefdom to allow 
a sick cow to graze in its pastures, 
avoiding contact with disease in its 
own fields 
kukhulula release 
kulilelwa an offer of condolence 
kumenta umnikati transfer of ownership 
kuncusa a chief’s request to his people to help 
build or repair a certain homestead 
kungeke kwendeke impossibility of performance 
kungena an act of marrying a widow 
kuntjintjiselana exchange 
kunuka to open a bag of bones 
kuphinga adultery 
kuphuma the party that has been misled 
kuqabangula an engagement 
kutsenga umuntfu to buy off a crime 
kusabisa to use ‘force’ in concluding a 
conflict 
kushaya to beat or assault 
kusisa farming out 
kusitana loan for use 
kutiba a form of betrothal 
kutinikela obligation 
kutsakatsa witchcraft 
kutsatsa to marry 
kuvuma consent 
kuvusa likhaya/umuti to perpetuate a family 
kuyenga misrepresentation 
kuyokwendziswa when a girl has refused the father’s 
approach 
kwemuka desertion 
kwenanisa one must return a thing of the same 
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kind, quantity and of similar quality 
kwendza marital status 
kwendzisa the process of when the girl’s father 
makes the approach 
kwephula sivumelwano breach of contract due to fault of one 
party 
labo labahlambisa a woman’s in-laws who received 
bridal gifts 
labangakendzi/ labangakatsatsi unmarried adults 
libandla council 
libheshu loin skin 
libovu red ochre 
libutfo regiment 
libutfo labomake a women’s regiment 
libutfo lemajaha regiment of young men 
libutfo letintfombi age regiment for young woman 
licansi sleeping mat 
licebo lekuyenga fraudulent misrepresentation 
licube traditional necklace made of beads 
lidvuna a headman who acts as a chief in a 
chiefdom where there is no chief 
lifuku sleeping hut 
ligunqa a council composed of senior princes 
and the headman of the royal 
residence; he lives with the king and 
acts as a close advisor 
lihawu a shield 
lijaha a young man 
lijuba a bead necklace made from a single 
string of blue beads with smaller 
white beads on the side and one heart 
bead in the position next to the man’s 
heart 
lilima to request people to come and assist 
with small tasks 
lincusa an emissary 
lingunga  princes of the realm 
liphakelo beast a milk cow 
liphehla animal fat 
liqoqo royal senior councillors chosen to 
oversee matters of the royal 
residences 
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lisiko custom 
lisiko lokuhlonishwako  traditional usage, custom 
lisokanchanti the family head’s firstborn son 
lizinga/sigaba/sitfunti rank/status 
lokungekho emtsetfweni an unlawful transaction 
lubandze to fetch wood 
ludvwendvwe the bridal party forming a straight 
line 
lugege the beast  that marks the conclusion 
of the agreement for emalobo 
between the parties 
luhlobo lwisivumelwapo the extent of involvement and 
consultation with other family 
members depends on the nature of 
the contract 
luhlongwa a grass bangle 
lusendvo family council 
lusiba feather 
makoti brides 
ngenhloso with intention 
ngiyacela I ask 
okuphuma esivumelwaneni withdrawal (from a contract) 
sankhala a portion of meat given to a 
convicted adulterer 
sento/sento tsite an act 
sibaya  a cattle kraal 
sibumbu a meat portion from the leg of the 
lugege beast 
sicholo/ticholo a beehive-hairdo 
sicheme a regiment 
sidvudvu semnyeni the beast given by the bride’s father 
to the groom’s people as a sign of 
acceptance of the emalobolo 
sidwaba skin skirt 
sidzandzane a young girl 
sigaba status 
sigeja a special shawl worn around the 
shoulders during the ceremony of the 
first fruits (incwala) 
sigiyo a special dance where the bride 
dances with her sisters and brothers 
sihlantsi smaller mat for seating 
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sikhulu chief 
siphandla a skin anklet/wristband 
sisa the cattle used for farming out 
purposes 
sisho proverbs 
sisinga progeny 
sitfunti dignity 
sisu stomachs 
sisulamsiti lesikhulu the king’s first wife; she must be a 
Matsebula and has special national 
duties to perform 
sisulamsiti lesincane the king’s second wife; she must be a 
Motsa and she has special national 
duties to perform 
sive the nation 
sivumelawano a voluntary agreement between two 
parties (a contract) 
tandla tiyagezana to wash each other’s hands 
teka to marry 
tibi tendlu the family’s dirty linen 
ticholo (kukhehla) a beehive-like hairstyle worn by 
Swazi women 
tifundza regions 
tigodlo the royal residences 
tigodzi wards 
tikhetfo traditional sieves 
tikhulu chiefs 
timbita traditional medicine 
tindvuna headmen 
tindziwo clay pots 
tinhlangotsi meat from the sides of each of the 
beasts that are exchanged 
tintfombi maidens 
titja dishes 
ululate praise singing 
umcwasho a woollen tassel worn by maidens to 
signify virginity 
umdzalaso a beast which is part of a fine for 
seduction 
umfana a young boy 
umfati a married woman 
umfati longugogo a wife who has the same surname as 
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the grandmother of the husband 
umfati losingani a wife whom a man has chosen for 
himself 
umfati wekukhiwa a wife who has been negotiated for a 
man by his parents 
umfati wekwendziswa a wife in an arranged marriage 
umfelakati a widow 
umganu a marula tree 
umgijimi a chief’s runner 
umgoqo/umvalo signifies a woman’s consent to be 
married following her coming out of 
the hut and hitting the gate with a 
spear or when she agrees that a goat 
they show her after the marriage 
ceremony be killed 
umhambo  manners, etiquette, polite usages 
umhlaba land 
umhlaba wemaSwati land belonging to the Swazi 
umhlambiso marriage gifts, given by the bride to 
in-laws 
umhlandla a cowhide necklace 
umhlanga  a reed, the type of grass collected by 
girls during the Reed Dance; a term 
also used to describe the Reed Dance 
umkhaya/emkhayeni a witch-hunt 
ummangali a complainant 
umndeni a family unit 
umndeni weSikhulu a chief’s family council 
umntfwana a child 
umntfwana welibovu a small child given to the bride to 
send around on errands 
umntfwananeSikhulu the son or daughter of a chief 
umntfwanenkhosi a prince or princess 
umntfwanenkhosi lomkhula a senior prince 
umnyaka, budzala age 
umphakatsi bukhosi spiritual unity of the nation 
umsasane special meat from the insides 
umsebenti wababe the duties of the father 
umsebenti wamake the duties of the mother 
umsila a tail to be cooked and given to the  
bride’s brothers to eat 
umsisi the owner of farming out (sisa) cattle 
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umsuka a particular type of hoe 
umtfalo responsibility 
umtsetfo a single law of ordinance 
umtsimba the marriage ceremony 
umuti weBukhosi the king’s village 
umyeni the man in charge of a groom’s party 
umzaca a straight stick 
uyangenwa late husband’s brother given to the 
widow as first choice partner 
uyinhloko guardianship or authority over a 
person 
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Annexure A 
 
LAW OF CONTRACT 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT 
 
 
Part 1: General principles 
 
 
General nature of a contract 
 
(1) Legal or quasi-legal rules governing contracts respond to the needs of 
parties to ensure that fairness and justice attend their contractual 
arrangements. 
 
(2) When a mutual agreement is the basis for economic exchange in a 
community, it does not, upon conclusion of the contract, provide a 
guarantee to a party that, if he complies with its terms, he will receive the 
full measure of his side of the bargain. 
 
(3) Any performance actually rendered guarantees counter-performance. 
 
(4) The realisation of profits is not a laudable goal when measured against the 
economic hardship this might impose upon the compensating party. 
 
(5) Profit is not a valuable end in itself when the result of its attainment has 
created disharmony in the community. 
 
 
Formalities 
 
(1) The conclusion of a contract is a public affair. 
 
(2) The subject matter of the agreement must be physically present at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract. 
 
(3) Publicity ensures that the parties intend to fulfill their undertaking and 
provides proof of the agreement and its terms, in the event of a dispute 
arising. 
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(4) An agreement not concluded before witnesses is enforceable: provided that 
its existence and terms are capable of being proved. 
 
 
Contractual obligations and liability 
 
(1)  
(a) Agreement does not give rise to liability to perform. 
 
(b) Liability arises only after performance by a party in accordance with 
the agreement. 
 
(c) An agreement must be followed by actual and concrete performance 
in order to establish contractual liability. 
 
(d) Until promises to perform are carried out, no remedies available if one 
party repudiates the agreement: umuntfu ulala agucuka (a person 
changes his or her mind) or litsemba alibulali umganga kudliwa bafati 
(hope does not kill). 
(2)  
(a) Performance of an agreement creates a debt between the contracting 
parties. 
 
(b) A debt must be paid on demand, or at the time agreed upon, and 
remains payable for an indefinite period. 
 
(c) A debt is not extinguished by prescription: licala aliboli (a debt does 
not decay). 
(3)  
(a) In an instance where an agreement of sale or barter contemplates 
delivery of property which is physically present at the time of the 
agreement, or otherwise subject to inspection by the transferee, the 
transferor makes no warranties with respect to the condition of such 
property. 
 
(b) When the transferee takes such property into his possession, he takes 
it "as is". 
 
(c) The transferee is barred from any claim against the transferor if such 
property does not fulfill his expectations, even though such 
expectations were represented to him by the transferor. 
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Part 2: Essential requirements for a valid contract 
 
 
Requirements 
 
The requirements for a valid agreement are the following: 
 
(a) consensus between the parties; 
 
(b) the property must be the proper subject matter of the agreement; 
 
(c) both parties must have the capacity to enter into the agreement; 
 
(d) performance must be possible when the agreement is concluded; and 
 
(e) the agreement must be lawful. 
 
 
Consensus 
 
(1)  
(a) A valid agreement must be based on consensus between the parties 
with regard to the material elements of the contract. 
 
(b) Consensus (sivumelwano) is reached through an offer (kushengetisa) 
by one party and an acceptance (kwemukela) of the offer by the other 
party. 
 
(c) Consensus with regard to the performance and counter-performance 
is essential for a valid agreement. 
 
(2) No consensus is reached if there is a mistake regarding an essential 
element of the agreement. 
 
(3) If consensus is obtained by improper means, whereby a party has been 
misled through misrepresentation or coerced by threat (duress) to enter into 
a contract, the contract is voidable at the option of the aggrieved party. 
(4)  
(a) In the case of misrepresentation, the aggrieved party may: 
  
(i) resile from the transaction, in which event restitution must take 
place; or 
 
(ii) adhere to the transaction but limit its performance to the value 
of the thing agreed upon or insist that the thing agreed upon be 
delivered instead of the misrepresented article. 
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(b) Fraudulent misrepresentation is a criminal matter. 
 
 
Proper subject matter 
 
(1) Property must be owned and controlled by the person obliged to transfer 
it. 
 
(2) Where an owner has loaned the subject matter of the contract under a 
long-term loan, he must first terminate the loan agreement before entering 
into such a contract. 
 
(3) A woman must not alienate property which is under the control of her 
husband or guardian, unless the latter consents to relinquish control to the 
woman for the purpose of the transaction. 
 
 
Capacity to enter into an agreement 
 
(1)  
(a) The head of a family, in consultation with the members of his 
family, must conclude a contract on behalf of, and in the interests 
of, the family. 
 
(b) The family head is liable for the performance of the obligations 
under a contract entered into by him or by a member of his family 
with his consent. 
(2)  
 (a) Individual members of a family may initiate agreements: provided 
that such person must consult certain relatives including bogogo, 
paternal aunts and the head of a household or homestead. 
 
 (b) The extent of involvement and consultation with such other family 
members depends on the nature of the contract concerned; 
contracts involving the exchange of small stock or grain, do not 
require the same level of consultation as contracts involving the 
exchange of cattle. 
 
(3) The authority of a head of a family to represent his family or a father to 
represent his child arises by operation of law. 
 
(4)  
 (a) Authority to represent the head of a household or a homestead may 
arise from a contract. 
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 (b) A family head may give a mandate to another family head to enter 
into a contract as a representative of the former: provided that the 
representative will not acquire any rights or obligations under the 
resultant contract. 
 
 (c) A representative may not be punished: sitfunywa asibulawa. 
 
 
Possibility of performance 
 
(1)  
 (a) Performance must be possible when the agreement is concluded. 
 
 (b) If one of the reciprocal performances is impossible at the time when 
the contract is entered into, the contract is void and no performance 
under the contract is due. 
(2)  
 (a) Damages may not be claimed when the contract is void on the 
grounds of impossibility of performance. 
 
 (b) If the creditor has incurred expense in anticipation of receiving 
performance from the debtor, the creditor may not sue for 
reimbursement in addition to restitution, where the debtor had no 
means of knowing that performance on his part would become 
impossible. 
 
 (c) A party is not expected to incur such expenses before he is in 
possession of the object of performance:  provided that expenses 
directly related to the fulfillment of the contract are permitted. 
 
 (d) Fraud is treated as a criminal matter and a court may order that 
compensation be paid to the deceived party. 
(3)  
 (a) If a debtor has assured a creditor that the object of his performance 
is available and the creditor has already rendered performance to 
the debtor, in the event of the debtor's performance subsequently 
becoming impossible, the creditor may claim the following - 
 
  (i) restitution; 
   
  (ii) delivery of a surrogate in place of the performance agreed 
upon by the debtor. 
 
 (b) Damages may not be claimed. 
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Transaction must be lawful 
 
(1) An unlawful transaction is not recognised and is unenforceable. 
 
(2) The parties to an unlawful transaction may be punished for committing an 
offence. 
 
 
 
Part 3:  Breach, remedies and termination 
 
 
Breach of contract 
 
(1)  
 (a) Breach of contract may occur as follows: 
 
  (i) delay in performing an obligation; 
 
  (ii) repudiation of the contract; 
 
  (iii) defective performance; or 
 
  (iv) prevention of performance. 
 
 (b) A creditor need not act immediately if the debtor does not perform 
his obligations. 
 
 (c) By means of periodic demands, a creditor may continue to confirm 
his rightful claim to performance. 
 
 (d) The debtor must be given reasonable time to perform, and great 
patience must be shown in this regard. 
 
 
Remedies for breach 
 
(1)  
 (a) In the event of the debtor's persistent failure to perform, the creditor 
may institute an action for the rendering of the performance or, 
upon default, claim restitution. 
 
 (b) Consequential damages may not be claimed. 
 
 (c) An aggrieved party may claim compensation for damages which 
are capable of being proved. 
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(2)  
 (a) When applying a remedy for breach of contract, a court must give 
effect to the principles of restorative justice in order to restore: 
 
  (i) the relationship between the disputants; and 
 
  (ii) harmony within the community as a whole. 
 
 (b) When given a choice between awarding consequential damages 
and damages to cover out-of-pocket losses, a court invariably 
ought to choose the latter for reasons as follows: 
   
  (i) the plaintiff will not be any worse off than before the contract 
was concluded and will be compensated for any actual 
harm; 
 
  (ii) the defendant will not suffer any excessive hardship; 
 
  (iii) out-of-pocket losses are easier to evaluate. 
 
 
Termination of contracts 
 
(1) Contractual obligations are terminated as follows: 
 
 (a) by rendering performance; 
 
 (b) release; 
 
 (c) novation; and 
 
 (d) merger. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS 
 
Contractual arrangements 
 
(1) Contracts may be classified according to subject matter according to the 
nature of the rights and duties created by the legal acts. 
 
(2) Contractual arrangements fall under the following heads:  
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 (a) agreements relating to non-permanent exchanges of goods, 
including loans; and 
 
 (b) agreements relating to complete exchanges of goods or services, 
including contracts of barter, sale and employment in the form of 
credit exchanges. 
 
(3) Such agreements 
 
 (a) relate to the bilateral exchange of goods or services; 
 
 (b) do not involve contracts affecting: 
 
  (i) the status of the parties; 
 
  (ii) incidents arising from emalobolo. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
AGREEMENT REALTING TO A NON-PERMANENT EXCHANGE OF GOODS 
 
 
Part 1:  Kusisa (farming out) 
 
 
Nature of the contract 
 
Sisa is a contract whereby the owner (umsisi) places certain animals under the 
control of another (umsiselwa) for an indefinite period, on the understanding that 
the keeper will enjoy the use of the animals, but that the ownership will remain 
with, and accrue to, the depositor. 
 
 
Agreement 
 
(1) A sisa transaction is a specific contract having an underlying common 
intention in regard to the essentials as follows: 
 
 (a) the nature of the transaction; 
 
 (b) the animals involved; 
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 (c) the right to use the animals and any proceeds flowing from such 
use; and 
 
 (d) the natural terms regarding (the implied rights and duties of the 
parties, in respect of the following - 
 
  (i) the right to be rewarded; 
 
  (ii) the duty to take care of the animals; 
 
  (iii) the duty to account for the animals and their progeny; and 
 
  (iv) the consequences of termination. 
 
(2) Farming out cattle is primarily for the benefit of the keeper (umsiselwa), 
although both parties should benefit as follows: 
 
 (a) the keeper (umsiselwa) enjoys the use and proceeds of the animals 
other than progeny; and 
 
 (b) the owner (umsisi) is relieved of the task of taking care of the 
animals. 
(3)  
 (a) In the case of the farming out of cattle, the keeper (umsiselwa) 
must approach the owner (umsisi) and make the offer to sisa the 
cattle. 
 
 (b) in respect of goats, the owner (umsisi) must make the offer to the 
keeper (umsiselwa). 
 
(4) A domestic animal may be farmed out. 
 
 
Use of animals and proceeds 
 
(1)  
 (a) Kusisa cattle must be kept distinct from any cattle the keeper may 
possess himself. 
 
 (b) The keeper (umsiselwa) may use the animals in the same manner 
as if he were the owner (umsisi). 
 
 (c) Whatever is earned from such produce belongs to the keeper. 
(2)  
 (a) A keeper (umsiselwa) may not slaughter an animal or use it to pay 
for his marriage. 
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 (b) A keeper may not lend the cattle to a third party. 
(3)  
 (a) Kusisa cattle may not be attached to satisfy the keeper's debts. 
 
 (b) Kusisa animals may be seized from the keeper to satisfy the debts 
of their owner. 
 
 (c) The keeper may not demand that the animals be replaced, if they 
have been attached to satisfy the owner's debts. 
 
 
Duty to care and to account 
 
(1)  
 (a) The keeper (umsiselwa) is responsible for the wellbeing of the 
animals while they are in his keeping. 
 
 (b) The keeper must exercise the same degree of care and diligence in 
looking after kusisa animals as he would if they were his own. 
(2)  
 (a) When the owner (umsisi) visits the animals from time to time, the 
keeper must account to him satisfactorily for the condition of the 
animals. 
 
 (b) The keeper (umsiselwa) has a duty to restore the animals to the 
owner whenever they are claimed, and he must diligently account 
for all losses not previously reported and also for all increases. 
 
 (c) Losses through death, theft or other causes must be reported to the 
owner immediately. 
 
 (d) Where an animal has died, the skin must be produced. 
(3)  
 (a) Failure to report a loss to an owner in the proper manner, renders 
the keeper (umsiselwa) liable to make good the loss. 
 
 (b) In such circumstances the keeper is held strictly liable to replace 
the animal:  provided that he is allowed to keep the meat of that 
animal. 
 
 
Duration of the contract 
 
(1) The keeper takes sole charge of the animals for an indefinite period that 
may be terminated at any time by either party. 
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(2) An implied term of the contract is that it will last for a reasonable period. 
 
 
Remuneration 
 
(1) The keeper (umsiselwa) is entitled to one of the progeny after the 
transaction (sisinga) has been terminated. 
 
(2) In addition, a calf may be given as a token of appreciation (kubonga) at 
the end of such period. 
 
(3) Where the animals farmed out are pigs, the owner must give the keeper 
(umsiselwa) a sow and a boar, so that the keeper may have his own pigs 
in future. 
 
 
Termination and restoration of kusisa animals 
 
(1)  
 (a) After a reasonable period has elapsed, the owner (umsisi) must 
claim his animals from the keeper. 
 
 (b) Once the claim is made, the keeper (umsiselwa) must return the 
animals. 
(2)  
 (a) The keeper (umsiselwa) may terminate the contract at any time:  
provided that the keeper must first discuss this matter with the 
owner (umsisi) so that the owner may receive proper notice and 
make the necessary arrangements. 
 
 (b) The keeper (umsiselwa) must give the owner a reasonable period 
of notice. 
 
(3) In an instance where a specified period has been determined between the 
parties, the owner (umsisi) may not terminate the contract. 
 
(4) The owner (umsisi) may terminate the contract prematurely without 
incurring any liability on reasonable grounds if the keeper (umsiselwa) is 
not taking proper care of the animals. 
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Part 2: Kusitana (loan for use) 
 
 
Nature of the contract 
 
(1)  
 (a) Loan for use is a contract whereby one person hands over 
something to another person gratuitously for the latter to use in a 
particular manner, after which the thing must be returned to the 
lender (kweboleka). 
 
 (b) Loan for use is a contract which is gratuitous. 
 
 (c) If the lender is to receive any remuneration from the borrower, the 
contract is one of lease. 
 
 (d) Kusitana is a bilateral contract. 
 
 
Duration 
 
Where no period for the return of the thing has been agreed upon, the borrower 
may use the thing for the purpose for which it was lent, as long as is deemed 
necessary. 
 
 
Objects on loan 
 
Household utensils and cattle are the objects of borrowing and lending:  provided 
that kusisa cattle may not be lent, referred to in section 328(2)(b). 
 
 
Defects 
 
(1) Where a thing which is known to have a defect is borrowed, the borrower 
has no action against the lender if such object should die while in his 
possession. 
 
(2) A lender has no action against the borrower, but the borrower is obliged to 
report to the lender if the property has been destroyed or damaged. 
 
 
Duty to care 
 
(1) The borrower must exercise the same degree of care as that of an owner 
over the thing lent to him. 
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(2) Where it is agreed that damage to, and destruction of, the thing will be 
made good by the borrower, the latter will be liable in terms of the 
agreement. 
 
(3) Liability is incurred for negligence on the part of the borrower if there was 
negligence involved. 
(4)  
 (a) When loss or damage was caused by accident, the two parties 
must negotiate the matter. 
 
 (b) If the owner is not satisfied, he must leave behind the meat and 
skin of the animal instead of taking it, thereby signifying his anger. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
AGREEMENTS FOR THE PERMANENT EXCHANGE OF GOODS OR 
SERVICES 
 
 
Part 1:  Kuntjintjiselena (exchange) 
 
 
Nature of the contract 
 
(1) This is a contract of exchange whereby both parties undertake to deliver 
to each other a thing with the purpose of transferring ownership of that 
thing. 
 
(2) Exchange is a reciprocal contract. 
 
(3) The essential elements of the contract are the following: 
 
 (a) performance and counter-performance; 
 
 (b) both performances exist in delivering a thing; and 
 
 (c) the intention of such delivery is the transfer of ownership. 
 
(4) In the absence of any one of the elements referred to in subsection (3), no 
contract of exchange comes into existence. 
 
(5) The following do not constitute a contract of exchange as follows: 
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 (a) where one party unilaterally renders performance; or 
 
 (b) where a party must deliver a thing for the rendering of a service. 
 
 
Formation of contract 
 
(1) For a valid agreement, the parties must agree on the thing to be 
exchanged. 
 
(2) Performance and counter-performance must be certain. 
 
(3) The parties may not agree that counter-performance should be 
reasonable or that it will be agreed upon at a future date. 
 
(4) The thing to be exchanged must be adequately specified in the 
agreement. 
 
(5) Where livestock forms the object of the agreement, the parties must agree 
on the type, size, age, sex and number of the animals. 
 
(6) No agreement is concluded if there is a mistake about a material element 
of the agreement. 
 
(7) Unlawful transactions are unenforceable, including the following: 
 
 (a) the exchange of a field or residential site for livestock or other 
movable things; or 
 
 (b) the exchange of a field for another field without the permission of 
Sikhulu. 
 
 
Terms 
 
(1) Under a contract of exchange, transfer of ownership is intended. 
 
(2)  
 (a) Each of the parties must be the owner of the thing concerned. 
 
 (b) No person other than the transferor must have a better title to that 
which is transferred. 
 
 (c) A person who intentionally exchanges another person's property 
commits theft. 
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 (d) If a party does not have valid title, the true owner may claim his 
property from the transferee, and the latter may demand the return 
of his property from the other party. 
(3)  
 (a) Ownership of an animal or other moveable thing passes on delivery 
by one party to the other. 
 
 (b) For delivery to be completed, there must be either physical delivery 
of the thing or pointing out of the thing, with the intention of 
transferring ownership. 
 
 (c) a description of the thing without showing it to the transferee does 
not constitute delivery. 
(4)  
 (a) Before delivery, the risk relating to the thing remains with the 
debtor. 
 
 (b) Progeny of an animal or increase of any other thing accrues to the 
debtor until delivery has taken place. 
 
 (c) After delivery, loss or other risks are borne by the transferee and 
any increase likewise accrues to the transferee. 
 
 (d) If the creditor refuses to accept proper delivery by the debtor at or 
after the stipulated time, he bears the risk from the time of his 
refusal. 
(5)  
 (a) Things are exchanged without warranty against latent defects, 
irrespective of whether the creditor has inspected the thing or not. 
  
 (b) A party who, being aware of a defect, and denies it, may be held 
liable to replace the defective thing. 
(6)  
 (a) Performance and counter-performance must take place 
simultaneously. 
 
 (b) The parties may expressly agree that the thing must be delivered at 
another place or that counter-performance will take place on a 
future date. 
 
(7) A standard medium of exchange exists including the following: 
 
 (a) eleven goats for one cow (ten females, one male); 
 
 (b) six goats for one cow (five females, one male); 
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provided that there is no rule which restricts the parties to the fixed 
equivalents or in any other way with regard to the value of their 
performance. 
 
Remedies for breach 
 
(1) If a debtor fails or refuses to perform when he is liable to do so, he may be 
ordered in an ensuing action to deliver the thing concerned. 
 
(2) Irrespective of whether a creditor elects specific performance or 
rescission, he is not entitled to damages in the form of reimbursement for 
the expenses he incurred in anticipation of counter-performance. 
 
(3) The court may alter an agreement to avoid hardship by ordering a creditor 
to accept what is offered to him in full settlement of a debt, in order to 
avoid him receiving no damages at all. 
(4)  
 (a) If a creditor is prevented from performing by the debtor, the creditor 
may either insist on specific performance or rescind the contract 
and claim restitution. 
 
 (b) The debtor is liable under the contract because the impossibility of 
his performance was of his own making. 
 
 
Part 2:  Loan for consumption 
 
 
Nature of the contract 
 
(1) A loan for consumption is a contract whereby one person delivers some 
tangible thing to another, who must return to the former a thing of the 
same kind, quantity and of similar quality (kwenanisa). 
 
(2) A person who receives a fungible thing must return the equivalent to what 
he has received, failing which, the transaction is not a loan for 
consumption. 
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Part 3:  Manual labour 
 
 
Nature of the contract 
 
(1)  
 (a) A person may hire another person to perform certain special work 
for him (kuncusa). 
 
 (b) Such work is paid for at a standard rate:  provided that the nature 
and extent of the work to be done, and the payment to be made for 
it, must be specified before the commencement of the work. 
 
 
Reciprocal rights and duties 
 
(1) A workman must fulfill his instructions before he is entitled to payment. 
 
(2)  
 (a) Payment is due when the work is completed. 
 
 (b) If payment is delayed for an unreasonable period, the workman 
may sue for it. 
 
(3) A workman may not claim payment while the work is incomplete, or if he 
does so, he will receive less than the amount of payment agreed upon. 
 
 
Special form 
 
(1) A special form of the labour contract is known as lilima. 
 
(2) When a person has a large amount of work that must be completed in a 
short period of time, he may invite his friends and neighbours to help him 
on an appointed day. 
 
(3) The persons who assist him are paid for their labour, usually in food, beer 
or tobacco. 
 
(4) If such persons complete their work on the same day, such payment is 
regarded as sufficient. 
 
(5) If the work is not completed, such persons may return the next day if there 
is more beer, or whatever commodity has been used as payment, 
provided that, if there is nothing left, they are not bound to do any more 
work. 
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Part 4: Kubita inyanga (acquiring the services of a traditional healer) 
 
 
Nature of the contract 
 
(1) Traditional healers (tinyanga) undertake work including divination, medical 
treatment, and the "doctoring" of people and homesteads as a protection 
against sorcery, and of fields, cattle and women for fertility. 
 
(2) Two types of agreement that may be concluded are as follows: 
 
 (a) with inyanga yekubetsela likhaya (for protecting the home); 
 
 (b) with the inyanga yemkhuhlane for healing. 
 
 
Payment 
 
(1) A traditional healer, when summoned by a client, must first "throw the 
bones" to divine the nature of the sickness or other condition he is 
required to remedy. 
 
(2)  The Inyanga may demand a fee called inkhanyiso to begin the process. 
 
(3) Such fee must be paid immediately before the divination is performed, in 
order to "make the bones speak". 
 
(4) The fee for the "doctoring" itself varies according to the nature of the work 
to be done. 
 
(5) Such fee is always paid after the doctoring has been done. 
 
(6) No fee is payable if the treatment has not been successful. 
 
(7) If the treatment has been successful and the fee is not paid within a 
reasonable time, the traditional healer may sue for it. 
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Annexure B 
 
LAW OF MARRIAGE 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 
Family and marriage 
 
(1) The family (umndeni) is founded upon marriage. 
 
(2) Marriage establishes special rights and duties among the persons 
concerned. 
 
(3) Marriage is a relationship which concerns not only the husband and wife, 
but also their respective families. 
 
(4) The formation of a marriage creates a series of reciprocal rights and 
obligations between the spouses for which their respective families are 
collectively responsible. 
 
(5) The most important features of marriage include those listed below. 
 
 (a) Marriage is a union between two people and their respective 
families (kuhlanganisa bukhoti). 
 
 (b) The principle of the continuing relationship is closely connected with 
the institution of marriage goods, known as emabheka or 
emalobolo. 
 
 (c) The procreation of children, both male and female, is of the 
greatest importance and the legitimate birth of children may take 
place only after a legally recognised marriage between the parties 
has been concluded. 
 
 (d) Marriage establishes various relationships of authority between 
spouses, as well as between parents and children. 
 
 (e) The conclusion of a marriage is the culmination of a series of 
events, rather than a specific event, accompanied by a variety of 
ceremonies, which have both a customary and a specific legal 
meaning. 
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 (f) Marriage does not contemplate its termination, whether by death or 
by divorce. 
 
 (g) Marriage is potentially polygynous (sitsembu). 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
CAPACITY AND CONSENT 
 
 
Capacity 
 
(1)  No fixed age is required for entering into a marriage. 
 
(2) A person is of marriageable age once he or she has reached puberty. 
(3)  
 (a) The age of puberty coincides with the incorporation into an age 
regiment. 
 
 (b) A male person must become a member of libutfo lemajaha 
(regiment of young men) and a female person a member of libutfo 
letintfombi (regiment of young women). 
 
 (c) If a person marries before informing his libutfo that he has received 
permission to marry, he must be fined a beast:  inkhomo 
yemabhaca. 
 
 
Kuvuma (consent) 
 
(1) The consent of all the parties is an essential element of a marriage. 
 
(2) Consent is confirmed by means of various ceremonies including the 
following: 
 
 (a) the biting of umgoqo/umvalo signifies a woman's consent after she 
comes out of the hut and hits the gate with a spear; or 
 
 (b) when she agrees that a goat they show her after the teka ceremony 
should be killed. 
 
(3) Although marriage is an agreement between two families, the consent of 
the bride and groom is not secondary to that of the two family groups. 
 
 286
(4) A girl may not always give her consent willingly since she may be coerced 
into marriage by means of the process of kwendzisa. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
IMPEDIMENTS TO MARRIAGE 
 
 
Physical and mental defects (e.g. insanity, physical deformity, deafness, 
dumbness, blindness) 
 
(1) Physical and mental defects are not an impediment to a valid marriage, 
provided that a person suffering from a serious mental defect is not 
permitted to marry. 
 
(2) The families of the spouses determine whether or not a particular member 
may enter into a marital relationship. 
 
(3) The family members of a disabled person must undertake to bear the 
responsibility for such a person. 
 
(4) Disability is not a factor in determining the number of emalobolo cattle to 
be delivered. 
 
 
Infertility and impotence 
 
(1) Neither infertility nor impotence is an impediment to marriage. 
 
(2) The respective families play an important role in determining and curing 
the defect with the use of timbita (a mixture of herbs and roots used for 
traditional medicine). 
 
(3) If this treatment is not successful, the woman's family must send an 
inhlanti to bear children for the husband. 
 
(4) In the event of a wife dying without bearing her husband any children, the 
cattle delivered as emalobolo may be returned. 
 
Marital status 
 
A married woman may not enter into a subsequent marriage during the existence 
of her marriage, but a married man may do so. 
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Persons of the same gender 
 
(1) Persons of the same gender may not marry. 
 
(2) A woman may marry another woman and ask a male relative to relate 
sexually with her wife. The children born out of such a relation belong to 
that woman. 
 
 
Prohibited degrees of consanguinity (blood relationship) and affinity 
 
Persons who are related to each other within certain degrees of consanguinity 
are prohibited from marrying each other, as follows: 
 
(a) consanguinity in the direct line; or 
 
(b) consanguinity in the collateral line. 
 
 
Consanguinity in the direct line 
 
Persons who are ascendants or descendants may not marry. 
 
 
Consanguinity in the collateral line 
 
(1) Blood relations who are related to one another by a common ancestor 
may not marry. 
 
(2) Cousins, an uncle and niece are all blood relations in the collateral line 
and may not marry each other. 
 
 
Relationship by affinity 
 
(1) Persons related to one another by affinity may not marry. 
 
(2) A man is not permitted to marry his wife's mother, grandmother or 
granddaughter. 
 
(3) A man may marry his wife's sister. 
 
(4) A man may marry his wife's brother's daughter after the death of the 
latter's father. 
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Other prohibited relationships 
 
(1) A person may not marry any person bearing the same clan name 
(sibongo) as he or she does. 
 
(2) Persons who share a common ancestor, as indicated in their clan praises 
(tinanatelo), even if not sharing the same clan name, may also not 
intermarry. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE COMING INTO BEING OF A MARRIAGE 
 
 
Kugana (courtship) 
 
(1)  
 (a) The formation of a marriage begins with the courting of a young 
woman by a young man. 
 
 (b) Several options are open to a young woman to mark the end of the 
period of courtship to indicate her consent, which is called kugana, 
as described as follows. 
 
  (i) Kugana ngelicube/lijuba/ingeje (beads) are beads that a girl 
will make specifically to give to her suitor to wear around his 
neck. 
 
  (ii) Lucube is a bead necklace made from a double string of an 
assortment of beads in red, white and black with lijuba. 
 
  (iii) Lijuba is a bead necklace made from a single string of blue 
beads with smaller white beads on the side and one heart 
bead in the position next to the man's heart. 
 
  (iv) Ingeje is a bead necklace made from lijuba beads, brown 
and yellow and two heart-shaped or egg like beads in the 
middle, also yellow. 
 
  (v) A grass bangle called luhlongwa may be used instead of 
beads. 
 
 (c) Following this, the young man's family must initiate the process of 
asking for the young woman's hand in marriage (kucela). 
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(2)  
 (a) Kugana ngekuhlehla is when a young woman reaches a decision to 
accept a suitor's proposal, while she indicates by inviting several 
peers from her area who wear their traditional attire (imvunulo) and 
will gather at the suitor's homestead to sing and dance. 
 
 (b) Others who watch will know who the parties involved are because 
the women mention the suitor's name in their songs, inviting him to 
come (batomgana). 
 
 (c) In turn, the prospective bride breaks away from the formation of the 
other women and dances apart, singing in praise of all of the 
suitor's attributes. 
 
 (d) After a while, the women leave and return to their various 
homesteads. 
 
 (e) After a few days, emajaha (young men) and tintfombi (young 
women) from the woman's and suitor's area meet at an agreed 
place to confirm the acceptance of the proposal (batobonga 
indzaba). 
 
 (f) The process of asking for the bride's hand in marriage (kucela) 
must then follow. 
(3)  
 (a) Kugana ngekutiba (betrothal) is a form of betrothal, not the 
acceptance of a proposal. 
 
 (b) A young woman must, following an understanding between herself 
and her suitor, also invite several other girls to the suitor's 
homestead (bayogidza umtsimba). 
 
 (c) The young woman must do this without her parents' knowledge, 
which means that the man's family will not have to deliver a beast 
to the bride's family to ask for the hand of the bride (inkhomo 
yekucela), 
 
(4)  
 (a) Kuqabangula (the betrothal) is an alternative form of betrothal. 
 
 (b) The process is initiated by the young woman. 
 
 (c) She must go to her suitor's homestead ayocela umbhidvo (to ask 
for emalobolo) on behalf of her parents. 
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 (d) She is accompanied by several maidens from her area and an old 
woman from her homestead. 
 
 (e) Through the older woman accompanying her, she must inform the 
man's parents that her parents have sent her kutocela umbhidvo. 
 
 (f) She must then produce a stick which has some markings on it, 
indicating the number of cattle to be delivered as emalobolo. 
 
 (g) After this, the process of asking (kucela) will follow. 
 
 
Kujuma (courtship) 
 
(1)  
 (a) In this form of courtship, the young woman has already accepted 
her suitor. 
 
 (b) Both the man and the woman may now visit each other's 
homesteads to spend a few days (not exceeding three) with their 
respective families. 
 
 (c) During these visits, the woman must be accompanied by another 
young woman from her area and the couple may not sleep 
together, let alone have sexual intercourse (akungenwa esibayeni 
sendvodza). 
 
 (d) The purpose of these visits is to inform the families of their 
respective children's intentions. 
(2)  
 (a) During kajuma the man's family may, when the woman returns to 
her family, put a porcupine quill (injelwane) on her head to indicate 
to her family that they are ready to have her married to their son. 
 
 (b) The porcupine quill (injelwane) is a signal to the woman's family 
that they should prepare her for marriage. 
 
 (c) This includes the shaping of her hair into a sicholo, when she 
becomes known as ingcugce. 
 
 (d) On a subsequent kujuma visit, a second porcupine quill (injelwane) 
must be put in the woman's sicholo confirming beyond any doubt 
that the man's family approve of her as a potential member of their 
family. 
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Kucela (to ask for a girl's hand in marriage) 
 
(1) Kucela marks the beginning of formal negotiations between the bride's 
family and the groom's family regarding the marriage of their respective 
offspring. 
 
(2) Kucela is initiated by the groom's family, which sends a delegation to the 
bride's family to request her hand in marriage. 
 
(3) To ensure that they are well received, the groom's family, represented by 
its delegation, may come bearing gifts of goodwill, which may include a 
beast called inkhomo yekucela (a beast to ask for the bride). 
 
 
Kwendzisa (when the woman's father makes the approach) and kukhiwa 
("to pick or pluck" - when the man's father makes the approach) 
 
(1) Despite the provisions of sections 203 to 205, a marriage may result from 
the processes of kwendzisa and kukhiwa. 
(2)  
 (a) The parents of a man may choose the family and sometimes even 
the woman they wish their son to marry. 
 
 b) The man's family must approach the parents of the woman and 
request her hand in marriage on behalf of their son. 
 
 (c) If the marriage is concluded, this woman ranks high when it comes 
to the ranking of wives and she is known as "umfati wekukhiwa" or 
"umfati lowakhiwa". 
(3)  
 (a) When the woman's father makes the approach, he selects in the 
manner contemplated in section 205, the man of his choice and 
offers his daughter in marriage. 
 
 (b) Marriage negotiations then proceed, except that inkhomo yekucela 
must not be delivered to the woman's family. 
 
 (c) This woman must rank first in the hierarchy of wives and is known 
as umfati lowendziswa or umfati wekwendziswa (an arranged 
marriage). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
UMTSIMBA (THE MARRIAGE CEREMONY) 
 
 
Part 1:  Kulungisa umhlambiso (the assembly of bridal goods) 
 
 
Inkhomo yemgano (a beast which must be paid by the woman’s family) 
 
(1) Inkhomo yemgano must be given by the bride to her in-laws as a sign of 
her acceptance of joining the marital family. 
 
(2) The beast must be delivered on the wedding day but, if it is not available, 
it may be delivered on a later day. 
 
(3) Once the umtsimba ceremony is over and the umtsimba has departed, the 
lusendvo meets at a later date after which the umgano beast is 
slaughtered. 
 
(4) The only people permitted to eat the meat of the slaughtered beast are the 
members of the man’s family, including daughters’ in-law (bomakoti) 
whose tinkhomo temgano have been delivered. 
 
(5) The new bride and other daughters in-law (bomakoti) who have not 
delivered tinkhomo temgano may not be included in the feast. 
 
 
Sidvwaba (skin skirt) 
 
A skirt made of processed cowhide sidvwaba (skin skirt), which is worn by 
married women, is presented to the bride by her family. 
 
 
Sigeja (a shawl made out of cattle tails) 
 
(1) A shawl made of cattle tails (emashoba) is worn by royalty. 
 
(2) Not every bride may wear sigeja. 
 
(3) Even a bride from a senior house may not wear sigeja. 
 
 
 
 
 293
Umtfwalo wamakoti 
 
(1) Umtfwalo wamakoti includes siphuku that the bride must use for the 
duration of the ceremony. 
 
(2) The bride’s younger sister carries a sleeping mat rolled together with 
siphuku (umtfwalo) and a wooden pillow (sicamelo) tied onto it. 
 
 
Umhlambiso (gifts that the bride presents to various members of her in-
laws) 
 
(1) The choice of those to receive umhlambiso is left to the groom’s family, 
who must communicate this in advance to the bride’s family. 
 
(2) Subject to variations depending on individual families, the people who 
must receive umhlambiso include the following: 
 
(a) the groom’s grandparents and parents; 
 
(b) heads of certain houses within the lusendvo; 
 
(c) wives of the heads, their first-born and last-born children; 
 
(d) umyeni (the leader of the party bringing emalobolo); 
 
(e) umntfwana welibovu, gozolo; and 
 
(f) the groom (umkhwenyana). 
 
(3) Umhlabiso goods comprise general domestic wares in the form of 
emacansi (sleeping mats), titsebe (grass mats), tindziwo (clay pots), 
tikhetfo (tranditional sieves), emahluto (strainers), imigcwembe (wooden 
meat platters), titja (dishes) and imitsanyelo (brooms). 
 
 
Part 2:  Ludvwendvwe/umtsimba (the bridal party) 
 
 
Roles within umtsimba 
 
(1) 
(a) The wedding ceremony is a communal activity and the various 
persons play important roles within umtsimba. 
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(b) Umphakatsi (representatives of Sikhulu) represent Sikhulu of the 
bride’s in-laws. 
 
(c) The Sikhulu must send a umgijimi (a messenger) to represent him. 
 
(d) Umgijimi’s role is that of an independent witness. 
 
(e) Umgijimi must ensure that important ceremonies are performed and 
may be called in case disputes arise later on in the marriage. 
(2) 
(a) Umphatsi-mtsimba (the leader of the bridal party) is a respectable 
elderly man who is not a relative (longesiso sihlobo). He must be 
chosen by the father of the bride to be the leader of umtsimba and 
his spokesperson. 
 
(b) The parents of the bride may not accompany their daughter or be 
part of umtsimba. 
(3) 
(a) Bomake bekudlalisela accompany the bride on behalf of her 
mother. 
  
(b) Their duties during the ceremony include dressing the bride, taking 
care of the bridal goods and ensuring proper behaviour by the 
maidens. 
 
(c) They also play a significant role during discussions with the 
groom’s family and when the bride is being told about marriage 
etiquette (ayalwa). 
(4)  
(a) Emajaha are young men, including the brothers of the bride, who 
form part of the dancing party and who will assist in different tasks 
that are undertaken, such as slaughtering of beasts. 
 
(b) Emajaha, particularly the bride’s brothers, have a specific role in 
the kugiyela dzadzewabo (special dance for their sister). 
(5) 
(a) Tintfombi are ladies who include the bride’s sisters, comprising 
three groups: emachikiza, ematjitji and tingcugce. 
 
(b) Collectively, they are the main bridal dancing party. 
 
(c) Tintfombi must assist the bride with amekeza (the singing of bridal 
songs) and must carry umhlambiso and other bridal goods. 
 
(6) Tingcugce are older than tintfombi and are ready for marriage, or may 
even be newly wedded women, who must stay with the bride all the time 
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assisting her in performing all activities. They are accompanied by 
tintfombi. 
 
 
 
 
Part 3: Kuphuma kwemtsimba (the departure of the bridal party) 
 
 
Departure and associated rituals 
 
(1) The bridal party departs early in the evening because it must arrive at 
night at the prospective in-law’s homestead. 
 
(2) Before the departure, certain rituals must be performed by the bride’s 
father. 
 
(3) The bride’s father must slaughter a goat or a cow from which a bile sac 
(inyongo) must be placed on the bride’s forehead to show she has 
departed from her parents. 
 
(4) The bride and lusendvo must enter the main house (kagogo) where she 
must be counselled by the elders to be a good ambassador, in the place 
where she is headed. 
 
(5) The group then proceeds to the kraal (esibayeni), where the bride is made 
to bath, and must then be dressed in her traditional gear (avunule). 
 
(6) The bride must be led to the entrance (esangweni) where her father or 
brother must pin a feather (lusiba) onto her. 
 
(7) The bridal party must then depart singing “incangosi”, following each other 
in a straight line (ludvwendvwe). 
 
(8) On arrival, umtsimba must sing and dance “sicela inkhonto”. 
 
(9) The bride and tingcugce must then proceed to where the in-laws are 
assembled. 
 
(10) This may be outside (emagumeni) or inside (kagogo). 
 
(11) The bride must enter with beads around her neck and must then ask for 
acceptance (ngitocela inkhonto). 
 
(12) The groom’s father’s sister must reply “Who sent you?” 
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(13) The bride must respond: “My father sent me”, calling him by name. 
 
(14) The groom’s family must inform her that she is accepted and thank her 
(siyabonga). 
 
(15) The bride and tingcugce must proceed to join umtsimba and dance until 
they are led into their hut. 
 
(16) A young girl must fetch them, carrying a sleeping mat on her head and 
lead them to their hut. 
 
(17) Early in the morning umtsimba leaves the hut and proceeds to the nearest 
river, where a goat or beast given to them by the man’s family, known as 
sahhukulu, must be slaughtered. 
 
(18) The party spends time at the river preparing themselves for the day. 
 
 
Part 4: Kugidza (marriage ceremony) 
 
 
Ritual of the marriage ceremony 
 
(1) Kugidza comprises the activities on the second day. 
 
(2) The groom’s family summons the bridal party from the river and they are 
invited to come back to the homestead. 
 
(3) The group to proceed first consist of tintfombi, tincugce, emajaha, and 
make wekudlalisela. 
 
(4) Make wekudlalisela dodges the men at the kraal gate and ululates inside 
the kraal. 
 
(5) One of emajaha (an adult man) must then sing the praises of the bride’s 
father, the bride and others. 
 
(6) Afterwards they return to fetch the rest of the umtsimba. 
 
(7) They must leave imvulalisango, which started as beads (buhlalu) or 
ludziwo, umgcwembe, becoming money much later. 
 
(8) After that the dancing must start. 
 
(9) A number of specific dances must be performed, including sigiyo which is 
a special dance where the bride dances with her sisters and brothers. 
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(10) During this period the beast which must be paid by the bride’s people 
(inkhomo yekugana) must be shown to the man’s family. 
 
(11) The bride must drive the beast into the cattle kraal with the assistance of 
emajaha. 
 
(12) If, on the other hand, the bridal party did not bring the beast with them, the 
bride must place cattle dung as an indication that ugana ngenkhomo. 
 
(13) At intervals during the dancing, the bride must rest on a mat made of dry 
grasses sewn together (likhenya), which is made for that specific purpose 
and must be burned afterwards. 
 
(14) After the dancing, the members of the bridal party proceed to their hut and 
spend the second night there. 
 
(15) The groom might invite the bride to spend the night with him. 
 
(16) One girl in the bridal party must accompany her in order to identify the hut 
in case the bride is needed. 
 
 
Part 5:  Kuteka/kumekeza (smearing of the bride) 
 
 
Smearing 
 
(1) Early in the morning of the third day, the sisters of the groom must call out 
to the bride “phuma (the bride’s name) sesikutekile” and proceed with her 
to sibaya. 
 
(2) Once inside, the bride is required to cry with a sharp voice (kumekeza) 
until dawn. 
 
(3) The bride’s sisters must assist her until her brothers come and take her 
out. 
 
(4) The bride’s brothers must not come peacefully, but must exhibit anger 
towards her in-laws. 
 
(5) They beat and kick everything in their path and take the bride back to 
umtsimba (river) 
 
(6) The bride’s in-laws must follow them later to the river with a pot of brew 
ludziwo, to thank the bride for kumekeza. 
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Part 6:  Kuhlambisa (bridal goods) 
 
 
Exchanging gifts 
 
(1) On this occasion, the bride must give gifts to certain members of her 
marital family. 
 
(2) Imvulalisango is a small gift preceding umhlambiso placed at the kraal 
gate and comprises a clay pot and a sieve (ludziwo nesikhetfo). 
 
(3) To start with, the bride must give gifts to the ancestors. 
 
(4) These gifts must be left at the kraal gate (enshungushwini) and comprise 
a clay pot and sleeping mat (imbita nelicansi). 
 
(5) Thereafter, the gifts must be given to people in order of seniority, starting 
with the fathers of the bride and groom and the fathers’ brothers, the 
mothers-in-law, starting with the groom’s mother, siblings of the groom, 
umyeni and gozolo. 
 
(6) The last person to receive umhlambiso is the umkhwenyana (the groom). 
 
(7) Kuhasa is the distribution of the remainder of the wedding gifts which must 
be given to the mother-in-law to distribute as she wishes. 
 
(8) Kuhlanjiswa, that is being a recipient of these gifts, is a legal right which 
attaches to a person because of the order of his or her birth. 
 
(9) The rule is that kuhlanjiswa attaches to the first- and last-born siblings of 
the groom in all the households. 
 
(10) After kuhlambisa is over and the bridal party are in their hut, tintfombi must 
go out to fetch wood (lubandze) and bring it back to the in-laws. 
 
 
Part 7:  Kugcotjiswa kwelibovu (smearing with red ochre) 
 
 
Smearing with red ochre as an essential element for a valid marriage 
 
(1) The smearing of the bride with red ochre (libovu) sanctifies a marriage. 
 
(2) A woman may be smeared with libovu only once in her lifetime. 
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(3) If she remarries, she is smeared with animal fat (liphehla) instead of 
libovu. 
 
(4) Immediately after umhlambiso, an old woman from the groom’s family 
must lead makoti to the kraal. 
 
(5) This woman must make the bride sit on a small mat (sihlantsi) and smear 
the bride with libovu from head to toe. 
 
(6) During this process, she is expected to cry. 
 
(7) She is then given a small child, umntfwana welibovu, whom she in turn 
must smear with animal fat (liphehla). 
 
(8) She must also give the bride umhlambiso. 
 
(9) This is the child whom the new bride may send around on errands. 
 
(10) After this, the old woman and other women of the family must counsel the 
new bride. 
 
(11) The bride, with the child in hand, must run away and a cow is offered to 
get her back. 
 
(12) This cow is called either insulamnyembeti or inkhomo yelibovu. 
 
(13) The cow belongs to the bride’s mother and must either be given to 
umtsimba to take it back with them, or must be delivered with the rest of 
emalobolo. 
 
(14) If the bride is smeared with red ochre and no libovu cow or emalobolo is 
delivered and she falls in love with another man, that man may marry and 
deliver emalobolo for her because there was no complete agreement in 
the previous encounter. 
 
(15) Before the bridal party departs, both families must hold general 
discussions. 
 
(16) At this stage, umphatsi mtsimba must formally present the bride to her in-
laws, and thank them for the hospitality accorded to the bridal party. 
 
(17) Bomake bekudlalisela must inform the in-laws of any ailments that the 
bride may have. 
 
(18) The groom’s family must be given a stick with lines indicating the number 
of emalobolo (lukhalo). 
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(19) A date for the delivery of emalobolo must be announced at that stage. 
 
(20) A woman may be smeared with libovu while on a visit to the groom’s 
home. 
 
(21) Although this is in breach of marriage procedure, it does not vitiate a 
marriage if the girl consented to it. 
 
(22) The groom’s family is required to pay a beast to her family to atone for 
their having smeared her with libovu prior to her becoming their wife. 
 
 
Part 8:  Emalobolo (marriage consideration) 
 
 
Significance of emalobolo 
 
(1) Emalobolo is one of the main elements for the conclusion of a valid 
marriage. 
 
(2) The process and ceremony of delivery of emalobolo forms part of the 
whole process of marriage negotiations which initiate the creation of a 
marriage between two families (kuhlanganisa bukhoti). 
 
(3) Emalobolo strengthens the relations between the family of the bride and 
that of the bridegroom (kuhlanganisa bukhoti). 
(4)  
(a) By means of emalobolo, guardianship of the children born of the 
marriage vests in the father’s family. 
 
(b) If a child is born without emalobolo having been delivered, or 
agreed on, the child belongs to the family of the mother. 
 
 
Time of delivery of emalobolo 
 
(1) No time is prescribed for the delivery of emalobolo. 
 
(2) Negotiations for the delivery of emalobolo start on the day the man’s 
family comes to the woman’s family to ask for her hand in marriage 
(batomcela). 
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(3) Emalobolo must be delivered immediately after the marriage ceremony 
(kugidvwa kwemtsimba), in accordance with the maxim: ‘kulotjolwa umfati’ 
(you deliver emalobolo only for a wife): provided that the families may 
agree that the delivery of emalobolo may be made at a future date. 
 
(4) If the delivery of emalobolo is not effected as a result of the agreement 
between the families, the outstanding emalobolo becomes a debt against 
the groom’s family. 
 
(5) Non-delivery of the full emalobolo does not affect the validity of the 
marriage. 
 
 
Number of emalobolo 
 
(1) The number of beasts required for emalobolo is prescribed by the parents 
of the woman when the prospective groom’s family request her (kumcela). 
 
(2) The number of beasts depends on variables relating to the status and rank 
the woman holds in society and within the family. 
 
(3) The ranking observed when prescribing the number of cattle to be 
delivered for emalobolo, is as follows, if the woman is a daughter of: 
 
(a) a King, not fewer than 50 beasts; 
 
(b) a Prince, not fewer than 30 beasts; 
 
(c) a Sikhulu, not fewer than 20 beasts; or 
 
(d) an ordinary person, not fewer than 15 beasts. 
 
 
(4) The first-born daughter (inkhosatana) and the last-born daughter (litfumbu 
lentfombatana) are also ranked higher, and more emalobolo must be 
rendered for them than for the other daughters of the family. 
(5)  
(a) In addition to the prescribed number of emalobolo contemplated in 
subsection (3), the groom’s family must deliver lugege and 
insulamnyembeti beasts. 
 
(b) Such beasts must be delivered irrespective of whether or not there 
is an agreement regarding the delivery of emalobolo at a future 
date. 
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(6)  
(a) The insulamnyembeti beasts, which are also known as inkhomo 
yelibovu or inkhomo yeluhlanga, must be delivered by the groom’s 
family to the mother of the bride to acknowledge her contribution to 
the upbringing of the bride. 
 
(b) The insulamnyembeti beast forms a part of the estate of the bride’s 
mother. 
 
 
Source of emalobolo 
 
(1)  
(a) A father must provide emalobolo to each son for his first wife. 
 
(b) If the father dies, the obligation falls upon his successor. 
 
(c) The father of the groom may refuse to provide such cattle. 
(2)  
(a) Cattle for the wife of a son may be taken from cattle obtained from 
the marriage of the daughters of that house. 
 
(b) If a younger brother borrows cattle from his house to provide 
emalobolo for his wife, he is required to return these cattle when he 
receives emalobolo for his eldest daughter. 
(3)  
(a) Because the delivery of emalobolo may be deferred in terms of 
section 219(4), it may be promised in respect of cattle not yet 
received as emalobolo of a daughter who is yet to be married. 
 
(b) A mother may provide emalobolo for one of her sons, using the 
increase of her insulamnyembeti beasts. 
 
(c) This becomes a debt in the estate of the mother which the son 
must repay even if the mother is deceased. 
 
(d) If the mother dies, the debt must be paid to the last-born son. 
 
 
Distribution of emalobolo 
 
(1) Emalobolo received from the marriage of the eldest daughter of each 
house must accrue to the estate of indlunkhulu. 
 
(2) Emalobolo received from the marriage of subsequent daughters of each 
house must accrue to their respective mothers’ houses. 
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Return of emalobolo 
 
(1) Emalobolo may be returned in exceptional circumstances that include: 
 
(a) the instance where the wife dies without bearing children and her 
parents do not send someone in her place in terms of section 234; 
and 
 
(b) the instance where the woman leaves her marital home (kwemuka), 
and, when confronted, refuses to return to her husband, referred to 
in section 246. 
 
(2) The maxim is:  ukhiphe tinkhomo emlonyeni weyise (she has taken the 
cattle out of her father’s mouth). 
 
(3) The exact number of cattle paid as emalobolo must be returned even if the 
cattle have multiplied over the years: tinkhomo temabheka atitali. 
 
 
Part 9:  Bayeni (The groom’s party) 
 
 
Assembling emalobolo 
 
(1) A few days after the marriage ceremony, the groom’s father, with the 
assistance of his relatives, must assemble emalobolo and designate a 
man (umyeni) to take emalobolo into his care and to present them at the 
bride’s homestead. 
 
(2) On a date previously agreed upon by both families, a small party 
accompanying them must carry umyeni’s luggage. 
 
 
Arrival at bride’s homestead 
 
(1)  
(a) Bayeni must arrive at the bride’s homestead after sunset. 
 
(b) On arrival at the bride’s kraal, the umyeni shout: “Siyalobola gogo” 
(“we have come to deliver emalobolo grandmother”) 
 
(c) While he is shouting, the small boys of the homestead may throw 
stones at the group in jest, causing them to run away. 
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(d) After a lapse of a few minutes, umyeni and his party return to the 
homestead and shout: “siyalobola gogo!” 
 
(e) Umyeni and his party must then mention the number of cows. This 
includes lugege and insulamnyembeti beasts. 
 
(f) Thereafter, a young maiden must come out to take umyeni’s 
luggage and lead the party to a hut prepared for the party. 
(2)  
(a) Once inside the hut, the umyeni must not sit down until the 
members of the bride’s family have provided him with a mate 
(licansa) to sit on. 
 
(b) At this stage gozolo must engage in the process referred to as 
kuhlamahlama (moving from one place to another within a 
homestead). 
 
(c) Gozolo must go into all the huts in the homestead to look for food 
for bayeni. 
 
(d) Gozolo may take whatever he likes in the form of food for bayeni:  
in most instances, the bride’s people would have already prepared 
food and a goat for bayeni to slaughter. 
 
 
Announcement of the bayeni 
 
(1)  
(a) On the morning of the next day, the head of the family must inform 
all the relatives that the bayeni have arrived. 
 
(b) The relatives must gather in the hut of the bayeni and meet them. 
 
(c) Greetings must be exchanged and the manner of greeting must be 
”sanibonani bayeni” by each member of the bride’s family, 
whereupon the whole party of bayeni must respond in the following 
manner: “size sazi”. 
(2)  
(a) After this exchange of greetings, the umyeni must inform the bride’s 
family about the purpose of their visit, being the delivery of 
emalobolo. 
 
(b) The bride’s family and the bayeni must proceed to the cattle kraal 
to inspect amalobolo. 
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(c) As a sign of acceptance of emalobolo, the bride’s father must give 
the umyeni a beast, referred to as sidvudvu semyeni or inhlabisa-
bayeni, which must be slaughtered. 
 
(d) The giving of this beast to bayeni signifies that the ownership of 
emalobolo has passed to the bride’s family. 
 
(3) The elderly members of both parties must then retire endlini kagogo where 
snuff is shared, signifying the cementing of relationships between the 
bride and the groom’s family. 
 
 
Slaughter of beasts 
 
(1)  
(a) The Inhlabisa-bayeni and lugege beasts must be slaughtered. 
 
(b) The lugege beast must be slaughtered as an essential element 
for the marriage, which marks the conclusion of the agreement 
between the parties. 
 
(c) Inhlabisa-bayeni and lugege beasts must be stabbed by the 
gozolo using the spear that was used for killing umtsimba beast 
(indlakudla) and also used by the bride during kumekeza. 
 
(d) When the gozolo stabs lugege beast, it should bellow, otherwise 
it is believed that its failure to do so indicates that the ancestors 
are not pleased about the marriage. 
 
(e) When the lugege beast is stabbed, the two parties must fight for 
its first blood. 
 
(f) The first blood must be taken to the bride to lick. 
 
(g) This ritual is a game that has no legal significance. 
(2)  
(a) All the girls who have accompanied the bride to umtsimba 
ceremony must stand next to the sibaya (kraal). 
 
(b) The bride must in the meanwhile be standing inside her 
grandmother’s hut, holding on to the pillar and standing with her 
feet crossed, which is supposed to prevent the beast from dying 
quickly. 
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(c) The girls at esibayeni must clap their hands, singing and 
cheering, singing the following:  “ayilale phansi inkhomo 
yadzadze” (let our sister’s beast lie down). 
 
(d) When the beast lies down, they must say “ayivuke inkhomo 
yadzadze” (let our sister’s beast not die). 
 
(e) The beast should not die until the bride has released her hold of 
the pillar and sat down: if the animal dies quickly, it is a bad 
omen, because it is likely that the bride will die quickly too. 
 
 
Skinning of the beasts 
 
(1) While inhlabisabayeni is being skinned, the woman who was Sikhulu 
woman to dlalisela umtsimba must stand by with a stick on to which the 
skinners must put small pieces of meat from time to time. 
 
(2) The lugege beast must be skinned and none of the meat must be 
apportioned. 
 
(3) Inhlabisabayeni is divided into the customary portions as when a beast is 
slaughtered. 
 
(4) The lugege beast must then be lifted by both the bayeni and the members 
of the bride’s family in its skin to the hut. 
 
(5) While they are doing so, the parties must play tug of war with the carcass. 
 
(6) This is accompanied by a rhyme in which a leader shouts: “yesibali”; the 
group must enjoin: “sibambu- mkhwenyewethu lolugege lugege”. 
 
(7) For variety, the leader may even shout the name of the groom. 
 
(8) Eventually the carcass must be taken inside the hut of the bayeni. 
 
Cooking and eating of beasts 
 
(1) Early the next morning, the two beasts must be properly cut up in 
preparation for cooking. 
 
(2) Several meat portions from the lugege carcass and the inhlabisabayeni 
carcass must be exchanged between the parties. 
 
(3) The exchange of portions must be done in such a manner that each party 
obtains a whole beast to signify the further cementing of relations. 
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(4) Certain portions of meat are important and the exchange of these meat 
portions is significant because they are eaten by particular persons within 
the families. 
 
 
(5) The meat portions are as follows: 
 
(a) the stomach (sisu) of the beasts are exchanged; 
 
(b) the heads of the beasts are exchanged; 
 
(c) a leg of one beast is exchanged for a leg of the other; 
 
(d) siluba of lugege beast, which is a meat portion from the breast of 
lugege beast; 
 
(e) umganga of lugege beast is cooked and given to the groom to eat, 
sharing it with his balamu, that is sisters-in-law; 
 
(f) meat from the sides (imihlubulo/tinhlangotsi) of each of the beasts 
is exchanged; 
 
(g) one “arm” portion of inhlabisabayeni meat is given to the bride to 
eat, since she may not participate in the eating of lugege meat; 
 
(h) emasondvo (hooves) of the beasts are exchanged; 
 
(i) umsasane is given to the bride’s grandmother as well as children 
who have not reached maturity to eat – it may also be given to the 
woman who ate umsasane wemtsimba to cook and eat with the 
children; 
 
(j) the umsila (tail), to be cooked and given to the bride’s brothers to 
eat; 
 
(k) sibumbu, a meat portion from the leg of lugege beast; 
 
(l) meat stuffed into an intestine of a beast on bayeni day (luhlanga 
lwabomake) is made up of pieces of meat stuffed into one intestine 
of inhlabisabayeni beast; 
 
(m) inhlukuhla is the portion of umyeni from the lugege beast (it is from 
the pelvis), the meat of which is scraped off the bone, and the bone 
is known as galo; 
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(n) galo is the pelvic bone from umyeni’s meat portion inhlukuhla, it is 
cooked and taken out by make wekudlalisela ululating:  “alilitele”, 
for which young boys fight each other to retain it; 
 
(o) the intestines are exchanged for a full set that has not been cut; 
and 
 
(p) tinhlangotsi are not eaten, but dried; when umtsimba has departed, 
the groom eats these with his balamu, if he has not been given an 
inhlanti. 
 
 
Part 10:  Kungcingcisa inyongo (a game on bayeni day) 
 
 
Game between young girls on bayeni day 
 
(1) A game must be played between the young girls of the bayeni party and 
the young girls of the bride’s family. 
 
(2) A bile sac (inyongo) must be placed in a small container and delivered by 
the girls of the woman’s family to the bayeni hut. 
 
(3) Upon receiving the bile sac, the girls of the bayeni party must take it back 
to the bride’s family hut and, in so doing, pretend to throw it at them. 
 
(4) This turns into a running contest between the girls of the two groups, each 
snatching the bile sac to throw it at the doorsteps of the other’s hut. 
 
(5) The game must continue until the bile sac ends up with the bride’s family, 
who must return it to the groom’s hut so that the sprinkling ceremony may 
be performed. 
 
 
 
Part 11: Kujojotela inyongo (to sprinkle bile juice on each spouse) 
 
 
Sprinkling of bile juice 
 
(1) Bile juice from lugege beast must be sprinkled on each spouse by the 
other as an exchange of marriage vows. 
 
(2) Thereafter, the whole bile sac must be prepared by the gozolo and made 
ready to be worn. 
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(3) The bayeni must then request a subsidiary wife (inhlanti) from the bride’s 
family. 
 
(4) If present, the inhlanti will be the one who will wear inyongo on the left 
wrist. 
 
 
 
Part 12:  Inhlanti (subsidiary wife) 
 
 
Selection and purpose of inhlanti 
 
(1) Measures must be put into place to pre-empt the occurrence of events 
which may eventually lead to dissolution of a marriage, on account of the 
barrenness of the wife or her death. 
 
(2) As referred to in section 231(3), the wife’s family must identify a potential 
inhlanti who is usually his wife’s younger sister or a paternal niece. 
 
(3) The inhlanti so identified may also be the wife’s younger brother or a 
paternal nephew. 
 
 
Inhlanti in the case of barrenness 
 
(1) An inhlanti is provided to fulfill the function of procreation, if a wife proves 
unable to bear children. 
 
(2) The inhlanti does not influence the status of the barren woman as a wife. 
 
(3) Any children the inhlanti bears are presumed to be the wife’s. 
 
 
Inhlanti in the case of death 
 
(1) The death of one of the spouses does not terminate a marriage. 
 
(2) If the woman predeceases her husband, an inhlanti must be provided to 
levirate that woman and occupy the position of wife to the widower and 
mother to any children of the deceased woman. 
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Part 13:  Kuyadliwa (feasting) 
 
 
Ritual of feasting 
 
(1) During the other proceedings of the day, a big feast is prepared and food 
is consumed well throughout the day. 
 
(2) In-laws do not eat in each other’s presence. 
 
(3) The groom’s and bride’s families must eat at separate intervals. 
 
(4) The bayeni must move out of the bride’s homestead when the galo bone 
is served. 
 
(5) The bayeni must remain outside the bride’s homestead while the bride’s 
family eats. 
 
(6) When the bride’s family have finished eating, the bayeni must be called in 
to eat. 
 
(7) At some point during the feasting, the groom must invite and share with 
his sisters-in-law the umganga meat. 
 
 
Part 14:  Kuyavaleliswa (official farewell) 
 
 
End of the ceremony 
 
(1) To mark the end of this ceremony, the parties must gather at endlini 
kagogo, and a pot of beer must be shared while they sing a song: 
“yokuvalelisa umuntu ohambayo” (bidding farewell to the one who is 
leaving). 
 
(2) Thereafter, the bayeni must depart. 
 
 
Part 15:  The legal requirements of a marriage 
 
 
Essential elements for a valid marriage 
 
A marriage will not be valid unless it fulfills the requirements set out below.   
 
(a) The bride must be smeared with libovu. 
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(b) Emalobolo must be negotiated. 
 
(c) The lugege beast must be slaughtered. 
 
(d) The insulamnyembeti beast must be delivered. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONSEQUENCE OF MARRIAGE 
 
 
Legal consequences of marriage 
 
(1) A new and separate household is established, which in the course of time, 
together with related households, develops (through the husband) into a 
homestead. 
(2)  
(a) The rights of the bride’s family in respect of guardianship over her 
are transferred to the husband and his family. 
 
(b) Children born of the marriage fall under the guardianship of their 
father and his family. 
 
(c) In her own house, the wife enjoys a considerable degree of 
independence, subject to her consulting with her husband on 
important matters. 
 
(d) The husband, who represents his household in external matters, is 
also responsible for order and discipline within his household, as 
well as for its needs and interests. 
 
(e) The marital power of a husband does not include the right to 
administer corporal punishment to his wife. 
 
(3) The marital union results in the establishment of an independent estate. 
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Personal consequences 
 
(1) Each wife in a polygynous marital relationship must occupy a particular 
rank within the greater composite homestead. 
 
(2) The rank of a wife influences her status, her relationship with her 
husband’s other houses and her children’s rights of succession. 
 
 
Relationship between husband and wife 
 
(1) The man and woman must live together as husband and wife. 
 
 
(2)  
(a) The wife must live wherever her husband establishes a household 
at the time of the marriage. 
 
(b) Each wife is entitled to a separate house (indlu) in the homestead. 
 
(c) A husband and wife must fulfill the duty of mutual support. 
(3)  
(a) A husband and wife must afford each other conjugal rights. 
 
(b) The husband must initiate sexual intercourse. 
 
(4) A husband and wife must fulfill the duty to procreate a family. 
 
(5) A husband and wife must share in the duty to care for their household. 
(6)  
(a) A wife must be under the guardianship of her husband, provided 
that the husband has no right to administer corporal punishment to 
her. 
 
(b) If the husband persists in administering corporal punishment to his 
wife, she may report him to the family council (lusendvo) or to the 
leader of the party bringing emalobolo (umyeni), who must resolve 
the issue. 
 
(c) If the husband’s family fails to prevent him from administering 
corporal punishment, the wife may escape to her parental home or 
to any relative’s home (kwemuka). 
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Patrimonial consequences 
 
(1)  
(a) Marriage creates a separate household with its own household 
property which is shared by all members of that household. 
 
(2) One house may not be enriched at the expense of another house. 
 
(3) The transfer of property between houses must be reasonable and for a 
just cause, including the following: 
 
(a) if a house has to repay a particular debt and does not have the 
necessary property to do so; or 
 
(b) if the cattle of one house are used as emalobolo for a son from 
another house. 
 
(4) The transfer of property from one house to another results in a debt which 
must be repaid. 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 
 
 
Part 1:  Death 
 
 
Death does not dissolve a marriage 
 
(1) The death of one or both of the spouses will not terminate a marriage 
relationship:  akuqatjanwa ngekufa (the families’ relationship will not be 
extinguished just because one of the spouses has passed away). 
 
(2) When the husband dies, his wife must remain with her in-laws who must 
take care of her 
(3)  
(a) After the mourning period has elapsed, the widow’s marital family 
must settle the issue of whether kungena custom must be invoked. 
 
(b) Kungena applies when a relative of the deceased, usually a 
younger brother or a male relative (cousin) of the deceased, is 
chosen to cohabit with the widow. 
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(c) The consent of the widow must be sought for entering into kungena 
custom, as well as the identity of the man chosen for her. 
 
(d) The widow may refuse to engage in such a relationship with any of 
the suitors. 
 
(e) Despite her refusal, she remains part of the family. 
 
(f) If the widow allows the man to engage in sexual relations with her, 
any children born to the wife as a result of this relationship belong 
to the deceased, and not to the umngeni. 
 
(g) The man receives a beast (inkhomo yemadvolo) for his exertions 
on behalf of the deceased, such as cattle having been received for 
any of the widow’s married daughters. 
 
(4) 
(a) In the event of the death of a wife, the relationship between the 
families of the spouses continues to exist. 
 
(b) An inhlanti may be provided for the widower by the wife’s family. 
 
(c) Emalobolo of five cows must be delivered for an inhlanti. 
 
(d) If the widower has made a private arrangement with an inhlanti, he 
must deliver full emalobolo for her. 
 
 
Part 2:  Separation 
 
Kuphinga (adultery) 
 
(1) Adultery (kuphinga) is committed when a married woman has sexual 
intercourse with a man other than her spouse or by a married man when he 
has sexual intercourse with a married woman other than his wife, referred to 
in section 98. 
(2)  
(a) Where the woman is accused of committing adultery, it must be 
proved. 
 
(b) An inquiry may be conducted by the lusendvo. 
 
(c) If found guilty of adultery, the woman may be sent back to her 
parental home. 
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(d) The woman’s parents must send her back, requesting an 
explanation of why she was sent back to them. 
(3)  
(a) The matter of adultery may be reported to amphakatsi who, upon 
inquiry, must cause the man who committed adultery with the 
woman, to pay a fine. 
 
(b) The fine, referred to as siti, may amount to about five beasts. 
 
(c) A further two beasts must be paid by the father of the woman to her 
in-laws as a fine to cleanse the misdeed (tinkhomo tekugeza 
emacansi). 
 
 
Kutsakatsa (witchcraft) 
 
(1) Kutsakatsa involves the actual or suspected practice of sorcery by a wife. 
 
(2) Where a wife is accused of witchcraft, the family may decide to approach 
traditional diviners who must conduct a kunuka (witch hunt). 
 
(3) A meeting of the two families must be convened and the wife’s family may 
call for a second opinion. 
 
(4) If a diviner chosen by the wife’s family again identifies the wife as the 
sorceress, she may be sent back to her parental home. 
 
(5) If it is confirmed that the wife is guilty of witchcraft, the family members must 
send her back to her parental family. 
 
(6) If the wife returns to her in-laws, she must not be attached to the main 
homestead; her new house must be built at some distance from the main 
homestead. 
 
 
Refusal of conjugal rights 
 
(1) Both spouses must afford each other reasonable sexual privileges. 
 
(2) Refusal to render conjugal rights by either spouse will not lead to 
separation. 
 
(3) A wife may refuse conjugal rights to her husband on reasonable grounds 
including the following: 
 
(a) the wife is in an advanced stage of pregnancy; 
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(b) the wife is menstruating; 
 
(c) the wife is in mourning; or 
 
(d) the wife has given birth within six months. 
 
 
Kwemuka (desertion) 
 
(1) Kwemuka occurs when the husband leaves the household with no intention 
of returning, or where the wife returns to her father’s home with no intention 
of returning to her husband’s home. 
 
(2) Desertion does not end the marriage relationship. 
 
(3) Spouses may return at any time they choose. 
 
(4)  
(a) The woman may return to mourn her husband. 
 
(b) This may happen despite the fact that she has in the meantime 
engaged in sexual relations with other men and children were born 
of such relationships. 
 
(c) The woman must be fetched back together with any children she 
may have had subsequently. 
 
(d) Such children belong to the husband’s family, even if biologically 
they belong elsewhere: ubashayele tinyoni. 
 
(5) A woman’s body may be returned to be buried at her marital home. 
 
 

